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Abstract 
Power networks connecting demand and generation are an essential component of a competitive 
market in the electricity sector, with cost reflective network access being critical for facilitating 
competition in generation and supply. In the current climate, where energy policy is being 
driven by the low-carbon agenda, market-based incentives to promote a sustainable power 
sector have resulted in over 20GW of new wind generation (both on and offshore) awaiting 
connection to the UK network. This development, along with increasing penetration of smaller 
scale generation in the distribution network is driving a radical change in the UK generation mix 
and the way the networks are used. 
This thesis begins by exploring the impact of these new generators on network access using an 
interdisciplinary approach to expose the fundamental economics of the new and existing system. 
In the new system network access requirements are altered by an increased generation capacity 
margin. Under these conditions, it is no longer economically efficient to invest in sufficient 
network capacity to accommodate simultaneous peaks from all generators. As such, the critical 
finding of this study is that conventional and non-conventional generation should share network 
capacity. 
Following this, a critical analysis of the existing technical, market and regulatory framework 
was conducted to evaluate whether it is capable of recognising these differences demonstrated 
in the new system. The evaluation found that although the current framework is appropriate for 
the incumbent system, it is a major barrier for the cost effective integration of non-conventional 
generation technologies in the operation and development of the network. 
Finally, the thesis presents and evaluates alternative options for the development of enduring 
transmission access arrangements for a future low-carbon system within the UK market 
environment, and explores a technical architecture to facilitate transmission network access for 
distributed generation and demand resources. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The role of the network in the modem power system is to transport power securely and 
efficiently from generators to demand customers; network design, operation and development is 
dictated by the requirements of these network users, their location, and their patterns of output 
or consumption. The existence of a network facilitates competition in generation and supply by 
allowing customers to access the cheapest generation resources regardless of their location in 
the system; in this context the concept of fair and cost reflective network access is fundamental 
to the development of efficient markets that create an environment in which all system users 
follow the same rules and are given an equal ability to compete. 
In the United Kingdom (UK), the power networks were shaped by economies of scale in power 
production which have concentrated generation technologies into a small number of large units 
generating in locations remote from demand centres. This required the development of an 
extensive national transmission network to deliver power to regional distribution networks; 
passive networks that distribute power to local consumers. Typically, the majority of generation 
capacity was connected at transmission level and, because consumer demand is treated as 
inflexible and unresponsive, this large scale plant is manipulated to follow load requirements 
and to provide system balancing and control. The design of the network has been devised in 
response to these factors, with the market and regulatory arrangements for network access (that 
guide network operation, investment and pricing) optimised to achieve efficient operation and 
optimal development of the networks for a system with large-scale conventional generation and 
passive demand. 
However, this conventional picture of the modern power system is on the edge of material 
change. Current UK energy policy, driven by the growing climate change agenda and the need 
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, is guiding the conventional power system towards 
ambitious goals for penetration of renewable generation. By 2010, 10% of all generation in the 
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UK should be from renewable sources, and by 2020 this target increases to 20% (DTI, 2007). 
The exact composition of the future sustainable system up to 2020 and beyond is uncertain. 
However, it is clear that this future will be materially different from the one we see today; one 
stimulated by the penetration of generation technologies of vastly differing scales, different 
operating characteristics and in new locations throughout the network. Under these conditions a 
new role may be created for demand participation and, crucially, changes may be required in the 
operation and development of the transmission and distribution networks to respond to the 
changing needs of these new system participants. 
There is a clear need to undertake analysis of the existing arrangements for network access, to 
establish whether they are capable of facilitating optimal operation and development of the 
network and providing cost reflective network access for the new system participants. If the 
current arrangements are no longer an accurate proxy by which the optimal operation and 
development of the network can be assured then there is the danger that cross-subsidy will 
emerge between users. This will negatively affect new generation (and emerging roles for 
demand) by restricting a competitive and fair environment. This, in turn, may slow penetration 
of these new technologies and prevent achievement of the targets for adoption of low-carbon 
generation technologies. 
This thesis addresses the challenge of providing network access for renewable and distributed 
generation, and highlights the pivotal role that network access must have to ensure optimal 
development of the new sustainable system. It undertakes an extensive analysis of the principles 
that have shaped the regulatory and market frameworks for network access to determine 
whether they still offer an efficient solution and fair, market based approach for the future 
sustainable energy system. The research identifies the main gaps in the current provision for 
access as it applies to non-conventional generation and develops a new framework for the 
creation of enduring access arrangements suitable for the future low-carbon power system. 
The following three sections identify the wider context for this work, before the research aims 
and methodology are developed in sections 1.5 and 1.6. 
1.2 Overview of the current network access arrangements 
Optimal network operation and development hinges on balancing the short term costs of 
operation (constraint costs, losses and unplanned outages) against the long term costs of 
investment in new capacity. Investment in system reinforcements is signalled when the marginal 
cost of operation exceeds the marginal cost of investment in new capacity, i.e. the operational 
14 
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costs such as constraints and losses become more expensive than building new capacity to 
relieve the local congestion'; the result is an optimally constrained network. Network operation 
costs will be driven by the requirements of the network users, namely generation and demand. 
When, where and how these network users access the network will impact on the extent of 
constraint costs and losses. 
In practice, comprehensive calculation of the reliability and cost-benefit assessments to 
determine optimal network development is simplified by network planners. In the UK this is 
undertaken using deterministic network planning standards. The standards present a proxy of 
the optimisation process for determining the amount of transmission capacity required to 
transport power across various system boundaries given a predefined set of generation and 
demand scenarios (based on the conventional system). Accurate determination of these 
scenarios is essential not only for optimal network development, but also to ensure that network 
access arrangements are cost reflective and signal to users the impact their activity has on the 
network. 
The UK network access arrangements are driven by the requirements of a competitive market^. 
The current voluntary trading approach and market for power under British Electricity Trading 
and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) sets the high level principles for network access in 
the UK. The value of power is determined by its location and time of use (Schweppe et al., 
1988), however, the wholesale electricity market allows trading of power separate from 
requirements for network access to deliver the contract. This approach separates energy and 
access, meaning that power can be bought and sold without consideration of network constraints 
(i.e. ignoring the location of both generation and demand). The wholesale price paid for 
electricity represents the value according to time of use (the short run marginal cost of 
generation), but not location. The locational element to value of electricity is correlated to the 
cost of resolving constraints on the network and to losses. Under the current arrangements the 
system operator resolves network constraints close to real time, and this cost (along with the 
cost of losses) is socialised across all network users proportional to the volumes they have 
^ There are clearly challenges in undertaking this optimisation considering the "lumpiness" of investment in new network 
capacity which prevents the incremental reinforcement of the network, but the principle of the optimisation still holds. 
^ Commercialisation of the power sector, and the introduction of market based competition began with the introduction 
of the Electricity Act in 1989 TSO (1989) Electricity Act. The Stationary Office. This set out the plan for unbundling of the 
vertically integrated and nationalised Central Electricity Generating Board and separation of its assets into a system 
operation function and privately owned generation operating through a competitive pool market. From this point, 
successive legislation TSO (1998) Competition Act. The Stationary Office, and regulatory change pursued the goal of 
increasing competitiveness, and market liberalisation which has resulted in the creation of fully open and competitive 
markets in generation and supply, and the creation of national and regional regulated monopolies in transmission and 
distribution. In 2000, the electricity markets were transformed from the compulsory Pool arrangements to a voluntary 
trading market, based around a wholesale market for electricity in England and Wales TSO (2000) Utilities Act. The 
Stationary Office, OFGEM (1999) The New Electricity Trading Arrangements. London, Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets., Subsequent legislation then created the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) 
and united the entire Great Britain (GB) system under a single market TSO (2004) The Energy Act 2004. The Stationary 
Office. 
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traded in the wholesale markets. There is no signal regarding the value of electricity derived 
from its location (the short run cost of network access) sent to users. 
In the transmission network, location specific signals on the cost of network access are made to 
reflect the long-run marginal costs (LRMC) of investment only. The distribution network 
currently has no universal charging methodology for reflecting the value of network access by 
location. 
To date, this approach of excluding location from the pricing of electricity and using network 
planning standards as a proxy for comprehensive reliability and cost-benefit assessments to 
guide network development has supported development of competitive markets. It has broadly 
promoted cost reflective treatment of network users in systems characterised by conventional 
technologies. However, the emerging low-carbon system is characterised by the penetration of 
technologies with significantly different operating characteristics which drive different impact 
on the network when compared to conventional generation. This presents new drivers for 
network development and operation, against which the current market structure and access 
arrangements may no longer be appropriate. In particular because the current approach sends no 
signals on the short run value of access or the importance of location, and treats users as 
conventional generating units through inflexible deterministic planning standards. 
1.3 Network access to facilitate competition 
Without recognition of the changing requirements of both generation and demand in the future 
sustainable energy system the current access arrangements cannot accurately represent the 
impact (both value and cost) of non-conventional generation and responsive demand. As well as 
leading to inefficient system development, this also prohibits competition as it fails to recognise 
the contribution that non-conventional users could make towards system development. Without 
appropriate access arrangements non-conventional generation and responsive demand are 
prevented from providing non-network solutions to traditional network operation problems 
(such as management of constraints, and mitigation of losses). Central to this appreciation of the 
value and impact of non-conventional users is recognition of the location and time of use of the 
system. 
Historically, renewable and distributed generators have not been well placed to participate fully 
in the conventional power markets and compete on the same level as conventional generation 
(Ofgem, 2001). The legacy of the existing inflexible transmission and passive distribution 
networks created for the incumbent conventional generators has meant that renewable and 
distributed generators operating alone rarely become profitable in the current power markets 
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(Patterson, 2004) and their contribution to network reliability and efficient operation is not well 
recognised (Levins et al., 2002). Attempts have been made to address these barriers to effective 
competition, specifically in the context of facilitating participation in the energy markets 
(DGCG, 2003, DGCG, 2004, Ofgem, 2003b, Ofgem and Dti, 2004) and in the amendment of 
the distribution network planning standards to recognise the contribution of distributed 
generation to security of supply for demand (Allan and Strbac, 2002, Allan et al., 2004). 
However, even with these improvements to the current regime, most generators (particularly 
distribution connected units) are still unable to compete with conventional generation on 
wholesale electricity price (DTI and Ofgem, 2007), and mechanisms are not yet in place to 
reward (distributed) generators for their contribution to network services. 
For new generation to succeed in this environment, a level playing field is required for all 
system participants, as is the need for recognition of the individual impact of each system 
participant according to their location and time of use of the network. The challenge for 
realising the value and calculating the impact of generation connected at different levels in the 
network is illustrated by the value chain from power generation to consumption, illustrated in 
Figure 1-1. 
Generation size & 
point of connection 
Energy market g 
network level 
Relative price of wholesale & 
retail electricity 
>1GW 
-100 MW 
-10 MW 
<1MW 
Wholesale 
energy market 
Transmission 
HV Distribution 
MV Distribution 
v > LV Distribution 
> ~2-3 p/kWh Wholesale 
electricity price 
> ~4-5p /kWh 
> -5 -8 p/kWh 
HV/MV 
Industrial 
^ consumer 
supply price 
Domestic 
• -8 -12 p/kWh consumer 
supply price 
Figure 1-1: Value chain for electricity from central generation to LV distribution 
The figure shows the price of electricity produced by centralised generation and sold in the 
wholesale markets to be around 2-3 p/kWh (the price of wholesale electricity). By the time 
electricity reaches the end consumer the relative "value" of electricity has increased, and the 
price, depending on the level in the network, is now 4-lOp/kWh (the retail price of electricity). 
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This increase in value of electricity up to the point of consumption is driven primarily by the 
added cost of network transmission and distribution services required to deliver power from 
centralised generators to customers elsewhere in the network. 
Distributed generation is located closer to the consumer and has fewer requirements for the 
transport services afforded by the transmission and distribution networks. In essence, distributed 
generation is delivering power direct to demand, power that should have an equivalent value of 
4-10 p/kWh, i.e. the costs avoided by not using the network. However, this network cost 
reduction, generated by the favourable location of some generators, is not fully recognised 
within the present commercial and regulatory framework. As a consequence, non-conventional 
generation invariably is competing with conventional generation in the wholesale markets at a 
price (2-3 p/kWh) that may be significantly lower than the true value of electricity delivered 
from a location close to demand (i.e. 4-lOp/kWh). The full value of generation in these terms 
will obviously be dependent on a number of factors, from time of use and location in the system 
to density of penetration of similar generation and timing of system peaks with output. In some 
instances renewable and distributed generators may cause more negative costs than benefit, but 
the principle of realising the full value of generation still holds. 
The same example is also relevant for the treatment of demand. Customers taking energy from 
the network at the right time and in the right location in the network (i.e. close to generation), 
have less requirement for network services. Yet for most consumers all power they receive is 
priced at the fixed retail rate, occasionally reflecting differences in time of use, but never 
fluctuating in response to location and the distance between generation and the consumer. 
Ignoring these particular features (time of use and location) results in sub-optimal network 
development because the full and true impact of the user on the network is not represented. 
Ultimately, this prevents new low-carbon generation (and demand) from competing with 
incumbent generation and traditional network solutions to guide optimal network development, 
with the result that the system must resort to increasingly expensive and unnecessary network 
reinforcement, and sub-optimal network support solutions. 
1.4 Implications of non cost reflective access arrangements 
Figure 1-2 is an illustration of the potential impact of continuing to exclude demand and to 
connect new renewable energy technologies (RE) and distributed generation (DG) without 
appropriate access arrangements that represent both user location and time of use (TOU). The 
first column on the figure illustrates the system we see today; one which has a limited 
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penetration of low-carbon technologies, and network access governed by an approach that sends 
no short term signals about the cost of network access. Up to now this has been an appropriate 
proxy for representing the traditional system based on conventional generation that has a 
homogenous use of the system based on simultaneous peak output to meet peak demand 
conditions. So the transmission and distribution network capacity that has evolved will be 
broadly appropriate for this system, and the arrangements that charge network users will 
accordingly be broadly cost reflective. 
The next two columns present the "Business as Usual" (BAU) future, which maintains this 
approach to network access and pricing and the "integrated" future, which integrates non-
conventional generation (and demand) into network access arrangements. 
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Figure 1-2; Relative levels of system capacity under location/TOU-specific and non-locational/TOU network 
access arrangements 
Under the BAU future, large-scale penetration of distributed generation and transmission 
connected renewables will disrupt the network. For example, at transmission level, additional 
wind generation connecting to areas that are already experiencing network congestion (as in 
Scotland) will contribute to an increased constraint cost and at lower network voltages 
distributed generation in weak areas of the system may increase voltage levels and cause 
unwanted voltage rise effects. Under the current arrangements, new transmission connected 
generation will be treated as conventional generation and impacts such as increases in constraint 
costs will drive additional transmission capacity according to the existing network planning 
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standards. For the passive distribution networks, disruptions to the quality of service received by 
customers are unacceptable, so networks will be reinforced to counteract any negative impacts. 
The net impact of this, as illustrated in the figure, is a (disproportionate) increase in network 
capacity in response to connection of renewable and distributed generation. By not integrating 
these new technologies into the existing access framework the BAU future will continue to 
respond to network operation and development requirements using only network- and 
conventional generation based solutions. The absence of fair network access arrangements 
which facilitates competition between all system users by recognising their individual impact on 
the network discriminates against new participants. This leads to sub-optimal network 
development and an unnecessary increase in system costs attributed to non-conventional 
generation. Ultimately this lack of cost reflectivity may impact the pace of adoption of new 
generation technologies and limit their penetration. 
Alternatively, by developing access arrangements that recognise and integrate the requirements 
of renewable and distributed generation (and the demand side), this provides the opportunity for 
the individual impact of all system users to be accounted for. In this instance, the contribution of 
non-conventional generation (and demand) to network constraints, losses and power flows is 
noted and charged or rewarded appropriately. For example, some users may drive network 
reinforcement; some may mitigate or delay it. Providing demand with the opportunity to 
respond to location based prices opens new opportunities to evaluate demand response as an 
alternative to network reinforcement. The net effect of redeveloping the access arrangements to 
reflect the changing system will be an increase in cost reflectivity, and a more optimal (and 
potentially cheaper) network that is able to evaluate a range of network and non-network 
options as solutions to traditional network problems. 
Historically, the network has had sufficient capacity and resilience to support transactions in the 
wholesale markets without significant cost accruing for managing constraints. Because this cost 
was a relatively small percentage of total electricity costs, socialising the charge around all 
network users, rather than sending location/TOU specific signals to users in the areas directly 
responsible for the constraint, was also an acceptable charging method. However as the system 
changes there is the potential for this approach to cause market distortions and sub-optimal 
operation and development of the entire system, with unnecessarily high costs to consumers. 
The materiality of the network access question is coming into focus with the pending 
connections of large amounts of wind and renewable generation in Scotland and the growing 
trend for connection of generation at distribution level. These new generation technologies are 
fundamentally different from conventional generation in the way in which they use the network. 
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Furthermore, there is dramatic asymmetry between the locations of renewable resources versus 
demand, with each being prevalent at opposite ends of the UK. Combined with the commitment 
to market driven system operation and development, network access is likely to play an 
increasing role in the future sustainable system. This is in part because new non-conventional 
generation cannot be accurately represented without this appreciation of location and time of 
use of the system. It is also driven by the fact that a market driven sector relies on accurate and 
transparent signals that are and will increasingly be masked by the current access arrangements. 
1.5 Research question, aims and objectives 
This study focuses on a central aim of facilitating optimal network operation and development 
in a future sustainable power system featuring high penetration of renewable and distributed 
generation. This should be achieved through development of cost reflective arrangements for 
network access that maintain a competitive market approach by charging or rewarding all new 
generation technologies and demand proportionally to their impact on the network. This 
requires evaluation of the cost reflectivity of the current market and regulatory arrangements for 
transmission and distribution network access as they are applied to the future system, and the 
development of new enduring arrangements for network access in the future sustainable system. 
Specifically, this can be broken down into four research questions and areas for research, each 
with individual objectives: 
RQ1. What are the main challenges facing development of the market and 
regulatory arrangements governing network access for the future low-
carbon power system? 
This requires analysis of the current and future systems and identification of the 
changes required in the high level principles which drive the market and regulatory 
arrangements for network access. The specific objectives to respond to this question are 
to; 
• review the physical operation and development of the current system and its 
regulatory and commercial frameworks as they relate to transmission and 
distribution network access, 
• identify the key characteristics of the future low-carbon system and the drivers 
for impact of non-conventional generation on the network, and 
• identify the challenges and issues for transposing the current regulatory 
framework onto the future system. 
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RQ2. What is the impact of non-conventional generation on the transmission 
and distribution networks? 
To determine whether the current access arrangements are effective in the future system 
requires an understanding of the impact, both positive and negative, that non-
conventional generation and responsive demand have on the transmission and 
distribution networks. With this quantification an assessment can be made of whether 
the current arrangements deliver outcomes that reflect the true costs imposed by all 
users on the system. The objectives in this research area are to: 
• devise a structured framework to assess the impact and value of non-conventional 
generation on the transmission and distribution networks in terms of network 
development (investment) and operation, 
• carry out a comprehensive review of existing quantitative studies detailing the 
value and impact of non-conventional generation in these areas, and 
• explore the impact of "enabling technologies" that can mitigate the costs of non-
conventional generation on the network, with a focus on demand side 
participation (and responsive demand) and active distribution network 
management. 
RQ3. Are the current network access arrangements still cost reflective when 
applied to systems with significant penetration of non-conventional 
generation? 
This section of the research should determine whether the current access arrangements 
are suitable for application to the future low-carbon system, in the context of 
maintaining optimal operation and long term development of the network based on 
competitive market principles and cost reflectivity. It will identify the main 
inefficiencies in the present network access arrangements that impact on cost 
reflectivity. The objectives developed to serve this assessment are to: 
• identify the characteristics of transmission access required in systems with non-
conventional generation, 
• conduct a critical analysis of the current arrangements for transmission access in 
the context of the findings on the impact and economics of non-conventional 
generation, and 
• identify inefficiencies in the current arrangements that are distorting competition 
and presenting a barrier to optimal network access. 
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RQ4. What should be the main features of enduring arrangements in access for 
future low-carbon power systems, and how should the technical 
architecture of the system support this framework? 
This area of analysis builds upon the outcomes from the previous research questions to 
develop and explore solutions to the key challenges identified in the evaluation of the 
existing access arrangements for transmission. The objectives of this area are to: 
• identify the core principles of new enduring access arrangements for a system with 
significant penetration of renewables, 
• devise regulatory framework options for delivery of network access in future power 
systems, 
• evaluate the options for new enduring transmission arrangements against the core 
principles and requirements for enduring access arrangements, and 
• identify and explore the technical architecture of the Virtual Power Plant concept, to 
facilitate transmission access for DG and demand. 
Synthesizing the findings of the various parts of the work, the study aims to uncover pathways 
for the evolution of the existing market and regulatoiy frameworks for network access in order 
to support the future low-carbon power system; and to do this through maintaining a 
competitive environment whilst ensuring all generation and demand is provided with equal 
opportunity to participate and realise the full value of its' contribution. 
1.6 Scope and methodology 
1.6.1 Scope of the research 
The title of this research thesis is "An analysis of the UK regulatory and market frameworks for 
network access to develop enduring arrangements for a low-carbon power system". The 
research and analysis that this indicates is bounded in four key ways; 
Timescales for enduring transmission arrangements 
The timescale for analysis is rooted in the present arrangements, with a view to the short to 
medium term future - i.e. not beyond 2020. This work is looking at the immediate transitions 
required in regulatory and market arrangements for network access to accommodate the 
challenges presented by non-conventional generation already requesting connection to the 
system and that which is expected in the next 5-10 years. 
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Scope of market and regulatory analysis 
The scope of the market and regulatory analysis undertaken in this thesis takes in network 
access arrangements from a theoretical level of first-principles. The analysis aims to review the 
fundamental competitiveness and cost reflectivity of the arrangements and to assess the impact 
of the high level principles that underpin methods for regulation and market development. More 
detailed analysis of the implementation of specific regulatory regimes, such as the development 
or evaluation of incentive mechanisms for network regulation, and detailed market design are 
outside the scope of this research. 
UK focus 
The thesis is grounded in research and analysis of the UK system. The UK is leading Europe in 
promotion of competitive markets for power system development and operation, so a focus on 
this country captures and builds on this broader framework. There is considerable experience of 
short term access questions in existing Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) markets across the 
world. Lessons learned from these markets will be drawn on for development of the UK 
arrangements. 
Focus on the transmission networks 
Through the early parts of the analysis it became clear that the main concern in network access 
that falls within the timeframe explored in the research is that of addressing the issues 
surrounding transmission network access (initiated primarily by the large numbers of wind 
generators requesting connection in Scotland and from offshore generation sites). The initial 
analysis highlighted the legacy of passive distribution network operation, where network 
capacity is designed to withstand a range of operational scenarios. This significant provision of 
capacity means that the present distribution network is sufficiently strong to withstand a 
considerable amount of DG penetration before it begins to become stressed and place 
potentially unnecessary costs on system users. As such, although there is ongoing interest in 
active management and integration of DG to manage the distribution network in real time, these 
solutions are only economically viable in certain areas where the network is weak and 
traditional network solutions are not possible (e.g. in built up urban areas where real-estate is 
prohibitively expensive). Within the time horizon of this research, development of active 
distribution networks which require markets for ancillary services at distribution level is 
unlikely to be necessary or cost effective and is thus out of the scope of this work. Although 
many of the findings are applicable to both distribution and transmission networks, this leaves 
the main focus of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 on the impact of the current arrangements of transmission 
access on non-conventional generation, and the development of enduring arrangements to fit the 
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transmission network. Chapter 6 highlights some of the challenges in the distribution network 
access area, and this is outlined in the description of further work. 
1.6.2 Overarching approach: Whole system analysis 
The overarching methodology of this research has been to adopt a whole systems approach to 
analysis, evaluation and development of frameworks for network access^. As illustrated in 
Figure 1-3 this approach realises the importance linking an understanding of the technical and 
economic performance of the physical system with an appreciation of the market and regulatory 
support frameworks to achieve delivery of an optimal network. Regulatory developments and 
market reform will impact the charging and treatment of users connected to the system, 
changing the efficiency of network design, and impacting system technical performance. 
WHOLE SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
System technical 
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Figure 1-3: Whole system analysis approach 
For example, reform of the deep connection charging regime for distributed generation has 
changed the economics of connection for DG, and should ultimately improve the connection 
rates of DG to the network, which in turn will affect the network e.g. network reliability. In the 
other direction, penetration of new generation into the system, e.g. offshore wind, requires new 
grid codes and definition of technical standards that reflect the economics of offshore wind 
operation and ultimately this will drive new pricing regimes for charging offshore transmission. 
Whole system analysis in this way accepts that it is not possible to assess regulatory and market 
arrangements in isolation from an understanding of the fundamental economics of the system 
under scrutiny and its technical performance. 
^ Note that the whole system approach is grounded in the power system; although it extends to a consideration of the 
demand side, it does not include wider interactions with other energy carriers such as gas or heat. Further discussion of 
this issue and the limitations of this approach are included in Chapter 6. 
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MARKET & REGULATION 
NETWORKS 
Figure 1-4: Increasing penetration of renewables and DG, and transitions in market and regulatory 
arrangements driving forward the evolution of the low-carbon system 
In the context of this thesis, the analysis focuses on market and regulatory arrangements for 
network access in systems with significant penetration of renewable and distributed generation. 
Figure 1-4 provides a diagrammatic representation of the thesis focus. On the left of the diagram 
is the stimulus for the analysis, that is, the penetration of non-conventional generation into the 
current system which is causing material changes in the physical system, and altering the impact 
on the economics of the system. 
In response to this, the market and regulatory environment also needs to change (the transitions 
on the right of the diagram). Market and regulatory arrangements are a proxy to achieve short 
term efficient operation of the networks and long term least cost development, so in order to 
maintain a fair and competitive market, they must be cost reflective. To achieve cost reflectivity 
requires appreciation of the fundamental economics of the system, which is based on an 
understanding of the physical system infrastructure and technical performance. This has the 
implication that for the regulatory arrangements to remain a representative proxy of system 
economics and technical operation they must also evolve to reflect the changing physical 
system. The whole system analysis method will be used to explore this transition in market and 
regulatory frameworks for access. 
1.6.3 Research methodologies 
The specific research methodologies adopted for the research were selected to allow coverage of 
a broad and interdisciplinary topic. Each chapter has its own methodological structure which 
centres on qualitative research methods, although in some chapters (3 and 6) there is also 
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evaluation, analysis and interpretation of existing quantitative studies. The approach for each 
chapter is outlined in more detail below. 
Chapter 2 was constructed using a literature review approach to build the picture of the current 
status of the power system and to provide detail on the specific access arrangements relevant to 
transmission and distribution networks. The majority of the texts identified in the literature 
review are industry documents, as well as reports and consultation papers from government or 
the sector regulator Ofgem. This was essential to ground the research in the UK network and to 
ensure elaboration of a comprehensive picture of the existing network access arrangements and 
the philosophy for development and operation of the networks. Identification of the future low-
carbon system was carried out in the same way. Informal input from industry and utility 
contacts was used to explore and discuss the potential impact of the existing network access 
arrangements on a future system featuring a high penetration of renewable and distributed 
generation. 
Chapter 3 explores the costs and benefits of non-conventional generation to the networks. The 
research draws on several quantitative studies carried out by the Centre for Distributed 
Generation and Sustainable Electrical Energy (CDGSEE). The author, although not directly 
involved in the quantitative aspect of these studies, has drawn together and interpreted the 
findings of these reports using a novel impact assessment matrix approach. Key inputs into the 
subsequent chapters are the synthesis of these findings into a coherent, qualitative review of the 
impact of non-conventional generation on both transmission and distribution and its 
implications for network access requirements of generation. 
Chapter 4 combines and analyses the output from the previous two chapters, undertaking a 
critical analysis of the current transmission network access arrangements. The cost reflectivity 
of the current arrangements when applied to a future system is ascertained through qualitative 
analysis of the high level characteristics of the future system and assessment of their 
representation in the existing access arrangements. From this evaluation of the current 
arrangements, a set of high level principles that define optimal enduring access arrangements 
was developed. These principles were then used as assessment criteria to determine the 
appropriateness of new approaches to network access and to evaluate alternative frameworks for 
new, enduring arrangements. 
Chapter 5 proposes and develops a vision for the technical architecture required to support 
distributed generation and demand access to the transmission networks. Drawing on the 
challenges for distributed generation access to transmission highlighted in Chapter 4, this 
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chapter uses a literature review approach to develop the Virtual Power Plant (VPP) concept for 
transmission network access. This aspect of work was undertaken as part of a European 
Commission funded project FENIX (Flexible Electricity Networks to Integrate the eXpected 
Energy evolution). The VPP framework was developed through extensive discussion and input 
from the FENIX team of European industry (Siemens & AREVA), utility collaborators (EdF, 
Iberdrola, EdF Energy Networks & National Grid Electricity Transmission) and research groups 
(IDEA, Labein and ECN). This chapter also presents the findings from the quantitative 
characterisation and modelling of the VPP concept. This was not work undertaken by the 
author'*, but illustration of the findings from this modelling is used to illustrate the main 
functionality of the VPP concept and to highlight the challenges for developing transmission 
access approaches for distributed generation. 
The thesis attempts to cover a broad range of issues around network access including 
consideration of the market and regulatory frameworks. Inevitably there are limitations to the 
breadth of this approach and the methodologies adopted. These limitations are discussed further 
in the final chapter of this thesis. 
1.6.4 Contribution and originality of the research 
Framing the debate for network access in the UK 
The network that was developed to support the traditional power system in the UK was created 
under different conditions to those that are emerging in the system we see today. The traditional 
network emerged in an era of centralised control, responding to the homogenous requirements 
of conventional generation and unresponsive demand. Under nationalised, vertically integrated 
control, the network installed was designed with the long term development of the system in 
mind, with the result that it was relatively robust in the short to medium term) resulting in low 
constraint costs (and a low value to network access). This background dictated the network 
access arrangements that frame the current system, but the current system is changing - and 
with it the importance of access is developing. 
When considered together these changes are fundamental; the UK network assets are nearing 
the end of their useful life, the generation system is increasingly different from the conventional 
mix and opportunities for demand are also changing the network access requirements of this 
user. Some generation is now connected closer to demand (distributed generation), other 
technologies are increasingly distant from demand centres (wind generation in Scotland) 
^ The work was carried out by Dr. Danny Pudjianto, lead contributor on the paper PUDJIANTO, D., RAMSAY, C. & 
STRBAC, G. (2007) Virtual power plant and system integration of distributed energy resources. Renewable Power 
Generation, lET, 1, 10-16. to which the author contributed the work presented in Chapter 5 on the structure and 
framework of the VPP. 
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dictated by the availability of renewable resources. Finally, system development is undertaken 
on the basis of market driven operation and expansion of the network. Without the visibility and 
insight provided by a vertically integrated utility, increasingly transparent market signals are 
required to stimulate the optimal operation and development of the network. 
The major contribution of this research has been to highlight and frame this network access 
debate for the UK power system, and to identify the evidence in support of the need for radical 
change in the current access arrangements. The research explores the old and new systems, and 
identifies the factors that have driven the access arrangements for the traditional system. It then 
highlights gaps in their construction that become apparent with a growing materiality of the 
importance of network access issues. The research draws the boundaries of this debate in the 
UK, and sets out a new framework for development of enduring access arrangements for the UK 
transmission system. 
Interdisciplinary research and evaluation using a whole system approach 
Identification of the core questions to explore network access issues and identification of 
solutions that assist the optimal development of access arrangements requires appreciation of 
findings and discussions from an interdisciplinary environment. It involves interpretation of 
quantitative results from network models and extrapolation of these findings to allow discussion 
of the impact of the physical system on the regulatory and commercial frameworks. In parallel 
with this comes the development of alternative regulatory structures and network access 
arrangements that adhere to the underlying philosophy of an electricity sector driven by market 
forces, but still reflect the changing physical system and user-network interactions. 
In this context another key contribution of this research is in its interdisciplinary exploration of 
the issues around network access for non-conventional generation. The research attempts to 
review and interpret quantitative models and build a framework for analysis of these results in a 
qualitative environment. This has allowed translation of findings across disciplines and has 
stimulated the convergence of the issues of network access around the central theme of creating 
new enduring arrangements that support all system users equally using the principles of a 
competitive market environment. 
The whole system approach and findings from this analysis are further critical contributions. 
This approach presents the fundamental physical principles and economics of the system 
alongside the regulatory and market structures which support the system. This presents the 
incumbent system from all angles and has facilitated the identification of significant gaps in the 
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existing framework, as well as characterisation of the core challenges for integration of 
renewable and distributed generation and development of a low-carbon power system. 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
Each chapter is focused on responding to one of the research questions outlined earlier. When 
combined, these sections serve to met the thesis aim of facilitating optimal network operation 
and development in a future sustainable power system featuring high penetration of renewable 
and distributed generation; to be achieved through development of cost reflective arrangements 
for network access that maintain a competitive market approach by charging or rewarding all 
generation technologies and demand proportionally to their impact on the network. 
To do this requires an understanding of the existing system and arrangements (Chapter 2) and 
detail on the impact of the new non-conventional generation on the transmission and 
distribution systems (Chapter 3). The key outcomes from these chapters can then be synthesised 
in an analysis of the cost reflectivity of the current arrangements for non-conventional 
generation (Chapter 4). This highlights the primary areas of inefficiency in the current 
arrangements and indicates the requirements for a new cost reflective framework for the future 
system. A framework for the analysis of new enduring arrangements for transmission access is 
proposed, and several options for network access are reviewed. Finally, an innovative technical 
architecture to allow transmission network access for distributed generation is proposed and 
developed (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 presents some discussion on the main points raised and draws 
together the conclusions from the previous chapters. This chapter also presents a critique of the 
methods adopted and the research findings and scope, and presents areas for further work. 
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CHAPTER 2: Network operation and development and 
challenges for the transition to a future 
sustainable power system 
2.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the primary function of electricity networks is to transport energy 
securely and efficiently from generation to demand; and the design and operation of the 
networks will be driven by the characteristics and requirements of both these network users. The 
location of generation relative to demand, the generation technologies employed in both the 
transmission and distribution system, together with the pattern of demand, will all influence 
network operation and development. Changes in the characteristics or location of generation and 
demand influences the requirement for access to the network, which in turn increases (or 
decreases) requirement for network capacity. In the UK, with the advent of renewable and 
distributed generation materialising at every level of the network and the possibilities for 
demand side participation increasing, the network in place to connect these participants must 
identify and respond to their new requirements for network access. 
This chapter aims to address the core aspects of this challenge, first by outlining the background 
upon which the current networks and their regulatory and market frameworks have been 
developed. It then lays out the high level vision of a future power system with a significant 
penetration of renewables and distributed generation, identifying the different characteristics of 
generation and demand in this future scenario, and highlighting areas in the current network 
access arrangements and approach that may no longer be compatible with this new future. 
The chapter then details the development of the transmission and distribution infrastructures in 
place in the UK today. It reviews the technical, commercial and regulatory frameworks that 
shape the networks and define network access for the conventional system, and highlights how 
these frameworks have been optimised for a conventional system based on a small number of 
large-scale generation units. The transmission and distribution networks are addressed in turn; 
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in each case a review is undertaken of the network access arrangements in place over a short-
and long term time horizon. This entails a description of the current design and development 
philosophy for network investment, the operation philosophy and methods and the network 
pricing methodologies to charge users (both generation and demand) for their use of the system, 
and impact on capacity investments. Alongside the description of the current status of the 
networks, this review of network structure and regulation also identifies the likely challenges to 
transmission and distribution network access that will result from the penetration of increasing 
amounts of renewable and distributed generation. 
2.2 Overview of the conventional and future power system 
2.2.1 Conventional system architecture and characteristics 
The conventional power system, as illustrated in Figure 2-1 was designed to support small 
numbers of large-scale generation technologies; mainly coal, oil, hydro, and nuclear, and more 
recently gas-based generation. The majority of the generating units in the UK are connected to a 
very high voltage transmission network operating at 275 and 400 kV, the role of this 
transmission system being to provide bulk transport of electricity from these large stations to 
demand centres throughout the network. 
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Figure 2-1: Schematic of the conventional power system 
At a regional level, electricity is delivered from transmission to the distribution networks and 
then to end consumers via a number of voltage transformations. End users are considered to be 
passive consumers of electricity, with little ability to respond to the system and limited elasticity 
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in demand. Because generation is primarily connected at the transmission level, the flow 
throughout the system is unidirectional from high to low voltage, passing from transmission to 
distribution networks and on to consumers. 
At transmission level, a distinguishing feature of this system is that it requires tight real-time 
control to maintain the balance between demand and supply at all times. Because demand is 
passive and uncontrollable, this control and balancing service must be provided by transmission 
connected generation running part loaded to provide the flexibility to respond to changes in e.g. 
the system frequency etc. 
Generation 
Figure 2-2 shows the current breakdown of installed generation capacity in the UK. Of the total 
installed capacity (83GW) around 5% (3.6 GW) comes from renewable sources, mostly 
transmission connected wind generation (1.65 GW) and large scale hydro stations, and 
approximately 5.5 GW capacity (6.6%) is Combined Heat and Power (CHP) using a variety of 
fuel sources (DTI, 2006a), two thirds of this capacity is connected to the distribution network, 
the rest to transmission (DTI, 2006b). 
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Figure 2-2: Breakdown of generation capacity In the UK by MWe and percentage share (DTI, 2006a) 
Accurate calculation of generation capacity connected at distribution level is hard to make, 
because many of the smaller units are not centrally registered with the transmission system 
operator. Recent figures (shown in Table 2-1) suggest that around 15% of total capacity is 
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embedded in the distribution networks with 8.8% of this being renewables or CHP based 
generation. 
Technology 
installed 
capacity 2006 
(MW) 
% UK total 
(84.5 GW*) 
CHP 3937 4.6 
Hydro 1058 1.2 
Onshore wind 944 1.1 
Landfill gas, sewage gas 7,81 0.9 
Waste incineration 497 0.6 
Offshore wind** 212 0.2 
Biomass and energy crops 43 0.05 
Tidal stream and wave 7 <0.01 
Photovoltaics 6 < 0.01 
Other (mainly gas)*** 5205 6.1 
Total (Renewables and CHP) 7485 8.8 
Total (All) 12690 15.0 
* Source (NGET, 2005b) 
** Most of the proposed offshore wind developments are transmission connected. 
*** Medium scale, dedicated electricity generating plant 
Table 2-1: Generation capacity installed In the UK distribution networks (DTI, 2006b) 
Given that the demand is not controllable to any great extent, and the transmission system 
operates with a fixed topology (i.e. the transmission network cannot be manipulated to control 
flows) the sole source of system control lies with transmission connected generators. 
Instantaneous changes and modulation of generation output are required to meet fluctuations in 
demand and to maintain system frequency and integrity. 
Furthermore, in order to supply demand that varies daily and seasonally, and given that demand 
is uncontrollable and interruptions very costly, installed generation capacity must be sized to 
meet maximum (peak) demand^. Historically, a generation capacity margin of 20% has been 
considered sufficient to ensure system reliability. Given the average demand across the year is 
considerably lower than the peak requirements this means that the average utilisation of 
generation plant is very low (around 55%), although this figure does vary widely amongst 
different generators (for example, the very lowest marginal cost generation (e.g. Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbine) would operate at around 85% load factor, while plant with high fuel costs 
used for meeting peak demand (e.g. Open Cycle Gas Turbine) will operate only a few hours per 
year). 
In the UK peak demand hours occur in evenings of winter working days usually in December or January, 
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Costs from generation account for 38% of the consumer's final bill (and costs from suppliers 
account for a further 30%). 
Transmission 
The design and structure of the transmission networks has been devised to support large-scale 
generation technologies. Deterministic planning standards created to guide the development of 
the network ensure that the transmission system meets requirements on reliability (i.e. that it 
does not unduly restrict generation from meeting peak demand) and economic efficiency. This 
involves balancing the operating costs of the network (i.e. cost of congestion, losses and lost 
load due to outage), against the cost of reinforcing the system. The value of lost load is very 
high, so typically, the network is installed with a high level of redundancy to ensure that after 
the outage of a single circuit the remaining lines will not become overloaded and the network 
will continue to function. This feature means that under peak demand conditions the system is 
usually loaded below 50%. This level of redundancy has a knock-on effect for losses from 
transmission; as losses increase (according to a quadratic function) with the loading of the lines. 
So reduced loading of the lines under normal operating conditions also decreases losses. Losses 
from transmission are currently around 2% (NGET, 2007a). 
Congestion related costs are derived from the physical restrictions of the network preventing the 
generation schedules that are contracted in the wholesale markets from being delivered. At 
present (in the UK) the main cause of congestion in the network is the geographic imbalance 
between generation and demand. An excess of generation relative to demand in Scotland, and a 
dearth of generation near demand centres in the South-East means that the transmission network 
is characterised by a North-South net flow, with Scottish generators exporting to England. This 
means that congestion arising at strategic points in the network must be resolved in real time by 
constraining generation off in Scotland and dispatching higher cost generation in England. At 
present the cost of constraints on the system is relatively low, but increased penetration of low 
marginal cost generation in the North could push these costs up. 
Costs from the transmission network account for around 3% of the consumer's final bill. 
Distribution 
In the distribution networks the approach differs because, historically, there was little or no 
generation connected at distribution level, so these networks are not controlled in real-time. Any 
operational problems are resolved at the network design and planning stage such that real time 
control becomes an investment question on how much reinforcement is required to maintain 
security and quality of supply under all feasible conditions. Furthermore, because of the lack of 
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generation in the networks, the standards and guidelines for development and design of the 
network are exclusively focused on the network requirements of demand. Network capacity is 
designed on the basis of securing demand, rather than providing generation with a secure route 
for delivery of power (as is the case in the transmission networks). Distribution Network 
Operator (DNO) performance is measured by two quality of supply indicators: Customer 
Minutes Lost (CML) and Customer Interruptions (CI), so provision of service is driven by the 
incentive to minimise the occurrence of these interruptions. When considering how to mitigate 
faults and improve these quality of supply indicators, it is noteworthy that the vast majority of 
interruptions to service come from faults in the lower levels of the distribution network ( l l k V 
and 0.4kV) (Ilex and UMIST, 2004). Compared to transmission, losses on the distribution 
network are relatively high, on average around 7% (Ofgem, 2003a), but increasing well beyond 
this level in locations where (and at times when) the network is heavily loaded. The low-voltage 
networks are responsible for the highest percentage of the losses in the distribution network an 
issue which has implications for the impact of generation and controllable demand in this 
location which is addressed in the following chapter. 
Costs from the distribution network (and metering) account for around 21% of the consumer's 
final bill®. 
Demand 
In the conventional system demand is treated as being passive and largely uncontrollable (apart 
from a few large demand side customers who offer balancing services to the TSO). 
As illustrated in Figure 2-3, daily peak demand usually occurs between 5pm and 6.30pm, with 
absolute peak demand (~60GW) occurring at this time during winter. Minimum demand occurs 
during the night, with summer night-time exhibiting the lowest troughs (~21GW). One of the 
main features of demand in the present system is the diversity that comes from the variety in 
end uses that characterise the demand sector. 
® Additional costs derive from the Renew^ables Obligation (2%), the Energy Efficiency Commitment (1 %) and VAT (5%). 
all cost percentages are sourced from OFGEM (2005c) Household Energy Bills Explained: Factsheet 52. London, Office 
of Gas and Electricity Markets. 
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Figure 2-3: Summer and winter daily demand profiles In 2005/06 (NGET, 2007a) 
Figure 2-4 illustrates this point; it shows how the demand coincidence factor changes with the 
number of households. The coincidence factor is the ratio between maximum coincident total 
demand of a group of households and the sum of maximum demands of individual consumers 
comprising the group. In other words, the coincidence factor represents the ratio of the capacity 
of a system required to supply a certain number of households, to the total capacity of the 
supply system that would be required if each household were self sufficient. 
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Figure 2-4: Load coincidence factor as a function of number of customer households (Strbac, 2006) 
The key to this effect is that diversity in demand means that peak demand for the group is 
highly unlikely to ever equal the sum total of each individual peak demand. Therefore, the 
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system capacity requirements (network and generation capacity) can be sized not to the sum of 
peak demand, but to some reduced level that is proportional to the "diversity effect" of the 
group. The graph illustrates that the capacity if an electricity system to supply 10,000 homes is 
almost one tenth of the amount required if sufficient capacity was provided to meet the 
simultaneous occurrence of their individual peak requirements. Along with the generation mix, 
this diversity in demand is a defining factor which dictates the design of the network. 
The potential for change 
However, this conventional system is already in the process of undergoing material change 
stimulated by increasing penetration of renewable and distributed generation into the traditional 
generation mix. Outlined in the following sections are the drivers for change that are 
precipitating the transition and a high level overview of the characteristics of a future power 
system based on these non-conventional generation technologies. 
2.2.2 Drivers for change 
A number of diverse factors are driving forward these changes in both the generation mix and 
the technical, commercial and regulatory environment in which the power system is grounded. 
Climate change 
Since the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, and the subsequent adoption of the UNFCC (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) and creation of the Kyoto protocol on 
climate change five years later (UN, 1997), the global environmental challenge of tackling 
climate change has been focussing UK national policy. The recent publication of the Stem 
Review, reporting on the economics of climate change (Stern, 2006), further consolidated the 
call for immediate action, highlighting that taking no action now will increase the costs of both 
adaptation and mitigation in the future. The development of policies to support a range of low-
carbon and high efficiency technologies on an urgent timescale has been highlighted not only 
through the Stern Review but also through numerous UK government activities. Carbon 
mitigation strategies, improving energy efficiency and rational use of energy have become 
primary considerations not only in developing UK energy policy but also as a cross cutting 
agenda shaping many aspects of policy development (DETR, 2000, DTI, 2003, DTI, 2007). 
The power sector, responsible for almost 47 mega tonnes of carbon emissions each year, around 
one third of total emissions by source (DTI and Ofgem, 2007) is a target for this activity and a 
sector ear-marked for change. Government policies aim to transform the energy sector with low-
carbon technologies and drastically reduce its emissions profile within the next 50 years. 
Environmental policy making and target setting precipitated by the climate change agenda is 
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playing a part in shaping the construction of the sector. There are ambitious targets for power 
generation from renewable sources^, and increasing pressure on energy suppliers to take an 
active role in promoting energy efficiency to their customers and a commitment to source a 
percentage of all power from renewable sources^ 
Aging Infrastructure 
The UK electricity generation and network infrastructure underwent considerable development 
and expansion in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Typically such assets are expected to have 
around a 40 year lifespan. Now, 50 years on, the assets installed during this period are reaching 
the end of their useful life and the case for large-scale replacement and reinvestment in new 
infrastructure is building. Across the UK there is the requirement for capital expenditure on 
network infrastructure to increase from 63 to 70% of network companies total spend by 2015, 
leading to an overall capital expenditure requirement of around £2.7bn per annum compared 
with present level of under £2.2bn (SKM, 2007). 
This opportunity for investment and redevelopment of the transmission and distribution 
networks opens important questions on the asset replacement strategy that should be adopted. 
The network operation and development philosophies have significant influence on the 
prevailing generation mix; development of network infrastructure with the new sustainable 
power sector in mind could play a key role in ensuring the competitiveness and success of 
renewable and distributed generation. Over the next decade, there is an unprecedented 
opportunity to develop alternative asset replacement strategies that are in line with the agenda of 
developing sustainable, secure and efficient electricity systems for the future (lEA, 2007b). 
Improving competition and the better regulation agenda 
The advent of liberalisation and competitive forces in the power market has also initiated some 
fundamental changes in the development, operation and regulation of the system. The current 
market arrangements were developed to support a system based on conventional generation and 
shaped by the political environment surrounding the changes from nationalised to privatised 
(and liberalised) industry in the late 1980's and again under the market reforms of 2001^ (Helm, 
' By 2010, 10% of all energy generated In the UK must come from renewable sources, and 10GW of new CHP must be 
Installed in the distribution networks (DETR 2000), with a commitment for an additional 10% (20% in total) by 2020, as 
part of a new European Union backed commitment to low carbon generation CEC (2007) An Energy Policy for Europe. 
Commission of the European Communities. 
° The Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) commits all UK energy suppliers to improving energy efficiency in the 
domestic sector, through saving a pre-negotiated amount of Carbon over a set time period. The Renewables Obligation 
ensures that all energy suppliers purchase a pre-negotiated amount of their power from renewable sources (see 
www.ofqem.aov.uk). 
® Transition from the "Pool" arrangements to the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA), a bilateral trading and 
wholesale market. 
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2003), and 2005'°. Although introduction of competitive markets into the electricity sector was 
completed over 15 years ago, these market and regulatory arrangements are still developing, and 
the debate continues as to what framework will deliver a secure, cost effective and sustainable 
system. 
There is a growing government commitment towards a better regulation agenda, promoting 
reform to improve market efficiency and transparency of operation. Reviews of recent 
developments in transmission and distribution network regulation reveal that the UK is at the 
forefront in Europe with regard to the development of a competitive market in electricity and 
towards integration of the sustainable low-carbon agenda into market rules and regulation 
(Djapic et al., 2007, Gomez et al., 2007). 
Security of energy resources and reliability of supply 
Issues of energy security have also come to the forefront. Security of energy supply has been 
raised at International and European levels (CEC, 2001, CEC, 2007, lEA, 2002, lEA, 2007a) 
and is influencing UK decision making on a number of planes. From the basic considerations of 
"keeping the lights on" and providing homes with uninterrupted power supplies under all 
conditions, to wider concerns of ensuring a diverse energy supply, maintaining secure import 
routes for the primary fuels and hedging against the risk of unpredictable or rising fuel costs, 
UK energy policy is adapting to attempt to meet all these challenges (DTI, 2006c, DTI, 2007). 
The influence of these factors is seeding a change in emphasis in government and private 
investment in the power sector, encouraging a broader base of generation technologies, and 
beginning to favour those technologies that diversify the current portfolio of generators away 
from a reliance on fossil fuels and unpredictable prices (Awerbuch and Sauter, 2004, Patterson, 
2003y 
2.2.3 Future system architecture and driving factors to challenge the 
current system 
The architecture of a future power system based on significant penetration of renewables and 
distributed generation will be materially different from the conventional system that we see 
today. Figure 2-5 illustrates this with a high-level schematic diagram that identifies the key 
differences by adapting the illustration of the conventional system shown in Figure 2-1. 
Firstly, generation of varying sizes and technologies will be connecting to all levels of the 
network and there will be a diminished role for large-scale conventional generation. From 
" Transition from NETA to the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA). BETTA was an 
expansion of NETA to include Scotland into the England and Wales market, making one single transmission system 
overseen by a single system operator. 
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domestic scale p,CHP of a few kW generating capacity at the low voltage distribution network, 
up to large transmission connected wind farms of over IGW, there will be generating units 
connected at any point in the network. Penetration of CHP will be driven by the benefits of 
improved efficiency from co-generation" (HoL, 2005). Decentralisation of these generation 
units into distribution networks is necessary to reduce heat losses, and help size units according 
to heat demand (Patterson, 1999). 
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Figure 2-5: Schematic of the future sustainable power system based on transmission connected renewables 
and distributed generation 
The spread of generation connections across the network has implications for power flows. 
Previously, where the majority generating capacity derived from large scale transmission 
connected generation, there were unidirectional power flows through transmission to 
distribution networks, and then on to end consumers via a series of voltage transformations. 
With the penetration of generation throughout the network these power flows will change. As 
illustrated in the figure, between voltage levels in the distribution network there may be reverse 
flows caused by generation connected to the distribution network producing more output than 
can be consumed by local demand. In some instances this may result in reverse flows at the 
transmission-distribution boundary and export from the distribution network back on to the 
transmission grid. 
" The average conversion efficiency for UK generation mix is around 0.38, compared to 0.8 for the more efficient co-
generation schemes found in Denmark and Sweden HOL (Ed.) (2005) 2nd Report of session 2005/2006 - Energy 
Efficiency Volume II, Evidence, London, HMSO, 
41 
Chapter 2: Network Operation and Development 
As well as changing the direction of the flows, increased penetration of generation into the 
distribution networks may also change the magnitude of the flows on the network. Sited closer 
to demand, distributed generation will reduce the distribution network import requirements, 
reducing the requirement for transmission capacity. However, this will not mitigate the 
requirement for transmission entirely; much of the generation that characterises a future low-
carbon system is constrained in its choice of location on the network by availability of primary 
resources. For example wind generation, the best wind resource in the UK is in Scotland and 
offshore; however the majority of the demand in the UK is in central and south-east England. 
For this type of location constrained generation that cannot be sited close to demand, 
transmission will still play a key role in long-distance bulk transportation of power. 
In the conventional system, the availability of flexible, controllable generation to maintain the 
system frequency and integrity and ensure that supply meets demand at all times is crucial. 
Within the new system, the maintenance of system integrity is equally important. However, 
with a reduced presence of conventional large scale generation, this system control must come 
from the new non-conventional generation units and from responsive demand. Without 
integration of these new generating technologies (and responsive demand) into the system 
operation activities, a larger proportion of conventional generation must be retained as system 
reserve and investment must be made in increasingly uneconomic network solutions to mitigate 
the impact of maintaining a large percentage of uncontrollable generation in the system. Given 
the average demand across the year, the average utilisation of the generation capacity in the 
conventional system is below 55%'^. This relatively low average plant utilisation opens a 
significant scope for involvement of an active demand side as shifting load from peak to off-
peak periods would reduce the need for generation capacity and increase the utilisation of 
generating plant and hence increase the efficiency of generation investment. 
Finally, the operating philosophy of the distribution networks is likely to change. With bi-
directional power flows and an influx of generation into the network it will be increasingly 
difficult for the distribution network operator to maintain a passive operation approach without 
investing heavily in network reinforcement. Active management of the network would allow 
integration of local generation and utilisation of this resource as part of daily network operation. 
This approach would go some way to recognising the value of generation by location in the 
network, by identifying the benefits that some units can bring through their proximity to load 
and the correlation of their output to system peaks (Lovins et al., 2002). 
There is a significant spread in utilisation among different generators. The lowest marginal cost plant would operate at 
abut 85% load factor (e.g. CCGT), while plant with high fuel cost (e.g. old OCGT) would operate only a few hours per 
year. 
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The impact of the new generation technologies on the transmission and distribution networks is 
driven (or mitigated) by a series of factors that will affect the extent of the changes described 
above. These drivers can be separated into locational and operational characteristics, and are 
broadly defined as follows; 
Locational characteristic drivers: 
Geographic location: 
The geographic location of generation in the system relative to demand will drive and determine 
key impacts on the network. In the UK example demand centres are in the South, and there is a 
general north-south power flow down the country. Generation siting in the north will contribute 
to this flow, generation in the south will alleviate it. 
Diversity of local network users: 
Relevant at transmission and distribution level, the nature of other users of the network in a 
local area will play some part in dictating the overall impact on the network. Where there is 
considerable diversity in use of the network (e.g. two generation types with output at 
uncorrelated times of the day) the combined impact of a diverse set of users on the network is 
less than the sum of its component parts. 
Density of local installations: 
Related to the diversity driver, the density of installations will also drive impact. Up to a certain 
penetration there may be no impact at all, then beyond this a positive effect, and beyond this 
again the costs may outweigh the benefit. Density and homogeneity of installations will play a 
role in the impact of non-conventional generation. 
Operational characteristic drivers: 
Pattern and time of output: 
Typically, conventional generation is load following and its use of the network is according to 
patterns of demand. In the future system, much of the new transmission connected (e.g. wind) 
will be driven by other factors such as weather conditions, that are not well correlated to 
demand conditions. Factors such as intermittency and variability and the extent to which they 
influence output will also be important. 
Capacity credit: 
Capacity credit is a measure of energy to capacity ratio; it indicates the amount of existing plant 
capacity that can be displaced on addition of new generation to the system whilst still 
maintaining a given level of system reliability. This driver is important in guiding transmission 
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network reinforcements in systems designed for reliability and can have an impact at 
distribution level where generation with high capacity credit is able to displace network 
capacity. Flexibility and controllability of generation is the key to maintaining the system 
frequency and integrity, the contribution that generation technologies can make to this will 
contribute to their capacity credit. 
(Distribution) Networl< management philosophy: 
The approach taken (at distribution level) to network management can have a mitigating effect 
on the impact of distributed generation on the network. Traditionally the network is passively 
managed with all network issues resolved at the planning stage. Under an active management 
regime problems can be managed and mitigated in the operational timescale, reducing the need 
for network reinforcement. 
Size of generation plant: 
Many DG and renewable generation technologies are too small to have a significant impact on 
some areas of the network when considered alone. However, as part of an aggregated group 
with a cumulative profile they can have a more significant effect. 
2.2.4 Materiality of the changes to the UK generation mix and demand 
In the short to medium term the biggest change in the UK system will come from connection of 
on and offshore wind connection. At present, there is 16GW of wind capacity with outstanding 
applications for connection to the GB transmission system in Scotland'^. Even if only a 
proportion of these developments goes ahead, against the current installed capacity of onshore 
wind of 1.65 GW, onshore wind generation is likely to make a considerable and material impact 
on the transmission system. Further impact is also felt because these generators are all 
connecting in the Northern reaches of the transmission system, where the network is already 
congested, and where generation dominates demand. Offshore wind is also set to play a 
significant role in the UK power system. With 214 MW already operational, there is a further 
IGW of capacity awaiting completion and connection under the first round of offshore 
generation licences, and 7.2 GW from the second round (BWEA, 2007). 
" These applications came online in 2005 as a result of the switch from NETA to BETTA and the unification of the 
Scottish transmission network with the English and Welsh system to make a single GB network. This queue was 
created because automatic rights to access were given to all applications outstanding at the time of the introduction of 
BETTA, an amnesty which caused a flurry of applications to connect before BETTA came into effect. It has been 
argued that this prompted many developers to submit more speculative proposals for investments, such that this 16GW 
of wind applications may represent a considerable number of projects that might not go ahead. The System Operator is 
concerned that the GB queue is maintained because developers are keen to retain their place in the queue in case this 
position becomes valuable and can be traded at some point in the future. NGET (2007b) Open Letter on the 
Management of the GB Queue. National Grid Electricity Transmission, Projections from the System Operator for 
generation capacity growth in the transmission system up to 2010 indicate a further 10GW of capacity coming online, 
with just over 3GW of this in Scotland OFGEM (2006b) Enduring Transmission Arrangements for Distributed 
Generation: Further Thoughts Document. Further Thoughts Document. London, Office of Gas & Electricity Markets. 
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Demand Zone 
Increase up to 
2009/10 (MW) 
Generation Demand 
North Scotland 622 71 
South Scotland 717 57 
Northern* 290 117 
North West 916 226 
Yorkshire* 752 96 
North Wales & Mersey 149 24 
East Midlands 702 228 
Midlands* 138 261 
Eastern* 1134 575 
South Wales 771 227 
South East 453 233 
London 76 458 
Southern England 199 407 
South West 183 196 
TOTAL 7103 3151 
Table 2-2: Projected increase in generation and demand in the 14 demand zones across the UK (Ofgem, 2006b) 
In the distribution networlcs, forecasting penetration of generation is subject to considerable 
uncertainty. Recently, projections for the likely future growth in both generation and demand 
were requested (by Ofgem) from UK DNOs for the 14 Demand Zones across the system 
(Ofgem, 2006b). The resulting response is summarised in Table 2-2 which indicates the total 
expected increase in generation and demand up to 2010. Although the exact figures are subject 
to change, of note is the overall trend of the increase in distribution connected generation 
outstripping demand, and of generation in the Scottish demand zones exceeding demand growth 
by a considerable margin. 
Finally, developments in the roll-out of domestic smart metering technologies are also set to 
change the responsiveness and involvement potential for the demand side. A European directive 
on the End Use Energy Efficiency and Energy Services came into force in the EU in April 2006 
(CEC, 2006a) The directive provides for Member States to take forward a range of energy 
efficiency measures by May 2008; this range of measures (on some interpretations) includes 
action to deliver time-of-use metering for the domestic sector where it is deemed to be 
technically possible and financially reasonable and proportionate. A recent Datainonitor report 
estimated that 41% of European homes will be equipped with an electronic energy meter by 
2012 (Datamonitor, 2007). In the UK, trials of smart metering technology have been announced 
(Ofgem, 2006a), with large scale roll-out of new meters expected in the medium term future. 
The emphasis of this initiative has been on the benefits for energy efficiency in improved 
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information to consumers, however there is also the potential for smart meters to provide new 
opportunities for demand participation in energy and other markets through demand response 
activities and smart appliances (Bilton et al., Forthcoming). 
2.3 Network access: Alternatives for investment and pricing 
With this description of the conventional and future power system and the overview of the 
potential changes in the UK system in the near term as a context, the following sections go into 
detail on network access arrangements in the current system. To provide an overview to this 
process the following section discusses the background to network access and charging 
arrangements. This details the alternative approaches to cost reflective charging for access based 
on long and short run costs, and highlights the importance of a locational and time of use 
element to charges. 
Following this, network access in transmission and distribution is reviewed by looking into the 
technical, market and regulatory arrangements for access in the system operation (short term) 
and investment (long term) horizons. Overlaid on this detailed identification of the historical 
drivers and philosophy behind the current system are the challenges of the future system and the 
drivers for change in system operation and development. These areas explore how non-
conventional generation will reshape the system, and how the regulatory framework will 
respond to maintain economically efficient and optimal network operation and development. 
2.3.1 Overview of cost reflective charging for network access 
Electricity is a commodity with a value that varies with location (of generation and 
consumption) and time of use/generation. Value is attributed to electricity on generation, 
transmission (transport over national grid infrastructure), distribution (delivery to local demand 
centres) and supply (metering and service provision). Costs are incurred at each of these points 
e.g. through losses, network congestion, network operation/maintenance and metering. 
In the context of electrical power systems and charging for network access, cost reflectivity of 
charges is required to send accurate price signals to individual users of the network with respect 
to the costs they impose on network operation and/or development. This will ensure that in the 
short term, the system is efficiently operated without cross-subsidy between users and that, in 
the long term, it follows the path of least cost development (efficient investment). 
For network operation and expansion, this requires some form of coordination between 
generation and network development as the optimisation of the network in isolation from 
generation would almost certainly not meet the above objective. Historically, vertical 
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integration of conventional utilities seemed necessary for a sufficient level of coordination to be 
achieved. In the competitive environment, as exists in the UK, the necessary coordination of 
investing in generation and network assets is to be achieved through efficient network pricing 
mechanisms. These price signals directed at users of the network should be developed to 
influence their future decisions with regard to (a) location in the network (b) patterns of network 
use and (c) the need for (and location of) new network investments, i.e. encourage efficient 
network investment and discourage overinvestment. 
2.3.2 Long-run versus short-run marginal pricing of network access 
One of the consequences of the deregulation process in the UK has been the separation of 
generation from transmission. This separation is indeed frequently considered indispensable to 
achieve open and non-discriminatory access to the energy market. In this environment, pricing 
of transmission becomes the key to achieving both efficient operation and least-cost system 
development of the entire system. Coordination of investments in generation and transmission, 
which are now operated as separate entities, is to be achieved through efficient network pricing 
mechanisms. 
This development has opened the debate into the need to restructure the framework for 
investments in the transmission network. Long term investment can be achieved through two 
complementary directions; (i) merchant transmission investments and (ii) transmission 
investments based on regulatory incentives. 
The first approach starts from the view that market forces are the keys to investment and 
expansion in transmission. Location specific, short-run marginal cost based pricing is now a 
well-established method for allocating scarce network resources (Schweppe et al., 1988, Hogan, 
1999). Locational marginal prices (LMP) computed from a bid-based security constrained 
dispatch and combined with financial transmission rights (FTR) have been successfully 
implemented in several major electricity markets (Bushnell and Oren, 1997, Baughman, 1997, 
Ilic et al., 1997, Read, 1997). Locational marginal prices, coupled with FTRs, provide a 
conceptual framework for both pricing and transmission investments (Hogan, 1992). Funds 
created by the purchase of FTRs should support investment for transmission expansion. In this 
case, investment decisions should be effectively made by the users of the network, rather than 
centrally by transmission network operators, based on their forecasts of future needs. 
The second approach starts from the premise that transmission network is inherently a 
monopoly and hence needs to be regulated. In this approach, the transmission investment is 
planned centrally by the transmission network operator for approval by the regulator. All 
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generators and loads are usually given (almost) firm access rights, and they are compensated if 
the network is unable to accommodate their power outputs. The key responsibility of the 
regulatory agencies that determine the income of transmission developers is then to organise 
incentives that encourage an efficient transmission expansion. This approach has been adopted 
by the majority of European countries including the UK, and the corresponding transmission 
pricing arrangements are based on transmission investment costs, rather than generation costs as 
in the LMP model. To signal efficient behaviour regarding location and timing of output, 
efficient network prices for long term access should be based on future network expansion 
costs. Establishing these costs is a fundamental part of network planning, and draws an intrinsic 
link between the efficiency of the planning process and the subsequent development of a cost 
reflective pricing regime (Strbac et al., 2005). Rather than simply facilitating revenue recovery 
for the system operator, network prices should provoke user responses focussed on managing 
risk and uncertainty to optimise a position in the future (Turvey, 2005). The risk for system 
users can be minimised, and decisions made more efficient if network planning is carried out 
under the principles of non-discriminatory access and in recognition of the potential value and 
impact that all users have on the network. 
In theory, both of the discussed approaches for long and short term pricing of network access 
should deliver the same transmission network investment if perfect knowledge of the future 
were available. This convergence of long and short term prices is a consequence of the 
theoretical optimum in which the long run marginal cost equals short run marginal cost 
(Boiteux, 1960). 
2.4 Transmission network access 
The following section explores fundamental principles and regulatory frameworks behind the 
operation and development of the transmission system and looks at how they have shaped the 
existing infrastructure and define future network investment and real-time operation. The 
analysis then discusses the impact of penetration of renewables and DG into this framework and 
explores how various drivers (geographic location, diversity, pattern of generation etc.) are 
likely to influence the evolution of the regulatory framework that support the transmission 
networks. 
2.4.1 Transmission network long term access: design and investment 
The development of planning standards for transmission investment 
Networks exist to connect demand and generation, so network requirements are driven by the 
location and characteristics of demand and generation. For centralised networks with large scale 
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generation in remote locations from demand centres this necessitates a significant transmission 
system for bulk transport of power from large power stations (often in remote locations) to 
demand centres. In the UK, the current transmission system was built to facilitate the bulk 
transfer of power from large coal fired power stations in the North of England, to demand 
centres in the Midlands and South East of the country. The benefits of interconnection also 
meant that regional electricity companies were able to take advantage of generating surplus in 
neighbouring areas that provided an improvement in reliability for the individual areas in the 
interconnected network. In general, the benefits of an interconnected power system that are 
derived from an extensive transmission network are: 
• Efficient bulk transport of electricity (minimisation of losses): an interconnected 
transmission system provides the means for efficient bulk transfer of power from 
generation to demand centres 
• Facilitation of the competitive market between generation and supply: the interconnected 
transmission system, by linking together all participants across the transmission system, 
makes it possible to select the cheapest generation available 
• Reliability & security of supply: transmission circuits tend to be far more reliable than 
individual generating units, and enhanced security of supply is achieved because the 
interconnected transmission system enables exploitation of the diversity between 
individual generation sources. 
• Efficient, cost effective utilisation of generation capacity: realisation of diversity in the 
interconnected transmission system enables surplus generation capacity in one area to be 
used to cover shortfalls elsewhere on the system, resulting in lower installed capacity 
requirements to provide generation security for the whole system 
• Efficient provision of system services: without transmission interconnection, each 
separate system would need to carry its own frequency response to meet demand 
variations; with interconnection the net response requirement only needs to match the 
highest of the individual system requirements to cover for the largest potential loss of 
power (generation) rather than the sum of them all. 
For the transmission system operator this means optimising transmission design, reinforcement 
and operation, to find an optimal combination of long term infrastructure investments balanced 
against real-time system operation that delivers these benefits at least cost. Planning this optimal 
system requires the consideration of a complex array of factors, including forecasts of growth in 
demand and generation with their temporal and spatial distributions, together with the technical 
and cost characteristics of generation. These forecasts must then be combined into a forecast of 
future energy market conditions in order to answer the key questions as to where, when and 
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what transmission reinforcement is justified. Networlc investment driven by economic efficiency 
is focused on allowing efficient use of generation sources across the system, and planning 
transmission capacity that doesn't distort the market unnecessarily or inefficiently. In this 
context, evaluating possible schemes involves comprehensive technical, economic and 
reliability assessments that balance transmission investment costs against generation operating 
costs (cost of network constraints''' and losses) and the cost of un-served demand due to lack of 
capacity and availability of transmission. Optimal transmission capacity is obtained by 
minimising these operating costs and transmission investment as illustrated in Figure 2-6. 
The figure illustrates that optimal transmission capacity is found by balancing the transmission 
investment cost against the benefit derived from this investment by way of reduction in out of 
merit generation. Under the current Great Britain Security and Quality of Supply Standards 
(GBSQSS) the requirement for high standards of system reliability usually ensures that the 
system specification already exceeds the capacity that would be proposed under planning 
proposals for economic efficiency alone. However, the consideration of DG in system planning 
may change this balance. As demonstrated in the previous section, many DG technologies make 
a limited contribution to reliability of the network due to low capacity, credits. As such, planning 
the network on the basis of generation contribution to reliability alone may no longer be 
optimal. 
Cost of 
constrained 
energy, losses 
& lost load 
Cost of 
Investment & 
Maintenance 
Optimal network 
Network Capacity and Redundancy 
Figure 2-6: Optimal balance between transmission investment and operating cost 
" The cost of constraints is in essence the cost associated with dispatching more expensive generation instead of 
cheaper generation due to network capacity constraints. This cost is also known as out of merit order generation cost. 
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In practice, the System Operator uses simpler deterministic planning guides (also called network 
planning standards) that present a proxy of the comprehensive reliability and cost-benefit 
assessments for determining the amount of transmission capacity required to transport power 
across various system boundaries given a predefined set of generation and demand scenarios. 
The GBSQSS drive the design of the GB Transmission Network and were developed as a proxy 
for investment in systems with conventional generation (NGET, 2004). The focus of the 
GBSQSS is on the development of networks that guarantee high levels of reliability. Economic 
efficiency of network development is also important, but the priority of reliability generally 
ensures that network reinforcements that meet reliability standards will exceed the capacity 
required if only economic efficiency is considered. The key underlying philosophy of the 
GBSQSS standard is that generation in one area of the interconnected transmission system 
should not be unduly restricted from contributing to securing supply for loads in a remote area, 
via the interconnected system. If necessary, this requirement drives reinforcement of the 
network to ensure that this criterion can be met. To do this, network planners traditionally 
would consider conditions of peak demand to determine the need for transmission network 
capacity across the major transmission boundaries based on these reliability requirements. 
For a system with conventional generation, network design driven by peak conditions is also 
adequate for a wide range of off-peak conditions, including planned outages of both generation 
and transmission facilities. In designing networks to meet this reliability criterion many other 
conditions concerned in network planning will also implicitly be met, for example losses; a 
network designed for reliability has a high level of redundancy which keeps loading of the 
network low, thus minimising losses as a side-effect of the design. 
The existing methodology was developed for conventional generation and considers 
contributions to the system at times of peak loading to be the primary driver for reinforcement 
of the network. The current standard presumes that because conventional generation is load-
following, that plant will be operating at close to maximum output at times of peak demand (to 
take advantage of peak prices). A scaling factor is applied to modify output according to 
expected load factors e.g. conventional generation has a scaling factor of 0.83, wind generation 
a factor of 0.6 and this is used to calculate the capacity requirements for a system with a given 
installed generation capacity and demand requirements. The scaling factor for low-load factor 
generation such as wind was recently introduced into the GBSQSS, however, there is ongoing 
discussion on the appropriate scaling factor to be used for wind, with alternative studies 
suggesting a factor of between 20-40% may be more appropriate (SKM, 2004, Strbac et al., 
2007X 
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Network investment for reliability 
The relationship which defines transmission network capacity required to achieve system 
reliability is not always clear, and in many systems techniques to determine adequate 
transmission capacity to ensure system reliability has been developed through the codification 
of long-standing heuristic rules (as described in the GBSQSS). To allow analysis of the impact 
of non-conventional generation on designing transmission networks for reliability, this section 
explores the link between overall system reliability metrics and the specific contribution of the 
(constrained) transmission network on system reliability'^. 
In many countries, overall system reliability is measured through the statistical probability that 
consumers of electricity may be faced with the loss of their supplies due to insufficient 
generation. In the UK this is measured by the Loss Of Load Probability index (LOLP) 
representing the probability of the annual peak load exceeding the available generation. For 
example, in the GB system, the generation adequacy standard used to set the probability of peak 
load not being supplied at 9%. This was often interpreted as the likelihood of peak demand 
exceeding the available generation being at most 0.09, or that generation shortages should not 
occur in more than 9 winters in one hundred years. This calculation was based on the 
probability of there being insufficient generation to meet demand, however, the risk of 
interruptions will also be affected (and will increase) in the presence of a finite transmission 
network capacity (i.e. an optimally constrained network). 
From a network perspective, an underlying philosophy of transmission network planning (for 
systems with conventional generation) is to ensure the adequacy (reliability) of supply. This 
centres on the requirement that transmission capacity between system boundaries should be 
sufficient to ensure that generators in remote areas are not unduly restricted from contributing to 
security of supply of loads (the basis of the GBSQSS proxy). On this basis, the average power 
transfers on the system at peak will be determined by the average local plant/demand balances. 
These power transfers can be obtained by scaling all generation throughout the system to meet 
the forecast peak demand (to take account of the generation margin). For example, under a 
central planning approach, this scaling factor would simply be the inverse of the plant margin -
thus if the margin were 20% the scaling factor applied to generation would be 1/1.20 = 0.83. 
In reality, the system is unlikely to require this "average" interconnection value at all boundaries 
across the whole system. This deviation from the average is allowed for by adding a margin to 
the planned transfer. In the GB system, the appropriate margin called interconnection allowance 
This describes the methods as developed in the recent report: STRBAC, G., PUDJIANTO, D,, CASTRO, M,, DJAPIC, 
P., STOJKOVSKA, B., RAMSAY, C. & ALLAN, R. (2007) Transmission Investment, Access and Pricing in Systems with 
Wind Generation. DTI Centre for Distributed Generation and Sustainable Electrical Energy. 
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was determined by observation of actual inter-area flows which allowed the construction of a 
relationship between the likely maximum required transfer and the generation and demand in 
the smaller of the two areas under consideration. 
The risk (probability) that the transmission system capacity will be insufficient to meet the 
demand is quantified using the methodology for the reliability evaluation of interconnected 
systems (Billington and Allan, 1984). This risk reduces sharply with the increase in 
transmission capacity between the two areas. However, at a certain level of transmission 
capacity, the risk converges to a value that represents the minimum risk that such an 
interconnected transmission system can have under given conditions (i.e. there is a point at 
which increasing transmission capacity can no longer improve the probability of loss of supply). 
This is illustrated in the 2 busbar system illustrated in Figure 2-1 a. The sample system is divided 
into areas A and B. Both areas are characterized by the same conventional installed capacity 
(3IGW, with availability factor of 0.85), and the same peak demand (25GW) and are connected 
by a transmission line of finite capacity. If generation outputs are scaled to meet peak demand, 
net generation will be 25MW from both A and B and average peak flow between the two areas 
is zero. However, it would be beneficial to have some transmission boundary capacity to enable 
sharing of reserve in both areas and increase overall system reliability. 
(a) 
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Figure 2-7: Example two-busbar system and calculation of system risk imposed by transmission capacity 
Using the previously cited methodology for reliability evaluation of interconnected systems, 
Figure 2-7b shows how the risk of loss of load decreases with increasing transmission capacity 
as described above. If we apply the GBSQSS based rules for network design to this system the 
optimal level of interconnection is found to be 2GW (See NGET, 2004 for a full description of 
the interconnection planning methodology). So under traditional network planning guidelines, 
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interconnection of 2GW would be installed. This is only around 0.5 GW less than the capacity 
at which no further improvement in system reliability is seen. 
So to quantify the additional risk of loss of load that a finite (optimally constrained) network 
imposes on the overall system we can see that this is around a 5% increase in system LOLP 
(from 0.073 to 0.077). In the context of whole system reliability, we can determine that the 
initial figure of 0.09 LOLP related to the probability of generation being insufficient to meet 
demand, is increased by 5% to 0.094 when the finite nature of the transmission system is 
included. 
The implications of this finding are that the transmission system designed using the current 
standard specifies an optimally constrained network that balances the cost of system reliability 
against the cost of investment, with the outcome that only low levels of system LOLP caused by 
transmission network constraints can be tolerated under the current arrangements. The focus of 
the current standards is on sizing the network to allow fulfilment of peak demand requirements, 
which is facilitated by providing sufficient network for coincident peak output of connected 
generators. 
2.4.2 Regulatory arrangements and charging for long term access: 
system reinforcement costs 
Long term transmission access for generation is linked to transmission investment and 
administered through the Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC) product, so all generators wishing 
to connect and export to the transmission system must hold TEC. Connection to transmission is 
on the basis of "invest then connect", so necessary network reinforcements are made before 
connection is allowed and TEC is then issued"'. For generators TEC represents the maximum 
allowable output from any given generator, at any point in time, and provides the generator with 
guaranteed, long term firm access rights for transmission. Generators holding TEC will be 
compensated by the System Operator if they cannot access transmission up to their purchased 
TEC capacity. For the System Operator, TEC is used as a proxy to determine transmission 
capacity requirements (and corresponding investment) to accommodate new generation into the 
network (i.e. to optimise constraints while ensuring adequate security levels). 
Long term network reinforcement costs are recovered through Investment Cost Related Pricing 
(ICRP) that indicates the marginal cost of connection for generation (based on TEC) and derives 
Note that the System Operator cannot issue more TEC than there is transmission capacity available, so if there 
insufficient capacity available to connect a generator, connection (and the issuing of TEC) is delayed until network 
reinforcements have been carried out. 
54 
Chapter 2: Network Operation and Development 
a locational cost element of the Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charge. An 
additional non-locational (or "residual") element is then added for revenue recovery. 
In order to achieve key pricing objectives of economic efficiency, National Grid Electricity 
Transmission (NGET), transmission system operators of the Great Britain transmission 
network, have developed a location specific network investment based pricing method. This 
method rewards users who reduce the demand for transmission investments (i.e. generators that 
are located in demand dominated areas and demand users located in generation dominated 
areas) and penalizes users who impose the need for transmission investment (i.e.generators that 
are located away from the load centres and demand located in demand dominated areas). 
At present, most generation connected in the distribution networks are not exposed to these 
TNUoS charges (Ofgem and Dti, 2004). Generation in the distribution network that is under 
lOOMW in capacity can choose to be a licence exempt generator. In doing so the generator 
waives the right to sign up to the Balancing and Settlement Code (which allows participation in 
the wholesale markets) and is not asked to be a signatory to the transmission Connection and 
Use of System Code (CUSC) (that brings with it mandatory control activities requiring the 
signatory to contribute to system operation functions). This means that licence exempt 
generation is not liable for TNUoS charges, as it effectively is not utilising the transmission 
network for export. Furthermore, for DG, being connected closer to demand (thus reducing the 
requirement for transmission) brings an additional advantage of the embedded benefit. For 
generators that have contracted to sell their output to an energy supplier with a presence in the 
same location (at the same Balancing Mechanism Unit (BMU)), their output can be offset 
against the supplier's total demand, reducing the net demand, and reducing the supplier's 
exposure to the demand TNUoS charge. 
For distributed generators that want to export to the transmission network or take part in the 
various transmission related services there are two access products - the BEGA and the BELLA 
- that can facilitate this interaction. 
• Bilateral Embedded Generation Agreement (BEGA): 
The BEGA is an agreement entered into between NGET and a CUSC user relating to a 
generating station (or other connections provided for in the CUSC) connected to a 
distribution system and the use of the GB transmission system. It identifies the relevant site 
of connection to the distribution system and sets out other site specific details in relation to 
that use of the GB transmission system. The BEGA confers use of system rights to a 
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generator (through allocation of TEC), allows utilisation of the balancing mechanism, and 
with all this exposes the generator to some use of system charges. 
• Bilateral Embedded Licence exemptable Large power station Agreement (BELLA) 
An agreement entered into between NGET and a CUSC user relating to a generating station 
(or other connections provided for in the CUSC) connected to a distribution system and the 
use of the GB transmission system. Unlike the BEGA, the BELLA does not allocate any use 
of system rights to the generator or require a user to pay charges in accordance with the 
transmission charging methodology. Furthermore, the generators would not be required to 
become a BSC party and fewer elements of the Grid Code would be applicable. 
These arrangements are relatively complex and involve DG interaction with both the DNO and 
TSO. They are contracts designed for single generators (usually those that are just under 
lOOMW) and it is unlikely that generators at the smaller end of the scale would find it 
financially viable to take on the administration of one of these arrangements. Because they are 
individual arrangements between the generator and the System Operator(s), both the BEGA and 
the BELLA result in gross treatment of DG access to transmission (fundamentally treatment 
using the TEC approach, although DG holding a BELLA does not have to specify TEC 
directly). This means that through these products each DG is allocated an individual maximum 
capacity allowance on the transmission system and no account is taken of time of use of the 
system or diversity in output between the DG with a BEGA/BELLA and other generators (or 
demand) in the network". 
2.4.3 Transmission networl< short term access: constraint management 
In the early 1990's, privatisation and liberalisation of the electricity sector in the UK led to 
development of competitive markets in generation and supply, but the activities of transmission 
and distribution, although privatised, were identified as natural monopoly functions and 
maintained as separate, regulated entities. The British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangements (BETTA) approach maintains the situation adopted by NETA of decoupling 
energy and short term transmission access. Under BETTA, there is unconstrained (non-location 
" A discussion to initiate the development of enduring transmission arrangements for DG was headed by Ofgem in 
September 2005 OFGEM {2005a) Enduring transmission charging arrangements for Distributed Generation: A 
Discussion Document. London, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, OFGEM (2006b) Enduring Transmission 
Arrangements for Distributed Generation: Further Thoughts Document. Further Thoughts Document. London, Office of 
Gas & Electricity Markets.. Here the concern was raised that DG was not adequately exposed to transmission charges, 
and that this could result in cross subsidy between transmission and distribution connected generation, creating the 
potential for perverse incentives for generation to connect at sub-transmission levels just to avoid charges. The 
consultation identified the growing penetration of DG as a stimulus for action on developing transmission arrangements, 
citing in particular the concern voiced by the System Operator that some distribution areas with particularly high 
penetration of DG could now be exporting back to the transmission network at particular times of the day without 
specific access rights NGET (2005a) Enduring Charging Arrangements for Distributed Generation: Response to Ofgem 
Discussion Document September 2005. National Grid Electricity Transmission.. 
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specific) energy trading in competitive wholesale energy markets. So, in the short term (real 
time operation) transmission availability and constraints resulting from contracts formed in the 
energy market are managed through the balancing mechanism. 
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Figure 2-8: Operation of the UK Electricity Market during a single Settlement Period (NGET, 2007a) 
Figure 2-8 illustrates the operation of the UK electricity market and the positioning of the 
balancing mechanism. Trading occurs for delivery of contracts in half hour Settlement Periods 
throughout the day (each day is composed of 48 periods), and contracts for each period can be 
agreed up to one hour before delivery (Gate Closure). The Market is split into three discrete 
periods; the Forwards Market and Power Exchange, the Balancing Market (including the 
Settlement Period) and Imbalance Settlement. 
At Gate Closure, all market participants are obliged to submit Final Physical Notifications 
(FPN) to the System Operator, informing the Operator of their expected generation or supply 
position in the subsequent Settlement Period. Any Party wishing to transact in the Balancing 
Market must submit bids (to decrease generation/increase demand) and offers (to increase 
generation/decrease demand), along with their Final Physical Notification. In parallel with this 
all Parties must also submit information on their contracted positions prior to Gate Closure to 
the ECVAA (Energy Contract Volume Aggregation Agent). 
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Management of network access and resolving constraints (caused by the non-location specific 
trading of energy in the wholesale markets) is carried out by the system operator close to real 
time. Under normal operating conditions, the system operator will begin to balance the system 
using Physical Notifications submitted by transmission connected generation. These 
notifications are submitted a day ahead (Interim Physical Notifications) and an hour before real 
time (Final Physical Notifications) by all market participants, which indicate to the system 
operator the physical flows on the network. The system operator will then use a combination of 
bids and offers from the Balancing Mechanism and dispatch of scheduled response and reserve 
services to ensure that supply and demand are continuously matched at all times and that any 
system constraints are optimally resolved. Under emergency situations the system operator has a 
range of additional system service contracts that it can call on at very short notice. The ability of 
generators to maintain a level of flexible and controllable capacity in the balancing mechanism 
is of key importance to providing these services to the system operator. 
2.4.4 Regulatory arrangements and charging for short term access: 
allocation of constraint costs 
The cost of short term network access is expressed in the transmission system constraint costs. 
This is the cost of constraining off and re-dispatching generation to resolve network constraints 
that arise because of un-restricted trading of energy on the wholesale markets. This cost is 
essentially the discrepancy between the amount paid to generators constrained on, and paid out 
by those which are constrained off. In a perfect system this will be equivalent to the fuel cost 
differential between generators. The system constraint costs are separated from energy 
imbalance costs'^ (where generators have over/under produced according to their contracted 
volumes) and the resulting Balancing Service Use of System (BSUoS) charges include the cost 
of losses which are shared equally throughout all market participants (generation and demand) 
according to their traded volumes. Because these costs are socialised across all system 
participants there is no locational element to the charge, users are not exposed to the costs of 
short term network access and the short term value of transmission access remains hidden. 
For every half hour Settlement Period market participants must ensure that their contracted volumes match their 
metered output (or demand) as closely as possible. Parties causing the system to be in imbalance are penalised with a 
dual price cash-out mechanism that charges market participants according to whether they have left the system long or 
short of power during the contracted period. Those causing the system to be short (i.e. a deficit of power due to under-
production or over-consumption) are obliged to pay the System Buy Price (SBP) on the volume of imbalance created. 
Parties causing the system to go long (i.e. a surplus of power due to over-production or under-consumption) are paid a 
System Sell Price (SSP) for the excess power. In most instances the SBP is greater than the average spot price for that 
period and the SSP is less. To manage this imbalance risk, market participants undertake balancing activities. Typically, 
this occurs in the power exchanges, where participants fine tune their positions close to real time by contracting with 
generators or suppliers to adapt their position. This type of balancing only takes place before Gate Closure. At Gate 
Closure, all parties must submit a full record of their contracted volumes for the same Period; during Imbalance 
Settlement, this data is then reconciled with final metering data to determine each party's imbalance position. 
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2.4.5 Challenges to transmission networf< operation and development 
from transmission connected renewable generation 
Challenging the appropriateness of the current GBSQSS 
Markets and regulatory frameworks are developed to achieve optimal allocation of resources in 
particular systems; they are tailored to meet the needs of the incumbent technologies and 
operating philosophies. As the profile of technologies changes, e.g. with the penetration of DG 
and renewables, market and regulatory arrangements may accordingly also need to change to 
reflect the changing characteristics of the system. The current system has been developed in the 
context of large-scale transmission connected generation. As demonstrated above, the standards 
that guide the design and development of the system, the GBSQSS, are a proxy to deliver the 
optimal development of this system. 
However, with the penetration of new, non-conventional generation technologies and a 
changing physical system, it is possible that this proxy will no longer be suitable for the system 
that we are moving towards. Recognition of the issue of spatial and temporal differences in 
renewable and distributed generation versus conventional generation is going to be vital in 
developing an optimal system that rewards generators appropriately, sends the correct signals 
regarding location and timing of output, and does not discriminate against any participant. For 
example, the role of reliability in network standards is likely to change. Previously a driving 
factor in network design, as identified in section 2.2.3, new generators entering the system 
invariably have a low capacity credit and are less able to make a contribution towards system 
reliability. 
Furthermore, there are entirely new technologies entering the system that require a complete 
reappraisal of the operation and investment regime for transmission. Offshore wind generation 
requires the construction of a new transmission system to connect generation units back to the 
shore. These offshore units are characterised entirely differently to onshore wind, and 
conventional generation. There is no demand offshore, cabling technology is different and 
considerably more expensive, even the structures for development of the roles of System Owner 
and Operator and the interaction with the onshore network operator are entirely new. Although 
offshore transmission questions are not dealt with further in this research, this highlights the 
materiality of the present issues in transmission. The system is undergoing material physical 
change that will necessitate reconsideration of the central tenets of its operation and 
development. (For further discussion of the issues around development of the offshore 
transmission network roles and responsibilities see (Tutton, 2007) and for a comprehensive 
view on the progress with offshore transmission grid codes and GBSQSS see (Ofgem, 2007b)). 
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Given this importance of spatial and temporal issues, and the difference between conventional 
and non-conventional generation in this respect, it is apparent that the new system will have 
different requirements. The optimal balances between investment in capacity and management 
of operational costs will change and this needs to be reflected in new GBSQSS or some 
alternative and new proxy. Standards are the starting point between the TSO and system users 
on how the network should develop and they should not ignore (or inappropriately 
oversimplify) what users want. In a competitive market environment user choice is the key; if 
the current standards are to remain, they must evolve to reflect this and represent the increasing 
number of options in system development. 
Maintaining the separation of energy and access 
The current market arrangements under BETTA maintain a separation of energy and access, so 
that energy is sold in the wholesale markets without including the value of short term network 
access in the wholesale price. Whilst this is an approach that has not been detrimental in the 
current system where a homogenous group of generation units use the system in a similar and 
predictable fashion, constraint costs are low and the impact of location on the value of power is 
minimal, the future system could change this. New renewable generation is entering the system 
in potentially very large amounts. Because of the availability of the wind resource this new 
generation must be sited in an area of the network that is already experiencing congestion, and it 
will exacerbate the already apparent north-south flow of power. 
It is likely that the value of access in these already constrained areas could change quite 
significantly (with time of use of the system and weather conditions) and that this could 
massively impact the value of energy from particular locations. Failure to reflect these 
differences in value that change with both location and time, and to pass the costs on to the 
users of the system that impose them, could result in a non-competitive environment of sub-
optimal development and considerable cross-subsidy between users. It also prevents certain 
systems users (primarily demand users) from receiving cost reflective price signals that could 
stimulate efficient responses in terms of system operation and promoting optimal long term 
development in non-network solutions (i.e. demand response could mitigate reinforcement). 
2.5 Distribution network access 
The following section explores fundamental principles and regulatory frameworks behind the 
operation and development of the distribution network. The legacy of passive operation means 
that all short term access issues encapsulated in the operational activities of the network are 
resolved at the network planning stage, so the concept of short term access and associated 
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frameworks is not well represented in the conventional distribution system. As such this 
analysis focuses on the long term network access arrangements and charging frameworks that 
dominates the network access discussion in the distribution network. 
As in the previous section, the analysis then discusses the impact of penetration of distributed 
generation into this framework and explores how various drivers (location in the network, 
density of installations, diversity, pattern of generation etc.) are likely to influence the evolution 
of the regulatory framework that supports the distribution networks. 
There is an extensive body of research on the impact of the regulatory regime at distribution 
level, particularly with reference to how this incentivises or acts as a barrier to connection of 
DG. The aim of this review of distribution network access is to identify the high level principles 
that drive the approach to network access, with a view to determining their impact on 
competition as reflected in cost reflectivity of access for system users. The detail of monopoly 
regulation and development of incentive schemes to reflect e.g. policy interest in encouraging 
low-carbon generation is out of the scope of the research presented in this thesis. For more 
extensive reviews of the impact of regulatory incentive schemes see work carried out under the 
SUSTELNET (Connor and Mitchell, 2002, Scheepers and Wals, 2003) and DG GRID 
programmes (Gomez et al., 2007, Bauknecht et al., 2007) 
2.5.1 Distribution networi< long term access: networi< design, security 
standards and investment 
In this section the key design and investment philosophies that have led to the development of 
the existing distribution network infrastructure are discussed. The main investment drivers in 
distribution network design are: 
• Network security: the need to satisfy network security requirements by investing in 
adequate network capacity 
• Network losses: the need to strike an optimal balance between operating costs and 
network investment; and 
• Service quality expenditure required to improve network performance indicators e.g. 
Customer Interruptions (average number of interruptions per 100 customers per year) 
and Customer Minutes Lost (average duration of interruptions per customer per year). 
The overarching theme running through all these drivers and through the design and 
development of the distribution system is that all the issues pertinent to distribution network 
access have to date been dealt with according to the requirements of demand. Because 
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conventional distribution networks are passive operators, they have the sole function of serving 
demand; and original grid codes and standards have been developed to uphold security of 
supply for demand alone, without consideration for the impact or needs of generation in the 
network. Historically, this has been an appropriate approach because the penetration of DG in 
the system has not been significant enough to cause disruption. 
Network Security 
Delivering security for demand 
The passively managed distribution networks are usually planned to accommodate single 
direction power flows. The primary assets (transformers, switchgear, overhead lines and cables) 
on passive networks are specified to accommodate a set of pre-specified operating conditions, 
ensuring the technical parameters of supply (e.g. voltage and power flows) are maintained 
within statutory and safe limits, without the requirement for proactive network monitoring and 
reconfiguration. This is a key feature of the overall philosophy of network operation and 
investment and is reflected in the distribution network planning standard (Engineering 
Recommendation P 2/6, adapted in 2006 from the previous P2/5 document) that is a part of the 
licence condition. The standard is focused on requirement associated with network security of 
supplying peak demand'^. The general aims of the security standard are to provide "sufficient 
plant and other resources to provide and maintain an economic level of reliability of supply to 
the consumer"; it proposes that "the main factors affording a gauge of reliability of supply are 
frequency of interruption, duration of interruption and value of the service not provided"(ACE, 
1979). 
ER P2/6 broadly defines the network design philosophy and requirements to comply with the 
security standard. The level of security in distribution networks is defined in terms of the time 
taken to restore power supplies following a predefined set of outages. Consistent with this 
concept, security levels on distribution systems are graded according to the total amount of peak 
power that can be lost. A simplified illustration of this network design philosophy is presented 
in Figure 2-9. For instance small demand groups (e.g. in the 0.4kV low voltage network) with 
less than IMW peak, are provided with the lowest level of security, and have no redundancy (N-
0 security). This means that any fault will cause an interruption and the supply will be restored 
only after the fault is repaired. It is expected that this could take up to 24 hours. 
' It is notable that the ER P2/6 standard does not discuss levels of security that may be appropriate for generation. 
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132 KV 
33/66 KV 
11 KV 
0.4 kV 
n-2 
3 Time to restore supplies (hours) 
Reclundancv 
24 
n-0 
Where: 
n-0 = no redundancy in security (must wait for repair of network); 
n-1 = one level of network redundancy; and 
n-2 = two levels of network redundancy. 
Figure 2-9: ER P2/6 restoration time philosophy relative to peak network demand/network voltage level 
For demand groups between IMW and 100 MW, although a single fault may lead to an 
interruption, the bulk of the lost load should be restored within 3 hours. This requires presence 
of redundancy, as 3 hours is usually insufficient to implement repairs, but it does allow network 
reconfiguration activities. Such network designs are often described as providing n-1 security. 
For demand groups larger than lOOMW, the networks should be able to provide supply 
continuity to customers following a single circuit outage (with no loss of supply) but also 
provide significant redundancy to enable supply restoration following a fault on another circuit 
superimposed on the existing outage, i.e. n-2 security. 
Recognising the security contribution from DG 
In the UK recognition of the contribution of DG to securing load has recently led to a change in 
the Engineering Recommendation (from P2/5 to P2/6), a methodology for updating the standard 
has been developed and adopted to take into consideration the contribution of new generation 
technologies (Allan et al., 2004). The methodology proposes a calculation of the capacity of a 
perfect circuit, which, when substituted for the DG, gives the same level of expected energy not 
supplied. The capacity of this ideal circuit is a measure of the capacity contribution of DG. 
The standard developed can deal with both non-intermittent and intermittent generation 
technologies. Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 are taken from the new standard to illustrate the features 
and the magnitude of the contribution to network security that is associated with various forms 
of DG. For non intermittent generation, availability of individual units and the number of units 
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are key driving factors of the contribution that DG can make. The average values of actual 
availabilities for each type of non-intermittent plant are established and a security contribution 
evaluated. As expected, units with higher availabilities make larger contributions to security 
than units with lower availability. Furthermore, a single unit makes less contribution than a 
capacity-equivalent group of multiple units. Both tables illustrate the "F Factors" for each 
characteristic technology, this represents a scaling factor to calculate the level output that can be 
guaranteed against the total capacity of the generator. 
For intermittent generation, such as wind and hydro, the average winter output profile and the 
minimum persistence time is used. Persistence time is the period of time for which 
intermittent generation will need to operate continuously at or above a certain output level in 
order to support the demand and provide system security. The minimum persistence time is 
dependent on the system state and conditions (such as switching, repair, and maintenance 
processes). As shown in Table 2-4 below, the longer the time period over which a certain level 
of output is expected the lower the capacity contribution of the intermittent generator. For 
example, if the time over which the support is required is 30 minutes, 28% of the installed 
capacity can be "relied upon" while this value reduces to 11% for the time period of 24 hours. 
Type of generation 
(average availability, %) 
Number of generation units 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+ 
Landfill Gas (90) 63 69 73 75 77 78 79 79 80 80 
CCGT (90) 63 69 73 75 77 78 79 79 80 80 
CHP 
Sewerage: spark 
ignition (60) 40 48 51 52 53 54 55 55 56 56 
Sewerage: Gas 
Turbine (80) 53 61 65 67 69 70 71 71 72 73 
Other CHP 
(80; 53 61 65 67 69 70 71 71 72 73 
Waste to Energy fSSj 58 64 69 71 73 74 75 75 76 77 
Table 2-3: F factors in % for non-intermittent generation 
Type of generation 
Minimum persistence time, Tm (hours) 
0.5 2 3 18 24 120 360 >360 
Wind 
Single site 28 25 24 14 11 0 0 0 
Multiple sites 28 25 24 15 12 0 - -
Small hydro 37 36 36 34 34 25 13 0 
Table 2-4: F factors in % for intermittent generation 
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Rewarding security contributions from DG 
The rate of deployment of new distributed generation has remained relatively low since the 
implementation of ER P2/6 and no examples of distributed generation being used to secure 
Demand Groups have been identified. The lack of an established framework by which DNOs 
can reward generators for the provision of security contributions has been identified as a barrier 
and the current regulatoiy arrangements do not incentivise DNOs to make payments to 
generators. However, examples of DNOs procuring short term network security contributions 
from distributed generation were identified in the Dutch electricity market with generators being 
rewarded accordingly. 
Quality of supply 
Evolution of quality of supply performance in UK 
Historically, quality of supply was regulated through the Guaranteed and Overall Standards of 
performance, using the performance indicators of Customer Interruptions (CI) and Customer 
Minutes Lost (CML) to measure the number of times customers lost service and the duration of 
the outage. Guaranteed Standards entitled consumers to compensation for receiving service 
below specified thresholds, while the Overall Standards monitored system level performance for 
each distribution company. Consequently, significant progress was made with regards to quality 
of supply. 
The Information and Incentive Project was first introduced in April 2002 to set each DNO with 
specific targets for the quality of supply measures CI and CML based on individual DNOs' past 
performance. The initial IIP incentive scheme linked the quality of supply performance of 
DNOs to their allowed revenue (+/-2% of exposed revenue). This included mechanisms that 
penalised companies for not meeting their quality of supply targets and rewarded companies 
that exceed them. The introduction of the IIP resulted in further significant improvements in the 
quality of supply indicators and on network reliability performance in Britain. 
Impact of IIS on network design and operation: System design and performance 
As discussed earlier, ER P2/6 does not require network redundancy at low voltage (LV) and the 
duration of outages caused by LV faults is determined by component repair and replacement 
times. High Voltage (HV) networks are generally designed as meshed but operated in radial 
mode. The consequence of this design feature is that, generally, faults on the HV network will 
cause interruptions to some customers although the network configuration enables restorations 
to be implemented rapidly, within 3 hours, as required by ER P2/6. Networks operating at EHV 
are designed to be operated in a meshed configuration, so that single faults would not normally 
lead to an interruption to end customers. 
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These network design practices, driven by ER P2/6, effectively determine quality of service 
characteristics as experienced by end customers. IIS targets incentivise DNOs to reduce the 
average number of CI/CMLs on electricity distribution networks. Consequently, DNOs evaluate 
the regulatory target and incentive framework to determine the most cost effective methods of 
achieving quality of supply improvements. To date, DNO IIS related investments have sought to 
address the most effective 'quick-wins' in terms of performance improvement. Since 
implementation, the IIS has focussed DNO attention upon HV network automation and remote 
control (and to a lesser extent LV) networks. After exhausting such HV automation 
opportunities, it would be logical to address LV network performance improvements although 
such investments may be more costly due to requirement to reconfigure (and potentially 
duplicate) primary assets. 
This attention has resulted in many LV and ETV circuits being designed beyond the ER P2/6 
minimum requirement. By contrast, there is less scope to effect IIS performance improvements 
through investments in EHV networks. This is attributable to the high reliability of such 
networks arising as a consequence of ER P2/6 redundancy requirements and extensive network 
automation. Quality of supply related incidents arising from EHV networks are therefore 
regarded as low probability: high impact events relative to HV/LV networks. Consequently, it 
can be concluded that the IIS has been particularly influential with respect to HV/LV network 
design, whereas EHV design has tended to be driven by planning standards. 
A potential future risk associated with reliance on an incentive scheme for network design is 
that a disproportionate focus could be placed on short term network performance. Such 
incentive arrangements adequately address frequent low impact interruptions. However, such 
arrangements do not adequately address low probability high impact events typified by the 
larger Demand Groups. Consequently, over-reliance on quality of supply incentive schemes to 
influence network design could be to the detriment of long term EHV network planning and 
security of supply to customers. 
Incentives to connect distributed generation 
In April 2005 Ofgem introduced an incentive scheme for DNOs in relation to the connection of 
distributed generation. Under the scheme, costs incurred by the DNO when providing network 
access to distributed generators are partially (80%) passed-through and potential shortfalls are 
compensated through the application of a supplementary £/kW revenue incentive of £1.50/kW 
for all DNOs (except for the North of Scotland) (Ofgem, 2004a). This arrangement was devised 
to incentivise DNOs to actively facilitate the connection of all forms of distributed generation. 
From a DNO's perspective, increasing the capacity of distributed generation connected to a 
DNO network also increases the DNO's corresponding revenue allowance. 
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Network Losses 
Minimum planning requirements and lifecycie costing 
The Losses Incentive Mechanism has been put in place to encourage DNOs to take steps 
towards reduction of losses. The incentive rewards DNOs with a flat rate per unit of losses 
reduced from a baseline derived from historical performance (DNOs are also penalised by the 
same amount for loss increases); the current reward rate is £48/MWh (Ofgem, 2004b). 
However, typically, losses have not been a key driver of network investment activity, although 
the UK electricity losses at distribution average around 7% per annum and are the highest in 
Europe (Ofgem, 2003a). 
Network design according to the minimum planning standard is focused on least cost 
investment to meet peak demand, and although this standard does now include the contribution 
of generation to securing demand, this approach does not encourage a whole lifecycie approach 
to optimising network investment against ongoing running costs. In the case of losses, recent 
work indicates that it can be economically efficient to install some network components (e.g. 
cables) rated at 5-10 times the demand requirement when evaluated over 20 year time horizon, 
especially for LV and HV circuits. However, under the current approach the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of ongoing operational costs is not sufficiently significant to warrant their consideration 
alongside (or over) the upfront costs of installation. 
2.5.2 Regulatory arrangements and charging for long term access: 
Distribution Use of System charges 
To evaluate charges for the use of distribution networks, the majority of DNOs use a 
methodology known as the Distribution Reinforcement Model (DRM). This method is 
employed to evaluate the long run marginal cost of expanding, maintaining and operating the 
distribution system. This is achieved by calculating the network cost of adding a 500 MW load 
on the system maximum demand. 
These costs are then allocated across voltage levels and customer groups such that the resulting 
Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charges are somewhat cost reflective. This is achieved by 
identifying the contribution of each customer group to the long term distribution system cost. 
The resulting tariff takes the form of maximum demand and/or unit related charges. Maximum 
demand charges are used for levels of the system close to customers. This is based on the 
argument that customers will occupy fully the capacity of the local network to which they are 
connected. These charges are usually expressed in terms of £/kVA/month. On the other hand, 
unit based charges in £/kWh reflect the impact on the network cost further up the system. This 
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approach is supported by the argument that the customer individual maximum demand is less 
likely to coincide with the system maximum demand. Although the tariffs are designed to be 
cost reflective a number of simplifying compromises are made in the implementation phase. 
It is important to bear in mind that distribution use-of-system tariffs have been developed for 
customers who take power from the network rather than for customers who inject power into it 
(i.e. generators). 
2.5.3 Challenges to distribution network operation and development from 
distributed generation 
The electricity distribution networks of Britain have delivered secure and reliable supplies to 
customers. This performance is directly related to the network planning, design and operating 
practices of the DNOs. Consequently, it can be inferred that the existing standards and 
regulatory incentive arrangements have been effective in delivering secure and reliable 
networks to date. The key issue going forward is how this framework needs to evolve to 
continue to deliver efficient and optimal operation and investment for the future sustainable 
energy system? 
Developing network access arrangements for generation 
As noted above, the primary feature of the current network access arrangements for the 
distribution is that they have been developed to serve the requirements of demand alone. 
Because of the historical lack of generation connection in the distribution network and the 
passive unidirectional operation philosophy, the driving factor in development and design of the 
networks has been in securing demand and ensuring quality of supply to demand customers. 
The first and most relevant challenge to distribution access arrangements therefore is the need to 
augment the emphasis of the current arrangements to include consideration of the requirements 
of demand in network operation and development. Without this consideration, as the penetration 
of generation grows in the network the current standards will be increasingly ill-equipped to 
direct the development of an optimal and cost effective network. 
As an example, the ER P2/6 does not address the security of power transfers originating from 
generation. Because of the historical demand-only focus, currently DNOs are not required to 
provide a particular level of security to generator customers. Although the adaptation of the 
P2/6 methodology to include the contribution of generation in securing demand was a 
significant step forward in recognising the contribution of DG to network conditions, this still 
maintains the demand focus, and makes no mention of the security requirements of DG. 
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Although not a material problem in the current system, offshore wind generation highlights a 
potential problem with this approach. 
A number of the new offshore projects will be coming onshore with a point of connection in the 
distribution network rather than directly to the onshore transmission network. This means that 
distribution networks may be required to transfer energy between transmission operators. In 
such circumstances, the applicability of the offshore Security and Quality of Supply Standard 
could be undermined in the absence of requirements to securely transport the power flows from 
such generation across distribution networks. As the current arrangements may not provide 
sufficient certainty for the developments in offshore wind, it will be important to understand 
these requirements and to quantify the appropriate levels of network security to transport the 
output from generators. A possible development path would be to review the existing industry 
codes, practices and governance procedures followed by development of an SQSS for onshore 
distribution networks and a corresponding industry code. 
DUoS for generation 
A further example of this omission of generation from the distribution access arrangements is 
seen in the Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charging methodology. Although consultations 
have been underway for some years to amend the charging methodologies to reflect the impact 
and contribution of generation, the majority of methodologies in use are still based on the 
historical demand-led approach. The impact of generation on distribution networks (in terms of 
costs and benefits) is site specific and it may vary in time. It will also depend on the availability 
of the primary sources, a factor important for some forms of renewable generation, as well as on 
size and operational regime of the plant, proximity of the load, layout and electrical 
characteristics of the local network, etc. It is not, therefore, surprising that the relatively 
simplistic DRM tariff structure, with network charges being averaged across customer groups 
and various parts of the network, cannot reflect the cost impact of distributed generation on 
distribution network. 
It should be noted that DRM tariffs also have no real ability to capture the impact of multi-
directional flows (caused by the presence of distributed generation) and cannot deal with the 
temporal and spatial variations of cost streams. Discussions to adapt this charging framework 
and move towards the transmission approach of long term investment based pricing that reflects 
the cost and impact of generation as well as demand on a iocational (and time of use basis) are 
currently underway. Two methodologies have been proposed (Strbac and Mutale, 2006, Li et 
al., 2005), both of which are being taken forward in the ongoing consultation on the DUoS 
pricing arrangements. In brief, the approach proposed by (Strbac and Mutale, 2006) takes a 
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reference network approach to pricing, pricing use of the system according to a reference 
network representing the optimal configuration of the network as per the approach proposed in 
(Farmer et al., 1995). This sends price signals to generation and demand which indicate optimal 
configuration, connection location and use of the system. The alternative methodology proposed 
by (Li et al., 2005), charges users on the basis of system "headroom" rather than on an optimal 
system configuration. Where there is sufficient headroom in network capacity to allow 
operation the network charges are limited. As the headroom is reduced charges increase to 
signal the need for investment or non-network solutions to maintain system integrity and 
economically efficient operation. Both approaches have been designed to deliver a greater level 
of cost reflectivity in charges that reflects the equal and opposite impact of demand and 
generation on the network. The important factor in each methodology is that this is done 
through reflection of time of use and location on the network; in distribution, (even more so 
than transmission), these parameters heavily influence user requirements for network access. 
A final consideration in the use of DG to provide network services is on the implication of using 
stochastic generators to provide system support and solutions to network problems for DNOs. 
This is a fundamentally different approach from the current method of providing system 
services which rely on network solutions (i.e. installing more network capacity, switchgear etc.) 
to reduce faults, ensure adequate security for demand etc. Using DG, some of which are 
inherently stochastic in nature or have limited availability, will change the level of certainty 
with which services can be delivered. Although this can be accounted for to some extent (the 
ER P 2/6 calculations on the contribution that generation can make to system security do 
account for availability and unreliability) the risk level of using DG is materially different to the 
network alternative (IIic et al., 2007). By using DG for solving network problems DNOs will 
have to evaluate the risk and cost of non-delivery of service. This is not only a shift in the way 
that DNOs currently evaluate solutions to network problems, but also creates potential 
incompatibility with the Quality of Supply incentive approach to regulation of the DNOs. The 
current approach to incentivising quality of service is about rewarding DNOs that reduce 
customer interruptions; as an example, using generators to secure demand may increase faults or 
will at least will change the risk profile (and consideration of risk) associated with the likelihood 
of faults. So in terms of balancing the costs of using DG versus network solutions this will also 
have to include a calculation of risk of non-delivery of services and the cost implications that 
this has for the quality of service/supply indicators. 
Active networks 
Although this will not be taken further in the rest of this research, the potential for active 
distribution networks and "smart grids" is also receiving significant attention. In the UK the two 
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Research and Development programs; Registered Power Zones (RPZ) and Innovation Finance 
Initiatives (IFI) have been initiated as part of the IIP. These programs incentivise DNOs to look 
for new ways to "connect and managet" DG and to integrate the resource effectively into the 
network (Ofgem, 2005b, Ofgem, 2004a). There is also a number of initiatives and projects in 
Europe and the US pursuing the development of more active networks. Programs such as the 
Intelligrids initiative are trying to take advantage of and develop existing ICT infrastructures at 
a devolved level to interconnect large numbers of smaller generators and bring an increased 
level of "intelligence" (EPRI, 2003, EPRI, 2004). The SmartGrids initiative promoted by the 
European Commission is also operating along the same lines, in developing a vision for the 
management of integrated energy resources and networks that would also be compatible with 
the active network management approach and a greater integration of DG (CEC, 2006b). And 
finally the GridWise programme in the US is working to accelerate and optimize system 
performance through greater use of ICT and integrative approaches to system operation 
(USDoE, 2003). The overarching regulatory framework and principles to support this active and 
integrated approach are discussed in more detail as part of the SUSTELNET project (Bauknecht 
and Leprich, 2004). 
2.6 Conclusions and implications 
This chapter has identified the main characteristics of the conventional system, and proposed a 
high level structure for the future, sustainable power system that may evolve in the short to 
medium term. The review of the conventional system has included an overview of the current 
access network arrangements and draws out the main differences in network access between 
transmission and distribution. It identifies points of friction where the penetration of new, non-
conventional generation technologies is most likely to cause investment and operational 
challenges. For the transmission system, originally installed with the primary function of 
allowing generation to reach demand, access arrangements have always focused on generation, 
albeit conventional generation. The challenge to transmission network access comes from the 
penetration of non-conventional generation that no longer fits the proxy set out by the current 
access arrangements. In common for both transmission and distribution is also the lack of 
attention given to short term access arrangements, encapsulated in the network operation 
timescale. The philosophy of the distribution network as a passive, demand driven activity 
means that access arrangements have been developed to serve the needs of securing demand. 
Although some innovative and advanced efforts have been made to integrate generation into the 
network at this level, the emphasis of this activity remains in securing load, rather than 
optimising network operation and investment for all system users, generation and demand. 
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Historical developments in the network access debate have mirrored the increase in materiality 
of renewable and distributed generation, the value of integration and the policy profile of low-
carbon technologies. To illustrate this point, they core evolutions are listed below: 
• Connection charging: movement from deep to shallow connection charges for generation in 
both transmission and distribution, 
• Use of system charges: In transmission, long term location specific pricing has been 
implemented in TNUoS, and TEC (although flawed for a system with non-conventional 
generation) is a user specified requirement for transmission. Although a crude measure, it 
still provides additional level of transparency regarding users' requirements from the 
network. In distribution, there is ongoing debate for DUoS charges focussed around 
gradually improving cost reflectivity for generation (and working towards the transmission 
ICRP based long term pricing model) as this becomes a material presence in networks. 
• Development of engineering recommendations: the active management recommendation, 
and the development of P 2/6 and its inclusion in the DNO standards (albeit in the context of 
the present demand dominated network access regime). 
• Performance based regulation of DNOs, including the IFI, RPZ and DG incentive; and 
• The next steps for the access debate as announced in the 2007 Energy White Paper (DTI, 
2007 pg. 164): Following the Ofgem review of Transmission Access for Distributed 
generation, and feedback from parallel groups such as the Transmission Access Standing 
Group, A major review of transmission access is planned for the last quarter of 2007. 
There is an ongoing requirement to bring access arrangements into line with the changing 
physical system. The recent changes have recognised that the current market is not necessarily 
providing a fair outcome for non-conventional generation or allowing cost effective operation 
and development. In most instances, the response to this has been incremental changes to the 
current regime that return the arrangements to an appropriate market proxy reflective of the 
physical system developments. This is having the effect of gradually moving the access 
arrangements to a more market based approach with each modification. Under this incremental 
approach, the whole system is slowly moving away from the long term approaches traditionally 
associated with central planning and the vertically integrated monopoly. Emerging is an 
approach grounded in conventional economic market regulation that begins with short term 
quantification of requirements and costs, to develop transparent and cost reflective arrangements 
for users. 
Arguably, the issue of integration of renewable and distributed generation into the market and 
regulatory environment in the UK has become a mainstream issue. Understanding of the impact 
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and value of integrating these new technologies has become a part of the driving force that is 
now dictating changes in the regulatory and market structures that underpin the system 
operation and development. The questions that will now be tackled by the subsequent chapters 
address whether the current access arrangements are fit to cope with this changing physical 
system. This chapter has raised a number of challenges facing the current regulatory and market 
framework for network access; building on this the following chapters will assess the impact 
and requirements of the new system, and evaluate whether the existing arrangements remain fit-
for-purpose. This chapter also raises for discussion the issue of whether the current approach to 
development of competitive market based arrangements for access is appropriate. At present 
the arrangements are being taken forward in incremental steps, reacting to identified challenges 
from the changing physical system. Whether this approach is sufficient to respond to material 
change in the generation mix remains open for analysis in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3: Network costs and benefits of renewable 
and of distributed generation 
3.1 Introduction 
Realising the physical impact of new generation connecting to the network and understanding 
the economics behind their network access requirements is essential to facilitate the 
development of access arrangements which drive optimal operation and long term development 
of the networks. This chapter identifies the main impacts that connection of non-conventional 
generation has on the transmission and distribution network and explores the enabling 
technologies that can mitigate and moderate this impact. 
An impact assessment methodology was developed to collate and analyse the findings from a 
series of quantitative studies on the impact of non-conventional generation on various aspects of 
the transmission and distribution networks. The approach considers the impact of renewable and 
distributed generation on the networks over both the long term investment horizon and on short 
term operational issues. It determines the requirement for additional capacity driven by these 
new technologies, and highlights their impact (positive and negative) on network constraints, 
losses and faults. In addition, the series of locational and operational characteristic drivers 
identified in Chapter 2 are elaborated upon and used as a qualitative measurement to identify the 
sensitivity of the key network impacts to different generation conditions. 
To explore the extent of these impacts further, the chapter also identifies two key "enabling 
technologies": active network management and demand side participation. These two examples 
can alter the impact of non-conventional generation on the network and offer an alternative non-
network solution to traditional network problems posed by the connection of new generation 
units. This chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the impact assessment for the 
network access requirements of a future sustainable system, and draws together these findings 
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with a summary of the access requirements for non-conventional generation in both 
transmission and distribution networks. 
3.2 Impact assessment methodology 
The methodology adopted for this chapter is a qualitative impact assessment approach to 
facilitate identification and discussion of the key impacts that non-conventional generation has 
on the transmission and distribution networks. The impact assessment draws on a number of 
quantitative studies from the Centre for Distributed Generation and Sustainable Electrical 
Energy (CDGSEE). The author was not involved in the quantitative modelling aspects of this 
work, but is interpreting the key findings from the individual reports against the impact 
assessment methodology. This approach facilitates the evaluation of a wide body of quantitative 
work and enables the many threads of the access debate to be drawn together. 
The chapter presents the key findings from the highlighted report and illustrates this where 
appropriate with case study examples of characteristic generating technologies (e.g. wind 
generation, CHP, ^CHP and PV). These findings are interpreted and evaluated using the 
devised qualitative impact assessment matrix approach detailed in the following sections and 
summarised in section 3.2.3. The assessment was undertaken over two timescales looking at the 
short term operational timescale, and the longer-term investment timescale. Building on this 
identification and classification of impacts, a series of drivers that moderate or increase the 
impact of renewable and distributed generation on the network are also explored. These drivers 
are elaborated in more detail in section 3.2.2 of this methodology. This assessment will provide 
insight into the differences between the network required to support conventional generation 
(and a traditional system), and that created through the addition of new renewable and low-
carbon generation. 
3.2.1 Definition of operational and investment timescales 
The impact of DG on the transmission and distribution networks was evaluated over the long-
and short term to capture the full range of operational and developmental activities undertaken 
by system owners/operators. For networks, transmission and distribution system operation and 
development are intrinsically linked. Investment in capacity as part of a long term programme 
has an impact on the short term activity of operation and maintenance of the network, and vice 
versa. An increase in the requirement for short terni balancing activity, can for example, 
increase prices and signal the need for longer term investment. Evaluating the impact of new 
generation against both of these time horizons is essential. It allows characterisation of the full 
impact and value of renewable and distributed generation on the network, which leads to 
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development of efficient and optimal arrangements that ensure cost reflective treatment of all 
system users. 
The assessment of costs and benefits over a short term timescale requires consideration of the 
effect of non-conventional generation on operational activities happening at or close to real 
time. In the instance of the transmission networks this is congestion management, and physical 
resolution of the economic dispatch schedule of generators that results from contracts made in 
the wholesale energy market. Because the UK market arrangements separate energy from 
location, power can be sold to any location in the network without consideration of the costs of 
network access to secure delivery of the contract. The physical constraints imposed by the 
transmission system must be resolved using the Balancing Mechanism, to curtail and dispatch 
flexible generation around constrained locations. From a short term cost perspective, losses and 
unplanned outages also form part of the operational costs of transmission alongside the cost of 
managing constraints. 
For distribution networks evaluation of the short term operational costs and benefits includes 
consideration of the impact of DG on network losses in low voltage networks, voltage rise and 
fault levels in higher voltage networks. 
Over the long term, the impact assessment considers the effect of introducing new non-
conventional generation on network development, in particular on the need for investment in 
new capacity to reinforce the network. Long term development of the transmission network 
requires an understanding of how connection of new generation maps to investment in new 
capacity to reinforce the transmission network. In transmission, the network is built to satisfy 
requirements for system reliability, and economic efficiency and historically reliability has been 
the binding parameter driving design of the network. The impact assessment will explore the 
network capacity driven by DG in the instance of system designed for under both these 
parameters. 
In the distribution networks most operational issues are dealt with at the design and planning 
stage of the network, the long-m investment timeframe. Specification of the network capacity is 
usually sufficiently high to support most operational possibilities whilst maintaining the passive 
operation philosophy adopted by the distribution network operators. The impact of DG on 
distribution over the long term timeframe will include consideration of the contribution of DG 
to network security (i.e. providing security to demand). 
77 
Chapter 3: Network Costs and Benefits 
3.2.2 Drivers of non-conventional generation impact on the network 
To contextualise the assessment of value and to provide a qualitative sensitivity analysis aspect 
to the impact assessment, a range of factors that may moderate or increase the impact/value of 
non conventional generation on the system were considered. As first identified in Chapter 2, the 
drivers of the impact that non conventional generation has on the system can be separated into 
two categories of operating and locational characteristics. These are then sub-divided into 
several factors which affect the magnitude of the impact on the transmission and distribution 
networks. Each of the impact-drivers is elaborated in more detail below: 
Operating Characteristics 
Pattern and time of output 
As illustrated in Figure 2-3 (in Chapter 2), peak demand in the UK occurs in winter evenings, 
around 5.30pm. This is generally coincident with peak prices in the electricity wholesale 
market. Peak network flows usually coincide with peak demand, and peak wholesale prices, so 
conventional generation will try and maximise output during these high price/high demand 
periods. For new conventional generation entering this mix it is a reasonable assumption that it 
will also behave in this way, and that the network will require reinforcement to accommodate 
the new generator during peak demand. Therefore the additional capacity requirements imposed 
by an additional conventional generator on the system will be close to the maximum output of 
the generator. 
The coincidence of new non-conventional generation output with system peaks will clearly 
affect transmission system capacity requirement. For many non-conventional technologies their 
pattern of output is not well correlated to demand, so many will not be generating at maximum 
output during times of system peak. 
The correlation of peak demand and output varies with technology, for example: 
• PV peak output will be in summer during daylight hours (Jenkins, 1995), and is thus 
unlikely to contribute to power flows during the winter peak, 
• |iCHP is likely to be operating during the winter peak to contribute to meeting 
household heat demands occurring around the same time (Cao et a!., 2006); and, 
• Wind generation, dependent on highly variable weather conditions, shows little 
correlation between peak output and peak network conditions (Oswald, 2006, Grubb, 
1988). 
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Capacity credit 
The capacity credit (or value) of generation technologies indicates the amount of existing plant 
capacity that can be displaced on addition of new generation to the system whilst still 
maintaining a given level of system reliability. This driver is important in guiding transmission 
network reinforcements in systems designed for reliability and can have an impact at 
distribution level where generation with high capacity credit is able to displace network 
capacity. Flexibility and controllability of generation is the key to maintaining the system 
frequency and integrity. The contribution that generation technologies can make to this will 
contribute to their capacity credit. 
Whilst energy from new non-conventional plant can displace the energy generated by 
conventional plant on a one-to-one basis, the capacity credit of these new technologies (or any 
generation technology) to the generation capacity margin is calculated by the extent to which a 
technology can displace incumbent plant without compromising system reliability. Capacity 
credit is determined by technology contribution in relation to system peak, and is derived as a 
measure of a generator's contribution to the total system. 
Many renewable and DG technologies have a low capacity credit. This means that they will 
displace proportionately more energy than generating capacity when introduced into the system, 
and some generating capacity may need to be retained to ensure that overall system reliability is 
not compromised. 
Size of generation plant 
Many DG and renewable generation technologies are too small to have a significant impact on 
some areas of the network when considered alone. However, as part of an aggregated group 
with a cumulative profile they can have a more significant effect both in terms of magnitude of 
response and also in controllability. In this instance some inflexible plant are able to benefit 
from inclusion in a portfolio with a percentage of flexible units (Ilex, 2001, Lampaditou and 
Leach, 2004). 
(Distribution) networl< management philosophy 
Active management techniques enable the DSO to maximise the use of the existing circuits by 
taking full advantage of generator dispatch, control of transformer taps, voltage regulators, 
reactive power management and system reconfiguration in an integrated manner. This active 
approach to system operation is reducing the negative impact of DG on the network, minimising 
requirements for reinforcement and reducing the cost of connection. 
Locational Characteristics 
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Geographic location 
At transmission level geographic location across the country is relevant because of its impact on 
power flows and subsequent contribution to network constraints in certain sensitive areas. On 
the UK system power flows are characterised by a north-south flow that is driven by the pattern 
of connection in generation and demand. Total installed generation and demand in the UK is 
spread across the country as illustrated in Figure 3-1. The overarching picture presented is that 
generation exceeds demand in Scotland, the North of England and the Midlands. In the South 
there is a small generation deficit with demand exceeding installed capacity by around 3GW. In 
the near-term future, generation capacity is expected to increase across all regions, maintaining 
the generation-demand pattern in Scotland, the North and the Midlands, and increasing 
generation capacity above demand in the South. 
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Figure 3-1: Total Demand and Installed/Utilised Generation (GW) In UK for 2006/07 and forecast for 2012/13 
(NGET, 2007a) 
However, this picture changes when considering the location of generation plant expected to 
meet this demand. Again, generation exceeds demand in the Scotland and the North, but much 
of the generation in the Midlands and the South becomes non-contributory causing significant 
net power transfers from the Northern parts of the system to the demand centres in the South, 
concentrating at the Cheviot Boundary (the point at which the old English and Scottish 
transmission networks were interconnected). 
The positioning of new non-conventional generation, i.e. whether it is close to demand centres 
or installed in exporting areas, will impact power flows and so have a positive or negative effect 
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on transmission constraints and their associated costs. From a long term perspective, location 
will also impact on network reinforcement decisions and investment. 
For distribution, location of generation within the network is of key importance to its impact on 
system operation and design. Generation installed in the high voltage network will have 
different impacts to the same unit installed at the medium or low voltage levels. For DG to have 
a positive impact on the network in terms of securing load and displacing network capacity, its 
location and proximity to load or weak network points is important. Rural and urban locations 
are also driving factors in determining how much impact any particular DG will have. 
Diversity of network users 
In a particular locality the requirement for network capacity will be determined not only by the 
addition of new generation into the mix, but also by the interaction between new and existing 
generation (and demand) in their use of the system. Diverse system users such as conventional 
and non-conventional generation, non-conventional generation and load, or different loads, are 
likely to have different requirement for network capacity and to use the system at different 
times. This diversity effect is clearly seen in the network capacity requirements for serving 
demand; figure 2-12 in the previous chapter illustrates the decreasing coincidence factor of load 
as the number of units considered is increased. The ramifications of this for network provision 
are that where a single load is being served, network capacity to meet the peak load must be 
provided. However, as more numerous and diverse loads are considered (e.g. as we move to 
higher voltage levels) the capacity required is less than the sum of their peak requirements. 
So, in areas where there is significant diversity of system users, addition of new generation may 
not drive significant amounts of network reinforcement because of the diversity in their use of 
the system. Conversely, in areas of homogenous system use, such as a remote transmission 
connection to a wind farm with no local load, there is no diversity in output and no opportunity 
for sharing of capacity (as all users will wish to use the network at the same time - i.e. windy 
days) so the requirements for network capacity are likely to be close to the net peak outputs of 
all users. 
Density of installations 
The density of penetration of a particular technology in a local area will also drive impact, 
particularly in the distribution network that is already sensitive to location of generation. 
Penetration of new generators that are spread evenly all over the system, versus the same 
number of units in a single locality can have dramatic, even opposite, effects on the network. 
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A key example of this is the impact of increasing levels of i^CHP and its impact on reverse 
flows and losses. Because of the high correlation between |j,CHP output and peak demand, 
penetration of CHP can initially have positive impact on the network. However, as penetration 
increases there is the risk of reverse power flows. For ^CHP, this phenomenon may occur in the 
early morning when a low demand for electricity corresponds with high heat generation 
requirements. PV generation during the daytime in the summer holidays could be critical for 
exactly the same reasons (Strbac et al., 2006). The full impact of density of installations is also 
linked to diversity of system users and geographic location in the network (i.e. rural vs. urban, 
or high vs. medium/low voltage). 
3.2.3 Impact assessment matrix 
These assessment timescales and impact-drivers have been summarised into an impact 
assessment matrix as illustrated in Table 3-1. Using the matrix approach allows structured 
interpretation of the findings from the core reports. This facilitates a quantitative assessment on 
the impact of non-conventional generation on the network and its influence on network access. 
Network & 
Timescale Transmission Distribution 
Drivers 
of impact 
Investment Operation Investment Operation 
Operating 
characteristics 
Pattern & time of 
output, Intermittency 
& variability, 
flexibility & 
controllability, 
capacity credit, 
Network 
management 
philosophy 
How much 
fransm/ss/oi) 
capacfYy 
reinforcement 
does new w/ncf 
generaAon dwe 
/n sysfe/ns 
for reliability 
and/or economic 
efficiency? How 
does OG dnVe or 
How does non-
conventional 
generaf/on 
contribute to 
power ^ows & 
constraint costs? 
What impact 
does it have on 
fosses and 
outages? 
What impact 
does DG have on 
network security 
and how does 
this impact 
system design? 
How much 
network capacity 
can be displaced 
by DG? How 
much is needed 
How does DG 
contribute to 
voltage rise effects 
and fault levels, 
and losses and 
what is the impact 
on seivice quality? 
Locational 
characteristics 
Geographic location 
Diversity of network 
users, Density of 
installations 
reduce the need 
for 
reinforcement? 
to accommodate 
DG? 
Table 3-1: Impact assessment matrix for evaluating impact of DG on transmission and distribution network 
investment and operation including defined drivers for impact 
This impact assessment approach is applied in the following sections; it explores the physical 
impact of non-conventional generation on the transmission network (section 3.3) and the 
distribution network (section 2.5). Each section is framed by a description of the main network 
challenges presented (to the current UK system) by the connection of non-conventional 
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generation at the specified voltage level. Then assessment of the main impacts at the operational 
and investment timescales is explored for both the transmission and distribution networks. In 
both cases the headline network characteristics are identified, and the impact of non-
conventional generation on these factors explored through qualitative discussion of the relevant 
drivers as identified in the impact assessment matrix methodology. 
3.3 Transmission impact assessment 
3.3.1 Introduction 
As highlighted earlier, Scotland has more generation capacity connected to transmission than 
demand, so transmission power flows are north-south (to demand centres in the midlands and 
south east). Furthermore, the transmission network is already congested both in Scotland and 
along the main transmission lines that run into England. As highlighted in Chapter 2, 16 GW of 
applications for connection of wind generation are awaiting permission to connect to the 
transmission system, the majority of it in Scotland. Even if not all of these applications 
materialise, integration of this new capacity into the system will generate costs to the network. 
Firstly, because it is being connected at a point in the network that is already congested, and 
secondly because connection of a low-marginal cost generation technology like wind will 
change the economics of the network short term operation. The challenge at the transmission 
level is to understand these impacts of wind on the transmission system, and to then use this 
understanding of the physical system to determine whether the current transmission access 
arrangements result in a cost reflective representation of these impacts. 
The transmission impact assessment uses the matrix approach described above to explore the 
impact of this additional wind generation on transmission operation to manage constraints and 
on network reinforcement. The presentation of the short term impacts of connection of wind 
generation in Scotland on the costs of constraints is derived from core power system economics 
theory overlaid with a discussion relating to the drivers for impact. The analysis of the long term 
impact of wind generation on driving network reinforcement uses the main findings from a 
recent CDGSEE study (Strbac et ah, 2007) as its basis, alongside some additional literature 
reviews in the area. 
3.3.2 Transmission operation: Constraints 
This investigation of the impact of wind generation on the real time operation of the 
transmission system is restricted to an analysis of the impact of wind as it relates to transmission 
access; namely the system balancing required to resolve the physical network limitations of the 
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economic dispatch of generators derived from the energy only wholesale market. There are 
numerous other impacts that wind generation has on the transmission system operation such as 
the impact of intermittency in output that leads to imbalance between energy contracted and 
generated. This drives additional real time system balancing activity and is related to issues 
surrounding longer term system reliability caused by the displacement of energy but not 
capacity from incumbent plant. Although there are some synergies and links between these 
questions and issues of network access, a comprehensive review and analysis of these non-
access concerns is out of the scope of this research; good overviews of these topics and 
quantification of the additional system costs that wind imposes in this respect can be found in a 
number of recent reports (Ilex and Strbac, 2002, Dale et al., 2004, UKERC, 2006). 
Impact on transmission network constraints 
In the operational timescale, the primary characteristics of concern that comprise the network 
operational costs are network constraints and losses. Of these two factors, network constraints 
are explored in detail in the following analysis at the expense of losses^". 
Non-conventional generation will contribute to network constraints according to its location in 
relation to the system demand centres. As explored previously, there are already North-South 
flows through the transmission network to meet demand in the Midlands and South East. Non-
conventional generation locating close to the demand centres will moderate this flow and relieve 
congestion in the constrained parts of the network. Generation connected in the north of the 
country will contribute to and exacerbate these flows, and this applies for any generation 
technology (both conventional and non-conventional), although the extent of this impact will be 
depend on the drivers explored below. 
Impact on constraint costs from connection of wind in Scotland 
Adding wind in Scotland (if no conventional generation is retired), will contribute to 
transmission constraints; and although it will displace the most expensive generating plant from 
the merit order of dispatch, it will also be responsible for increasing the per-unit cost of 
constraints. The following simplified example illustrates this effect. 
In the UK power is sold in the wholesale market without regard for location. The market is 
settled on a half hourly basis; so the contracts made in each settlement period represent a merit 
order of generation dispatch which should be the most economically optimal dispatch if the 
The impact of non-conventional generation on transmission losses is relatively straightforward, with generation sited 
closer to demand reducing losses through reducing the distance travelled on the network. The impact of losses on the 
cost of operation is a relevant factor, but it is not a cost element that fluctuates a great deal nor is it one likely to drive 
changes in access requirements over and above those initiated by network constraints. 
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network were unconstrained. The network is in fact optimally constrained, so these constraints 
must be resolved close to real time by constraining off (cheaper) generators in some locations, 
and dispatching other (more expensive) generators elsewhere to balance the physical system. 
The cost of constraints is essentially the cost of out of merit generation caused by network 
constraints preventing the dispatch of generators according to the contracts made in the energy-
only wholesale market. This is equivalent to the differential between operating costs (essentially 
fuel costs) in the constrained and unconstrained system. 
Adding wind generation into the system adds a zero (or low) marginal cost generator into the 
mix. This displaces the most expensive generation in the merit order, reducing the overall 
marginal cost of generation dispatch in the energy markets. The reduction in the unconstrained 
marginal cost thus increases the differential between the constrained and unconstrained systems, 
resulting in an increase in the overall cost of constraints. However, the addition of low marginal 
cost generation into the mix also reduces the overall energy costs for the systems as a whole (by 
displacing the most expensive generation from the merit order). The significance of the increase 
in the cost of constraints will depend on the benefits from reduced cost generation, and on the 
behaviour of generators in the balancing mechanism. 
With regard to wind generation, it should also be noted that the impact on constraints will be 
mitigated by the fact that wind has a low load factor of around 20-40% in UK conditions 
(BWEA, 2007). So constraint costs per unit of wind capacity installed will be lower than if a 
similar low-marginal cost generator were connected with a higher load factor (e.g. nuclear). 
Correspondingly, the benefits from adding a low marginal cost unit to the generation mix will 
also be reduced. 
Revenue flows, winners and losers from connection of wind 
Observing the revenue flows and market activity for the incumbent Scottish and English 
generators reveals a little more about the activity underlying this process. Figure 3-2 illustrates a 
highly simplified GB system that presents England and Scotland as a 2 busbar system. The 
system has more generation than demand in Scotland which precipitates a north-south power 
flow. The link between England and Scotland is constrained at 2.5GW, limiting the export of 
generation from Scotland. In this example the most expensive generators, i.e. those displaced in 
the new merit order dispatch, are found in England. To alleviate congestion on the system the 
Scottish generators must be constrained off and English generators constrained on. 
85 
Chapter 3; Network Costs and Benefits 
Convemiona 
Generation 
9 GW 
SCOTLAND 
ENGLAND 
Conventional 
Generation: 
58 GW 
Wind 
Generation: 
Varying 
c a p a c i i y 
D e m a n d ; 
6.6GW 
Optimal capacity 
2.5 GW 
D e m a n d : 
60GW 
Figure 3-2: Simplified 2 busbar example of the GB system illustrating the England-Scotland transmission 
connection 
Increasing the connection of wind generation in Scotland reduces total power traded by all 
incumbent generation in the forward market because it is displacing the most expensive of the 
incumbent generators. However, increasing volumes will be traded in the balancing mechanism 
to re-dispatch some of the displaced generation still required to resolve network constraints. 
Scottish generators will contract their output in the forward markets, but will be increasingly 
constrained off in the balancing mechanism as the penetration of wind generation increases. 
Indeed, as penetration of wind generation in Scotland increases, the total volumes (and revenue) 
that Scottish Generators trade in both markets (the PX and the BM) will decrease. The 
constrained line between England and Scotland is limiting export from Scotland, so additional 
wind is directly displacing Scottish generation. 
English generators will also contract less in the forward markets as low marginal cost wind 
generation displaces higher cost incumbent generation. However, this is counteracted by 
increasing activity for English generators in the balancing mechanism, and an increasing 
volume of offers accepted. Since, in a constrained system, the export from the Scottish group of 
generators must always be the same, English generators will always be required to dispatch the 
same final volume, regardless of the level of wind penetration in Scotland. So overall output 
(and revenue) from English Generators remains the same. 
Impact assessment analysis: Drivers of constraint costs 
The theoretical result outlined above relies upon generators that are constrained off paying back 
their marginal cost of generation, and those which are dispatched to balance the system only 
charging up to their marginal cost. In the real system it is likely that generators constrained off 
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will attempt to retain some of their revenue gained in the energy markets, and those constrained 
on are likely to charge more for their dispatch in the balancing mechanism. This situation is 
obviously open to abuse of market power, further exploration and modeling of constraint costs 
on a simplified GB system is needed. 
However, some broad conclusions can be explored in a qualitative manner using the drivers 
identified in the impact assessment matrix. 
Location and power flows 
Although this section has been focused on wind generation, the impact of DG on the 
transmission network is similar. Both wind generation and DG will contribute to transmission 
congestion (and costs) according to their location in relation to demand and their subsequent 
impact on power flows. Note that although distribution connected generation may contribute to 
balancing demand locally, the nature of the interconnected GB system is that local activity and 
changes in net flows between transmission and distribution will have an impact on the system as 
a whole, particularly with reference to the existing North-South power transfer. Generation 
connected (close to demand) in the distribution network has an impact on the net import/export 
position of a particular node, which in turn impacts on the use of the transmission system. 
Distributed plant generating in the South will effectively reduce local demand and have a 
beneficial effect on the North-South power flows. Conversely, generation connected at 
distribution level in the North and Scotland will reduce local demand in an area already 
dominated by generation, increasing export and possibly exacerbating system operation issues 
associated with North-South power transfer. 
For the UK, this pattern of North-South, generation and demand is likely to continue into the 
near future, so locational considerations of wind generation and DG will be important in 
determining the full impact of non-conventional generation on transmission constraints and 
costs. 
Pattern and time of output and Diversity of networl< users 
The impact of non-conventional generation on transmission constraints is also moderated by the 
pattern and time of output. Transmission constraints are most likely during peak demand times, 
when all conventional generation is running close to full output. Non-conventional generation 
(in the "wrong" location) that runs during these times will contribute directly to an increase in 
constraints and costs. However, for most non-conventional generation output is not dictated by 
demand requirements but by less predictable elements such as the weather. So, even units in the 
"wrong" location in the North of the country may have a negligible impact on constraints if they 
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operate at non-peak times when there is ample network capacity to accommodate additional 
input. 
Building on this concept, diversity in network users (i.e. conventional and non-conventional 
generation) that use the network at different times because of differing drivers for output will 
also mitigate the impact of non-conventional generation connecting to an already congested 
area. If the surrounding network users require access at peak times, then non-conventional 
generation may effectively be able to share the existing capacity and only occasionally 
contribute to network congestion on the few occasions when peak output happens to be 
coincident with peak demand. Correlation between peak demand conditions and peak wind 
generating conditions are very weak (Grubb, 1988, Oswald, 2006) and correlation between wind 
output and cold temperatures is also uncertain (Oswald, 2006). In all, although simultaneous 
peak output from conventional and wind generation is possible, it is a random occurrence and 
not linked by any strong statistical correlations. 
Summary 
This assessment highlights that although non-conventional generation will have the same 
headline impact as conventional generation on constraints, the magnitude of these impacts can 
be mitigated by a number of drivers. For both conventional and non-conventional generation the 
impact on constraints is driven initially by location of generation relative to demand. But for 
non-conventional generation, time of use of the network is of additional importance in 
determining actual impact on constraints. The operating patterns of many non-conventional 
generators are fundamentally different from their conventional counterparts; recognition of this 
in transmission access arrangements (particularly within a charging regime) is the key to 
reflecting an accurate picture of the short term costs imposed by these technologies. 
3.3.3 Transmission investment: Capacity requirements for wind 
The current network planning standards that guide network reinforcement requirements were 
developed on the basis that generation technology would be operating at maximum output 
during times of peak system operation (i.e. peak demand coincident with peak prices). 
Therefore, it has been reasonable to design and price transmission investments on the basis that 
the capacity provided should be sufficient to accommodate simultaneous peak output from all 
connected generators. Output from wind generation is variable, generally inflexible and thus 
cannot be optimised according to price signals. Output can be predicted to a certain degree, but 
forecasts for generation become increasingly accurate closer to real time. As highlighted in the 
previous section, these differences in operating characteristics and time of use of the system 
have a fundamental impact on the way in which wind generation uses the system and also how 
it drives investment in transmission. 
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Chapter 2 revealed the drivers for transmission network investment in the UK, namely 
reliability and economic efficiency. To date, the requirement to meet standards for reliability 
has driven transmission network design and reinforcements, and this has been sufficient to also 
meet the capacity requirements for economic efficiency (i.e. allowing demand customers to 
access the cheapest generation). However the penetration of wind generation is likely to change 
this balance. This section will examine how wind generation impacts transmission investment 
requirements according to these two methods for determining transmission capacity, and will 
explore how the balance between these two drivers for capacity investment is changing. 
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Figure 3-3; Simplified Great Britain (GB) transmission system 
The following sections present the findings on the impact of wind generation on the 
transmission network from the report by (Strbac et al., 2007). The methodologies for 
transmission investment for reliability and economic efficiency are illustrated on a two-busbar 
example system (reliability only) and on a simplified GB transmission model, see Figure 3-3. 
Using the GB transmission model, the methodologies propose transmission capacities for each 
of the 14 major boundaries in the model when lOGW of wind is added in Scotland and 3GW in 
England (using a non-diversified wind profile)^'. This study compares the outcomes of both 
approaches to the results for network capacity delivered by the existing GBSQSS approach - all 
these findings are presented and explored below: 
Transmission networii capacity for reliability 
The method also assumes that no conventional plant is retired (worst case scenario) and that the marginal cost of 
generation in Scotland is lower than that in England (which will tend to drive more transmission capacity). 
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Wind power characteristics & the contribution of wind to system reliabiiity 
The contribution of any generation technology to system reliability depends on its capacity 
credit, i.e. how much incumbent generation capacity it can displace without adversely affecting 
the overall reliability of the system. The greater the capacity credit, the more a technology can 
be relied on to secure load during peak conditions. If a generator is crucial for securing load 
then network capacity must be provided to ensure that it is not unduly restricted from doing so. 
The ability of wind generation (and many intermittent/variable generating technologies) to 
displace incumbent generation capacity is somewhat limited. Table 3-2 below illustrates this 
point, taken from the UKERC review of the costs and impacts of intermittent generation; this 
extract of a representative sample of the studies explored in the UKERC report reveals that all 
recent work has shown that wind has limited capacity credit. 
Study Wind penetration 
Capacity 
credit range 
(MottMacDonald, 2003) Carbon Trust and DTI intermittency survey & 
roadmap 10-20% 27.5 - 20% 
(Dale et al., 2004) Total cost estimate for large scale wind scenarios 
(Energy Policy) 20% 19.1% 
(Ilex and Strbac, 2002) Quantifying the system costs of additional 
renewables in 2020 (SCAR), for the DTI 17-27% 22.9-18.4% 
(Grubb, 1991) The integration of renewable electricity sources (Energy 
Policy) 5 - 38% 35-19.3% 
(RAoE, 2003) Royal Academy of Engineering response to the House of 
Lords Science and Technology committee inquiry into the practicalities of 
developing renewable energy 
11.6-31.3% 26.7-16% 
(Sinden, 2005) Wind power and the UK resource, Oxford Environmental 
Change Institute for the DTI 10% 23 1% 
(KEMA-XENERGY, 2004) Intermittent wind generation: summary of report 
of impacts on grid system operations 4.8% 25.9 - 0% 
Table 3-2; Wind Capacity credit, extract from (UKERC, 2006) 
The findings from these studies suggest that wind can, at best, have a capacity credit of 35% for 
low penetrations of the technology and as the penetration increases the associated capacity 
credit decreases. Some of the quoted studies (e.g. Sinden, 2005) consider the capacity value of 
wind on the basis of an even dispersal of the technology across the country. The picture 
becomes more complex as we consider the impact of uneven geographic dispersal and 
clustering in a single location. For wind farms spread across a very wide geographical area the 
diversity effects will be significant ("diverse" wind), there will be less correlation between 
outputs from generators in the portfolio under consideration, and less chance of low (or zero 
output) (Ilex, 2001). While wind farms in close proximity will have a closer correlation in 
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output profiles and will be characterized by low-diversity profiles ("non-diverse" wind)^^. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3-4 which shows the fi-equency distribution of the half-hourly wind 
power output for diversified and non-diversified wind generation profiles. 
I V 3 O" (U 
Non-diverse 
wind source 
Diverse 
wind source 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
Normalised wind output 
Figure 3-4: Normalized wind output for diverse and non-diverse wind sources (Ilex and Strbac, 2002) 
The figure illustrates the smoother distribution of the diverse wind source, illustrating that 
diverse wind output can provide a more consistent resource , with an improved load factor to the 
non-diverse portfolio (Holttinen, 2004). This is echoed in the estimation of capacity values for 
diverse and non-diverse sources. Using the normalised outputs in Figure 3-4, Figure 3-5 
represents the capacity credit for various levels of installed wind capacity and illustrates the two 
different diversity characteristics. 
^ The majority of wind developments pending connection are in Scotland. This would place the UK profile somewhere 
in between the diversified and non-diversified profiles, closer to the non-diversified end of the scale. 
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Figure 3-5: Capacity of conventional plant that can be displaced by wind generation (Strbac et al., 2007). 
Figure 3-5 shows that at low levels of wind penetration the capacity credit of wind is relatively 
significant. However, as the capacity of wind generation increases the curve heads towards 
saturation resulting in a decrease of the marginal contribution: 40 GW of wind capacity 
displaces only about 6 GW of conventional generation. Clearly, in order to maintain the same 
level of reliability, a significant capacity of conventional plant will still be required. In the case 
of wind farms characterized by a non-diversified profile, the capacity credit of wind reduces 
further. The figure shows that the capacity displacement tails off after the 10 GW wind 
penetration level. The reason for this is that the probability of wind output at low levels is much 
higher than in the case of diversified profile as shown in Figure 3-4. The correlation effect seen 
for the output of diversified resources is lost in non-diversified output. 
This illustrates that wind (particularly from non-diverse sources) makes an increasingly limited 
contribution to maintaining the generation capacity margin. The knock-on impact of this is that 
load secured by connection of wind generation will not be equal to the capacity of wind 
generation added into the system. Only a (small) proportion of capacity can be relied upon as a 
resource to secure load during peak conditions when making calculations regarding system 
reliability. Because wind (and other technologies with a low capacity value) can only make a 
small contribution to system reliability; this generation technology is unlikely to require 
significant network capacity in systems built for reliability. This is illustrated in the following 
sub-section. 
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Transmission capacity requirements for wind in systems designed for reliability - example 
As detailed in the study from the CDGSEE (Strbac et al., 2007), a simple two-busbar system 
can be used to illustrate the impact of the low capacity credit of wind generation on driving 
capacity reinforcements in systems designed for reliability (Figure 3-6). The system under 
analysis is characterized by 5GW of peak demand in area A and 45GW of peak demand in area 
B, and a total installed generation capacity equivalent to 50GW^^. Area A is also characterized 
by the presence of wind power with an increasing penetration level varying from 0 to 20GW. 
Total Generation 
Capacity (A & B): 
SO GW 
Wind 
Generation: 
Varying 
(0-20 GW) 
Area A 
I L-iv 
\ ) Demand: 
5 G W 
AreaB Optimal capacity 
2.5 G W 
1 L_iv 
V > Demand; 
45GW 
Figure 3-6: 2 bus-bar example Illustrating the methodology for determining transmission capacity requirements 
driven by reliability in systems with varying penetration wind 
Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 present the transmission capacity required to connect the two areas 
for different levels of conventional generation and wind generation capacities in area A. Figure 
3-7 presents the case for a diverse wind profile, Figure 3-8 for a non-diverse profile. In all cases, 
the amount of transmission capacity maintains the LOLP based on the 5% additional risk 
imposed by finite transmission capacity by retiring the appropriate amount of conventional 
generation from the system. 
' Accounting for the reduced capacity credit of wind generation as detailed earlier. 
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Figure 3-7: Transmission capacity requirements for the system with diverse wind generation resources 
Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 show that when area A is an importing area, the presence of wind 
generation in the system leads to a relatively modest reduction of transmission capacity 
requirements compared to the capacity required by the equivalent system without wind. The 
transmission capacity remains practically at the same level for increased levels of installed wind 
capacity. Such behaviour suggests that wind has a modest transmission capacity credit to 
provide reliability in the importing area. It is important to note that an area is considered to be 
an import area if additional generation in that area reduces transmission capacity requirements 
although the total installed generation capacity may already exceed the peak load in that area. 
o 
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Figure 3-8: Transmission capacity requirements for the system with non-diverse wind generation resources 
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When area A is an exporting area, although the presence of wind generation increases the need 
for transmission reinforcement, this increase is relatively small compared with the wind 
capacity installed. As expected, we can also observe that diverse wind generation would require 
more transmission capacity than non-diverse wind. For example, in the case of 8 GW of 
conventional generation is present in the system A, the transmission capacity will increase from 
2.5 GW for no wind to 5.5 GW for 10 GW of diverse wind installed. In the case of lOGW of 
non-diverse wind, the required transmission capacity will be 4.5GW. In this case, transmission 
capacity is built to allow conventional and wind generation in area A to contribute to the 
reliability of supply in area B. However, the increase in transmission capacity required for this 
purpose becomes smaller with increased levels of installed wind capacity. This indicates that the 
transmission capacity credit of wind generation (the percentage of the conventional capacity that 
wind can displace) decreases when wind penetration level increases. 
Transmission capacity requirements for wind in systems designed for reiiabiiity - GB model 
This approach to determining transmission capacity requirements to maintain reliability was 
also carried out on the simplified 15 bus-bar GB system as detailed in Figure 3-3. 
Boundary From To 
Transmission Boundary 
Capacity (MW) 
Reliability GBSQSS 
1 NW-SHETL N-SHETL 2100 2561 
2 N-SHETL S-SHETL 3500 4439 
3 S-SHETL N-SPTL 3300 4904 
4 N-SPTL S-SPTL 4100 5438 
5 S-SPTL UN-E&W 4300 7667 
6 UN-E&W N-E&W 4700 7514 
7 NW-E&W N-E&W 2400 2424 
8 NE-E&W N-E&W 5600 4895 
9 N-E&W M-E&W 8700 10674 
10 MW-E&W M-E&W 6800 6848 
11 ME-E&W M-E&W 5400 4869 
12 M-E&W S-E&W 8100 9206 
13 SW-E&W S-E&W 3400 4360 
14 SE-E&W S-E&W 5100 4766 
Table 3-3: Comparison of transmission capacities associated with key system boundaries derived using the 
approaches for reliability and the current GBSQSS (Strbac et al., 2007) 
The results are presented in Table 3-3, alongside the results using the existing GBSQSS method 
(that treats wind generation as though it had the similar characteristics as conventional 
generation, and applies a scaling factor to wind equivalent to a capacity credit of around 60%). 
Observation of these results shows that the methodology for designing networks for reliability 
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delivers less capacity at all of the boundaries in Scotland (highlighted in bold) where the bulk of 
the wind generation has been placed. This reflects the earlier finding that as wind has limited 
capacity credit, it is not necessary to build transmission capacity to accommodate it. The scaling 
factor for wind currently applied by the GBSQSS equates to an equivalent capacity credit of 
around 60%. The result of this allocation is an overestimation of capacity required in exporting 
areas, but underestimation of capacity in importing areas. In this result we can see that the 
current GBSQSS would tend to overestimate the contribution that wind is making to reliability, 
and build more transmission than is necessary. 
Drivers of capacity for non-conventional generation in systems built for reliability 
Location 
The import/export nature of the local network will impact on the transmission requirements of 
wind and non-conventional generators. In exporting areas the addition of low capacity credit 
non-conventional generation often drives less transmission capacity than conventional 
generation. However, in importing areas, addition of such non-conventional generation may not 
displace significant amounts of network interconnection capacity. Its output cannot be 
guaranteed to cover the local load requirement, so interconnection capacity is still required to 
allow the load to be secured from other areas. In some instances, for example if local 
conventional generation is retired from areas with wind generation (or other low capacity-value 
technologies), additional investment in interconnection capacity may actually be required to 
maintain system reliability. 
Capacity credit 
As described in the earlier sub-section, the capacity credit of a generation technology is a major 
contributor to the network capacity that it can drive. Those with low capacity credit cannot be 
relied on to secure a significant amount of load at peak time and will correspondingly drive less 
transmission capacity to support this limited activity. 
If the same analysis is carried out as shown in Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8, but presuming that the 
non-conventional generation has the same capacity credit as conventional generation, the 
capacity requirements are very different. Firstly the calculation would allocate a far higher firm 
output to the installed non-conventional generation, making the area A an exporting area. 
Secondly, it would recommend over investment in capacity to support that output in meeting 
demand in area B. The characteristic V curve in the figure would be lost; and the system would 
be under-invested when there are low levels of conventional generation in area A and 
increasingly over invested as conventional generation increases and area A exports. 
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Diversity of networl< users (generation) 
Diversity in generation changes the capacity required for reliability driven investment through 
altering the output profile of the generators under consideration. This in turn changes the 
capacity credit of the technology. For example in the case of wind; a diverse wind resource will 
have a less intermittent output profile. As a consequence it will have an increased capacity 
credit, and will drive more capacity that a non-diversified wind resource. Diversity in resources 
can also come from considering a group of different generation technologies (and demand). 
Positive benefits of diversity would be seen if there was low correlation in output between 
technologies (i.e. the intermittent generation in one technology falls at a time when another is 
not .generating). Diversity of network users will be of particular relevance for distributed 
generation gaining visibility at transmission level and exposure to the relevant transmission 
access arrangements. The impact of DG at transmission level is represented by the flow at the 
transmission-distribution boundary. This flow will be a product of the generation and demand in 
the network below the boundary. The level of diversity in these users will be a key feature in 
determining the ultimate impact of DG on transmission capacity requirements. 
Transmission networl< capacity for economic efficiency 
Cost benefit analysis to deternnine economically optimal investment 
Optimisation of network capacity according to the most economically efficient solution will 
allow demand customers to take advantage of low marginal cost generators, such as wind. By 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis, decisions taken to reinforce transmission can be justified if 
the savings in the marginal reduction in out of merit generation cost (marginal cost of 
constraints) caused by penetration of new wind generation are greater than the marginal 
transmission network investment cost (see Figure 2-6). 
The previously cited study from the CDG&SEE developed an investment optimisation 
methodology (based on a DC-load flow optimisation formula and using a simplified GB 
transmission model, Figure 3-3) that, through simulation and optimisation of the system 
operation across an annual time horizon, balances the annual generation costs and amortised 
investment costs in order to analyse the need for transmission system reinforcements. Under this 
methodology, the cost of transmission infrastructure and the cost of constraints will be the key 
drivers for decisions associated with network reinforcement^'*. 
Although it is in principle appropriate that a cost-benefit analysis is applied for determining network capacity and 
investment, this approach also relies on a range of assumptions that may be contentious. This includes future 
generation technology distributions, fuel costs, projection of future constraint costs and their variations in time and 
space, network reinforcement cost (which may also vary significantly). The accuracy of the results could depend 
significantly on the accuracy of the modelling process. However, not only the values that would be used in such 
evolutions debatable, but so too is the basis on which these values should be derived. In addition, there are questions 
as to whether and how the short term imbalance prices should be used as signals for making decisions on long-term 
transmission investment, given their volatility. There are also significant uncertainties associated with the conversion of 
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To illustrate the outcome of a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) for transmission requirements in the 
case of connection of wind in Scotland, lOGW of wind was connected in locations in Scotland 
in the GB model outlined above. The analysis assumes that no conventional plant will be 
decommissioned in Scotland (worst case scenario) and that constraint costs are cost reflective. 
The total installed capacity of generation (conventional plus wind) in Scotland is fixed at 
19.5GW, and local load is set at 6.5GW, 
Transmission capacity requirements for wind in systems designed for economic efficiency 
The results for economically optimal transmission capacity at each of the 14 boundaries are 
presented in Table 3-4 alongside the results for a reliability optimised design and the current 
GBSQSS approach. 
Boundary From To 
Transmiss ion Boundary 
Capacity (IVIW) 
Economics GBSQSS 
1 NW-SHETL N-SHETL 2437 2561 
2 N-SHETL S-SHETL 3571 4439 
3 S-SHETL N-SPTL 4110 4904 
4 N-SPTL S-SPTL 3564 5438 
5 S-SPTL UN-E&W 5357 7667 
6 UN-E&W N-E&W 4935 7514 
7 NW-E&W N-E&W 1942 2424 
8 NE-E&W N-E&W 2218 4895 
9 N-E&W M-E&W 7870 10674 
10 MW-E&W M-E&W 4798 6848 
11 ME-E&W M-E&W 4459 4869 
12 M-E&W S-E&W 8434 9206 
13 SW-E&W S-E&W 2781 4360 
14 SE-E&W S-E&W 1438 4766 
Table 3-4: Comparison of transmission 
approaches for economic 
capacities associated with key system boundaries derived using the 
efficiency and the current GBSQSS (Strbac et al., 2007) 
When building transmission network for economic efficiency, the key impact of non-
conventional generation is that it is no longer optimal to build a network to support the 
simultaneous output from all generators; instead generators can share network capacity. This is 
illustrated in the capacity requirements indicated for the Cheviot Boundary (boundary number 5 
between England and Scotland). To accommodate peak output would indicate the construction 
of more than lOGW of capacity in this location (total generation capacity in Scotland less local 
demand). However, from Table 3-4 it can be observed that economically optimal network 
the applications for connecting wind power into actual projects due to difficulties of obtaining planning consents and 
other reasons. 
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capacity across boundary 5 should be set at 5.4GW. This result provides clear evidence that it is 
not economically efficient to invest in transmission to accommodate simultaneous peak outputs 
from both wind and conventional generation, and it demonstrates that transmission capacity 
should be shared between conventional and wind generation. On windy days the capacity of 
transmission corridor between Scotland (S-SPTL) and England (UN-E&W) is primarily used to 
transport wind power, while on non-windy days, this capacity would be used to export energy 
from conventional plant. 
The cost-benefit approach illustrates that economically efficient transmission investment is 
made when the opportunities for sharing of transmission between different generating resources 
are recognised. The analysis has shown that the contribution of wind generation to use of this 
shared capacity is less than conventional generation, therefore wind (or other non-conventional 
generators with low capacity credit) should also be charged less. Distinguishing between 
generation-types and location to reflect these differences in operation characteristics and output 
is essential if optimal decisions are to be made in transmission investment and if cost-reflective 
pricing regimes are to be devised for accurate reflection of generation costs imposed on the 
system. 
Drivers of capacity requirements for non-conventional generation 
Pattern and time of output 
Pattern and timing of output is crucial in dictating the contribution to network reinforcement. 
Wind generation and other non-conventional generating technologies are not load-following. 
Rather, their output is dictated by the weather or other variable factors. In this instance, output 
from these generators will not be coincident with the system peak by design, allowing the 
sharing of capacity. The extent to which this can occur will depend on the level of correlation 
between the outputs of each technology. 
Diversity of other network users and pattern and time of use of the system 
The diversity of surrounding users will impact on the opportunities for sharing of network 
capacity. In areas with conventional and non-conventional generation or those that are 
characterised by generation units that have non-correlated use of the system, sharing of capacity 
will be possible. However, in areas with homogenous generation technologies the opportunity 
for sharing will be limited. In this instance network capacity should be provided to meet the 
maximum output of the connected units, such as the proposed Beauly-Denny transmission 
connection (NGET, 2007a). Here, wind is the only source of exporting power, so it becomes 
economically viable to install transmission to accommodate the full peak output of wind 
generation and prevent curtailment of a zero-marginal cost generator. 
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3.3.4 Summary and conclusions 
As highlighted in Chapter 2 (section 2.4.1), the contributions of the network to compromising 
overall system reliability through preventing generation from accessing demand under peak 
conditions are limited. The presence of an optimally constrained transmission network only 
increases the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) from 9 to 9.5% (i.e. increasing the chance of 
system failure from 9 to 9.5 times in 100 years). This means that historically, generation has had 
almost full access to load; the network has been built on the basis of reliability which has 
created a transmission system with a degree of network redundancy that does not compromise 
the economic efficiency driver for transmission (i.e. more than adequate capacity is built to 
satisfy the transmission requirements that allow load to access cheap generation).. 
All this has kept operational network constraints to a minimum in the conventional system. 
However, with the addition of non-conventional generation to the network, particularly wind 
generation, this picture is changing. As the impact assessment has identified, wind power can 
displace energy produced by conventional plant (i.e. reduce the fuel burnt), but its ability to 
displace conventional plant is limited. As the capacity credit of wind power and other non-
convention generators is limited, network reinforcement driven by non-conventional generation 
will be limited in systems designed for reliability. Wind generation is essentially a fuel saver, 
rather than a contributor to generation capacity, so building transmission to support it on this 
basis is not optimal. 
Wind is, however, low marginal cost and thus too cheap to constrain off on a regular basis. So 
the new network to support the sustainable power system needs to make sure that sure that wind 
is not constrained unnecessarily. An assessment should be made to determine what level of 
additional transmission is required to facilitate economically efficient sharing of capacity. Then 
expensive and fossil fuelled generation should be constrained off the system when the wind is 
blowing coincident with system peaks. 
This signals a change in the decision making process for investment in transmission capacity. 
Although reliability is still a driver, optimal networks built for non-conventional generation are 
likely to be constructed with economic efficiency as a dominant factor dictating network 
investment decisions. The requirement for high levels of network redundancy across the 
network to ensure reliability will be reduced (because some connected generators will not be 
making a contribution to this aspect of system planning), and in some areas where capacity is 
driven by economic efficiency the occurrence and relevance of constraints is likely to increase. 
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3.4 Distribution impact assessment 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, modern distribution systems were designed to accept bulk power 
from the transmission network and to distribute it to customers. The flow of power was always 
from the higher to the lower voltage levels. However, with significant penetration of distributed 
generation the power flows may become reversed. As this situation develops the distribution 
network is no longer a passive circuit supplying loads but an active system with power flows 
and voltages determined by generation as well as loads. 
As per the impact assessment methodology, this section reviews the major impacts of DG on the 
distribution network operation and investment, both positive and negative. In addition it 
illustrates how these impacts can be mitigated and moderated with the use of active 
management and the other drivers detailed in the introduction. It also discusses the implications 
and materiality of these impacts in the context of the present distribution network and the 
current and expected penetration of distributed generation. 
3.4.2 Distribution network operation 
The operational performance indicators in the distribution network are the levels and duration of 
network outage (to which the customer quality of supply indicators, CI and CMLs, are linked) 
and the magnitude of losses. Relevant DG network impacts are those with a negative or positive 
impact on either of these operational characteristics. The main impacts caused by DG in the 
operational timescale are: increased fault levels, voltage rise effect and reduction in losses from 
connection of micro-generation. Each of these impacts is reviewed in turn, also highlighting the 
drivers that can moderate or mitigate their effect. 
Voltage rise effect 
Every DNO has an obligation to supply its customers at a voltage within specified limits. This 
requirement often determines the design and expense of the distribution circuits and so, over the 
years, techniques have been developed to make the maximum use of distribution circuits to 
supply customers within the required voltages. During minimum load the voltage received by 
all customers is just below the maximum allowed; if a DG unit is now connected to the end of 
such a circuit then the flows in the circuit will change and hence the voltage profiles will also be 
affected. The most severe case is likely to be when the customer load on the network is at a 
minimum and the output of the distributed generator must flow back to the source. 
Current operating policy based on passive operation of distribution network limits the capacity 
of generation connected based on the extreme condition of minimum load, maximum 
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generation. In order to minimise the overall voltage rise effect, network operators prefer to 
connect DG at higher voltages where their impact onto voltage levels is minimal. However, the 
commercial viability of distributed generation projects is sensitive to connection costs. These 
costs increase considerably with the voltage level at which the distributed generation is 
connected; generally the higher the voltage or more sparse the network, the higher the cost. The 
developers of distributed generation therefore prefer to connect at lower voltages. 
Drivers of voltage rise 
Location, density of installation & diversity of surrounding generation and load 
In rural areas, or sparse parts of the distribution network, locations at the end of long feeders 
with limited local demand are particularly susceptible to these voltage rise effects. Clearly, the 
surrounding generation/demand environment is also important, and the impact can be mitigated 
to some extent through demand participation and demand response to increase loads at critical 
times on the network. 
Network management philosophy 
The present passive network operation philosophy is known to considerably limit the amount of 
distributed generation that can be connected in areas susceptible to voltage rise; however, an 
active management approach will allow considerably greater penetration of distributed 
generation. 
(Shafm et ah, 2004) illustrate the impact that active management techniques can have on DG 
induced voltage rise effect in rural areas. Coordinated voltage control with on load tap changers 
(OLTC) enables connection of increased capacity of DG by actively changing the OLTC setting 
and maintaining the voltages of a distribution network within defined limits. Remote 
measurements from key network points are transmitted to the relevant substation and used to 
control the set-point of the OLTC automatic regulator. This approach does require additional 
ICT infrastructure to be installed within the network; however, the active management approach 
mitigates significant levels of network reinforcement, such that avoided infrastructure costs can 
outweigh ICT investments in many instances. 
Further analysis in (Grenard et al., 2005) quantifies the impact of active management to mitigate 
voltage rise for the UK distribution system caused by integration of various levels of CHP. The 
work estimates total cost of implementing active management techniques to be between £40 
million and 160 million^^. The incremental cost of reinforcement under passive and active 
The highest cost implementation appears in the low-density penetration scenario (because more widespread 
upgrades are required to accommodate the active management techniques across a wide area). 
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network management scenarios, for low and high density penetration of DG, is presented in 
Table 3-5. The study concludes that where the connection of DG is imposing additional 
reinforcement costs to the system, there will be a cost saving from implementing an active 
management approach. Furthermore, in every instance this cost saving outweighs the initial 
implementation costs. 
Penetration of 
DG 
Density of Installation and Active Management Control Scheme 
Low P Low A High P IHigh A 
2.5GW 0 0 0 0 
5GW 0 0 238 84 
7.5GW 100 0 359 253 
10GW 243 0 560 376 
Table 3-5: Total incremental cost of upgrading feeders and substations in rural systems (in Emillion) for passive 
(P) and active (A) management (Grenard et al., 2005) 
However, it is noteworthy that at the lower penetrations of DG under the low-density scenario, 
the initial impact of connection is minimal on the network. This indicates that the existing 
network is already reasonably resilient and capable of absorbing an amount of generation before 
any additional cost is incurred. 
Increased fault levels 
Accurate detection, location and isolation of faults are the key components to reliable operation 
of an electricity network. When a fault occurs, a fault current is generated on the network. The 
fault current must be large enough to be easily and quickly distinguished from normal currents 
and be localised enough to indicate the position of the fault so that it can be repaired quickly. 
However, this must be carefully judged such that the current remains within the operating limits 
of the circuit breaker that must interrupt the current. Adding DG tends to increase the current 
and confuse these locational signals, and tends to increase the number of faults recorded. There 
is therefore a need to look at ways of limiting fault current to the safe maximum. This usually 
involves the upgrading of expensive switchgear, and could add significantly to the cost of 
connection of DG were this cost of upgrading to be passed through in its entirety. 
Drivers of fault levels 
Network management philosophy 
The work undertaken by (Wu et al., 2003) outlines an active management technique for 
management of fault levels in urban areas, for networks with high penetration of DG. The 
management technique itself is a simple approach of splitting substation bus-bars. Fault level 
103 
Chapter 3: Network Costs and Benefits 
management using this technique would open the 1 IkV bus section circuit breaker. By splitting 
the network in this way, the impedance between the 33kV and 11 kV systems doubles, reducing 
the fault current coming from the upper voltage levels. Alternative methods for active 
management of faults include application of fault current limiters or reconfiguring bus-bar 
arrangements to reduce the fault level (Lopes et a l , 2007). 
Further analysis on the impact of active management on fault levels was undertaken in the 
previously cited study by (Grenard et al., 2005). Table 3-6 highlights the headline figures 
quantifying the impact of the network splitting activity on reductions of DG fault associated 
costs. The table presents the network reinforcement costs for the passive (P) and active (A) 
management philosophies under low and high density penetration scenarios. The figures 
presented in brackets in the active management columns represent the costs of implementation 
for the active management scheme. 
Penetration of 
DG 
Density of Installation and Active Management Control Scheme 
Low Density, 
Passive Mgmt 
Low Density, 
Active IVIgmt. 
(cost of AM 
Emiiiion) 
l-iigh Density, 
Passive Mgmt. 
IHigh Density, 
Active Mgmt 
(cost of AM 
Emillion) 
2.5GW 796 0(320) 398 0 (80) 
5GW 796 0 (320) 398 0(80) 
7.5GW 796 0(80) 415 415 (80) 
10GW 796 0(80) 1012 1012 (80) 
Table 3-6: Total reinforcement costs of upgrading switcligear in urban areas (in (million) for passive (P) and 
active (A) management, with 0% headroom (Grenard et al., 2005) 
The analysis shows that there are some considerable benefits of implementing active 
management schemes, particularly at lower penetrations of DG, although as penetration 
increases in high density situations the benefit can be lost entirely. 
Reduction of losses 
Energy losses from the network occur in the form of heat in transmission and distribution 
circuits. In the UK, annual losses from the distribution system account for around 7% of the 
electricity transported (Ofgem, 2003a). The magnitude of losses is influenced by a number of 
parameters, namely; electrical resistance of circuits, proximity of generation and load, 
temperature, network configuration, voltage level of transmission/distribution, voltage 
transformations, magnitude and diversity of the load and power factor. DG can influence losses 
through altering these parameters. 
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Drivers of reduction of iosses 
Time of output 
Losses are at their peak during peak loading of the network. In the UK, peak loads occur during 
winter evenings around 5-6pm^^, so generation technologies that output during this period will 
contribute directly to reduction in losses. See Figure 3-9 for an illustration of the correlation 
between distribution network losses and daily load in both rural and urban locations. Because of 
the strong correlation between peak load and losses, reduction of load during critical periods can 
have a significant impact on loss reduction. 
A) Rural 
0.8 
0.4 2 
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Time 
Figure 3-9: Correlation between losses and system load for (a) rural and (b) urban areas (Cao et al., 2006) 
These contributions to loss reductions are entirely location specific, dependent on technology 
(size, type etc.), operating strategy, density of technology penetration, network topology, 
proximity to load, etc. The same generating technology in different locations can have opposite 
effects on network losses. 
For example, CHP technology, the heat generated by domestic-scale |iCHP is used for space 
heating inside the host premises. Therefore the electrical energy output of |aCHP is most often 
driven by the heat requirements of consumers. Figure 3-10 illustrates the normalised generation 
' See Figure 2-3 on page 39Error! Bookmark not defined, for tine Summer and Winter daily demand profiles. 
105 
Chapter 3: Network Costs and Benefits 
profile of nCHP. The study by (Cao et al., 2006) assumes the output of |iCHP is nil during the 
summer, but the winter profile, as illustrated below, shows good shape correlation with the 
load/loss correlation profile (Figure 3-9) with the two characteristic output peaks in the morning 
and early evening driven by domestic heating demands. 
Losses are a quadratic function of load; they are at their highest when networks are most heavily 
loaded. The strong correlation between jaCHP output and peak loading means that ^iCHP can 
make a significant contribution to loss reduction by helping to meet load locally and reduce 
pressure on the network. 
« 0.4 
O 0.2 
Time 
Figure 3-10: Normalised (jCHP output during winter {Cao et al., 2006) 
In contrast, photovoltaic (PV) generation makes a far smaller contribution. Much of the interest 
in PV in the UK is focused on incorporating the photovoltaic modules into buildings and 
houses. Thus, these small PV installations are connected directly into customers' circuits and so 
interface with the low-voltage distribution network. Figure 3-11 describes the normalised 
energy profile used in this study based on (Jenkins, 1995) to model the output of PV. PV output 
corresponds to the direct conversion of sunlight to electricity, which as the figure demonstrates 
corresponds to the height of summer over midday. During (typical UK) peak demand (winter 
evening around 6pm) PV output will be nil, and this technology will make zero contribution to 
reduction in losses. 
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Figure 3-11: Normalised PV output profiles (Jenkins, 1995) 
However, this can vary in some specific areas where the peak demand is not defined by winter 
conditions. As typified in some Southern European Countries, the summer peak is becoming 
increasingly prevalent. Driven by the need for cooling services during hot summer days, this 
peak demand is far better correlated to the PV output profile. In the UK, peak summer demand 
has been a network characteristic in some isolated cases (e.g. Central London) where air-
conditioning load is out-stripping winter heat demands. 
Location in the networl< 
Through its location in the distribution network, appropriately sited DG reduces the transport 
distance to loads and can potentially make a significant contribution to reduction of losses. The 
highest percentage of losses (around 40%-60%) in distribution networks occur in the LV 
systems, so micro-generation is well placed to make a significant contribution to loss reduction. 
Generators connected at LV offer not only potential for loss reduction at LV but also at higher 
voltage levels by reducing net energy flows from higher voltage to lower voltage. 
Location, in the context of rural versus urban, will also drive the impact that DG can have on 
losses at this level. Typically rural locations, with longer network connections to remote 
locations are more susceptible to losses. So location in this context will also drive the magnitude 
of impact that DG can make. The study by (Cao et al., 2006) quantifies the impact of [iCHP and 
PV on the distribution network losses in both rural and urban locations. 
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The results of the studies are summarised in Figure 3-12 (a&b). The losses are given in the 
percentage of annual energy consumption. In the UK, the average distribution losses are about 
7% with losses in rural networks are significantly higher (mostly doubled) than losses in urban 
(city) areas. This can be understood since customers in rural areas are more clustered and 
connected via longer and smaller conductors compared with customers in the city. 
Thus, the effect of deploying |liCHP and PV is more apparent on the rural systems. The level of 
losses can be reduced by 41%, from 8.5% to 5% of annual energy consumption, by |j.CHP with 
total installed capacity of 50% of the total Grid Supply Point (GSP) peak load. In urban areas, 
the same capacity of ^iCHP reduces the level of losses from 4.5% to 3% (33% reduction). 
Application of PV also shows similar trends but significantly less in magnitude. With the same 
installed capacity (50% of peak demand), the reduction of losses is about 1.5%. This is less than 
half of the benefit obtained by micro-CHP. Given that the peak output of PV is not correlated to 
peak demand especially in the UK, PV contribution to loss reduction will not be as significant 
as laCHP. 
(A) 
(B) 
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Figure 3-12; Contribution of pCHP and PV on the reduction in distribution network losses in (A) Rural areas and 
(B) Urban areas (Cao et al., 2006) 
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Density of installation 
Density of installations also has a significant impact on the pattern of losses. As illustrated in 
Figure 3-12a, successive increases in capacity of [iCHP bring down losses to just under 4.5%. 
However, at around 70-80% penetration the benefit to losses levels-out, and as penetration 
continues to increase losses increase moderately. This demonstrates the characteristic of 
distribution networks with significant DG penetration, whereby reverse energy flows (from 
lower to higher voltage) occur if demand is less than generation. For example, where low 
electricity demand is coincident with high heat requirement (e.g. early mornings) this may cause 
reverse flows on the network, which could require additional network 
management/reinforcement solutions and may erode the loss benefits if generation starts to 
drive peak flows. In this case, additional micro generators increase system losses. 
3.4.3 Distribution network investment 
The main investment drivers in distribution network design are: 
• Network security; the need to satisfy network security requirements by investing in 
adequate network capacity 
• Network losses; the need to strike an optimal balance between operating costs and 
network investment 
• Service quality expenditure required to improve network performance indicators e.g. 
Customer Interruptions (average number of interruptions per 100 customers per year) 
and Customer Minutes Lost (average duration of interruptions per customer per year). 
Contribution to security of suppiy for demand 
Network security, based around providing sufficient network resources to secure load in the 
event of network failure, can be augmented to include the contribution of DG (Allan and Strbac, 
2002). 
30 MW 
Group Demand 50 MW 
Figure 3-13: Example of secure network design witfiout generation contributions 
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A simple example is set out in Figure 3-13 and illustrates how a DNO traditionally ensures 
security of supply in a 33/11 kV demand group through network design (Ilex and UMIST, 
2004). As can be seen, the group demand of 50 MW can be supplied through either distribution 
circuit such that if one circuit were to fail, the group demand could be accommodated through 
the remaining circuit. In this example, the DNO ignores the presence of the generator and no 
security contribution could be allocated to this resource. 
If the group demand in the above example were to grow to 55 MW, the supplying network 
would no longer be compliant, thus requiring the DNO to seek additional security contributions. 
Figure 3-14 illustrates two different approaches available to DNOs, which would secure 
sufficient additional security for network compliance. Assuming no generator contribution 
could be utilised, the DNO is forced to seek a network solution and install a third circuit to meet 
the security shortfall (Figure 3-14A). Alternatively, the DNO can utilise the contribution of the 
generator. Assuming availability of the 30 MW generator resulted in a security contribution of 
60%, an overall security contribution of 18 MW could be recognised for network planning 
purposes (Figure 3-14B). Through the addition of the generator security contribution, the 
original network becomes compliant and network reinforcement is mitigated. 
(A) 
50 ICi 5 0 1 ^ T3 
30 MW 
0 
Group Demand 55 MW 
(B) 
50 50 
30 MW 
< D 
Group Demand 55 MW 
Figure 3-14: Network (A) and non-network (B) solutions to a distribution network security of supply shortfall. 
This contribution of DG to securing load has recently been recognised through adaptation of the 
Engineering Recommendation P 2/6 (as highlighted in Chapter 2) (Allan et al., 2004). 
Drivers of contribution to security of supply 
Location 
The performance of 1 IkV and 0.4kV networks has a dominant effect on the overall quality of 
service seen by end customers. The vast majority of interruptions (about 90%) have their cause 
in these networks (Ilex and UMIST, 2004). This is primarily driven by the radial design of these 
networks, as any fault on a circuit leads to an interruption to some customers (unlike 
110 
Chapter 3: Network Costs and Benefits 
transmission and higher voltage level distribution networks that operate as interconnected 
networks). In line with this, generation located below the fault (i.e. closer to load) is able to 
make the most significant contribution to securing the load. 
Time of use and availability 
Time of use and availability of generation have a significant impact on the contribution that they 
can be relied upon to provide for network security. The new P 2/6 recommendation takes 
account of such issues in its development of "F-factors" for intermittent and non-intermittent 
generators^^. These factors form part of a deterministic calculation that indicates the level to 
which various technologies can be relied upon to contribute to network security according to the 
number of units considered. 
Reduction of power flows at higher voltage levels 
The output of some DG technologies will reduce the net import energy from transmission to 
distribution networks during peak demand conditions, decreasing network peak loads and the 
requirement for capacity. This effective release of capacity from local generation can be used to 
accommodate load growth in the lower voltage network without the need for additional 
reinforcement. Thus, the connection of some DG technologies can defer the future network 
reinforcement and reduce the stress of the system which is likely to improve the lifetime of the 
assets. The following discussion focuses on the potential of jiCHP to impact network flows and 
the drivers that moderate the magnitude of this effect. 
Drivers for reduction of power flows 
Location 
DG generally has most impact on the network design at and above its level of connection. In 
general smaller scale generators tend to be connected to lower voltage levels than larger DG 
schemes. In this context, small scale generation that is located closer to demand will have higher 
relative value than large generation schemes connected to higher voltage levels, because it is 
better place to serve demand and mitigate power flows higher in the network. However, it is 
also important to remember that a significant proportion of the network costs are in assets 
operating at 33kV and below. So although it can be beneficial to reduce network requirements at 
higher voltage levels, this may be outweighed by the requirement for additional capacity to 
support additional low-voltage connections. 
' See Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 on page 66 for full elaboration of the F-Factors for DG. 
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Size, magnitude and diversity of generation and demand 
The number of generators and generation technologies plays an important role in the reduction 
of power flows at higher voltage levels. This is due to increased diversity which has the effect 
of firming up the output and increasing the contribution that local generation can make to 
meeting load requirements. This in turn reduces the demand for access to the higher voltage 
networks for transport of power from the transmission network. 
Time of output and capacity credit 
As discussed above, unlike many other DG technologies, |j,CHP can make significant reduction 
in the amount of conventional generation capacity required to meet system peak demand, 
resulting in a relatively high capacity credit (Hawkes and Leach, 2007). fiCHP output, typically 
coincident with the winter peak demand condition, effectively reduces the demand at the winter 
peak, thus reducing the capacity required to maintain system security. Averaged across many 
CHP units this effect would be fairly predictable and reliable, so ^CHP may not increase the 
need for reserve, and can actually displace existing capacity. Conversely, wind has a low 
capacity credit and produces disproportionately more energy than it displaces in capacity 
(Jenkins et al., 2006). Generators that are expected to operate during winter peak demand 
condition (such as fxCHP), contribute to a reduction in the requirement for network capacity and 
would reduce the need for distribution network assets (or for network reinforcement). 
Density of installation 
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Figure 3-15: Contribution of pCHP on the demand for network capacity (Cao et al., 2006) 
The study carried out by (Cao et al., 2006) revealed the potential capacity reduction that can be 
obtained from various levels of penetration of ^CHP. The results are summarised in Figure 
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3-15. It can be concluded that pCHP can be used to reduce up to 22% demand of network 
capacity. This is obtained when |aCHP generators are installed at 70% of the customer premises. 
Increasing further the penetration of the CHP will not further reduce the capacity since the 
critical capacity now is determined by load conditions where |iCHP does not operate, for 
example the summer peak load. 
3.4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Total capital investment from all UK DNOs during the period 2005-2006 was £11.17 billion 
(Ofgem, 2007a). The present penetration of distributed generation in the UK network sits at 
around 12.7GW, with approximately 4GW of this as CHP installations, and 3.5GW of 
renewables^^ with the remainder as gas-based generation primarily at the higher voltage levels. 
These installations are fairly evenly dispersed across the GB system. Approximate predictions 
from the UK DNOs have forecast penetration to increase by 7GW up to 2010 (with a 
corresponding increase in demand of around 3.5GW). This section has demonstrated that DG 
can have significant impact on the distribution network, both at operational and investment 
levels. However, the analysis has also shown that the magnitude of that impact is highly 
sensitive to levels of penetration and density of the installations. 
In some areas it is clear that the penetration of distributed generation on the distribution 
networks is not yet large enough to have a material impact on the way that the network works as 
a whole. Take for example the reduction of voltage rise effects in rural areas using active 
management techniques. For penetrations of CHP/DG at around 5GW and below, the actual 
impact on the network is negligible. The introduction of active management at this level is not 
required for straightforward network access to be achieved. There will be pockets of more 
extreme problems, for example at the end of long rural feeders with wind turbines connected at 
the very end. But at present (and in the short to medium term future) these problems are an 
exception to the norm justifying specialist attention rather than a wholesale conversion of 
operation philosophy to accommodate DG network access. 
Furthermore, within the distribution network investment and planning guidelines, the 
developments that have happened and are in progress to date are keeping pace. Such as, for 
example, the developments under P 2/6 and the ongoing discussions to develop the DUoS 
charging mechanism, to integrate more explicit inclusion of generation in a locational long term 
investment cost related framework similar to the existing TNUoS charge. 
' See Table 2-1 on page 36 for the full detail of distributed generation installed in the UK. 
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Problems do exist, and there are areas where the connection of DG has a significant network 
impact that drives reinforcement or other network investment. Particularly in sparse rural 
networks the entry of generation is likely to have an impact that cannot be recognised in the 
current access arrangements. However, the existence of these one-off, specialised issues cannot 
justify wholesale change of the solutions for network reinforcement, and operation that govern 
the current network. Until the penetration of generation into the network presents a material 
problem this remains a second order concern to transmission issues, and one that is already 
being kept under a watching brief through a number of initiatives such as the Registered Power 
Zone and the Innovation Funding Initiatives (Ofgem, 2005b). As such, the remainder of this 
thesis is devoted to the discussion of transmission access related issues. These concerns are 
presenting an immediate challenge in the short to medium term, and will be taken forward to 
fulfil the aims and objectives of the thesis in the following two chapters. 
3.5 Implications and Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the impact of renewables and DG on the transmission 
and distribution networks in terms of access over operational and investment timeframes. The 
impact assessment allowed deduction of the characteristics of non-conventional generation that 
have a crucial impact on the driving network access requirements. This highlights the core areas 
that must be adequately represented at the regulatory and market level to ensure cost reflective 
and optimal arrangements for all generation technologies. 
The assessment revealed that at both the transmission and distribution levels the importance of 
recognising the spatial and temporal characteristics of non-conventional generation is crucial. It 
is these specific attributes (such as time of use of the system, coincidence with system peak, 
voltage level connection, geographic location in the GB system etc) that represent the material 
differences between conventional and non-conventional generation, and ultimately drive 
different impacts on both the operational and investment horizons for network access. 
The movement towards consideration of more specific spatial and temporal characteristics of 
generation in the access arrangements signals another step towards fully market based solutions 
to access questions with a focus on the short(er) term. This presents the main challenge to the 
status-quo approach to network development and operation firmly rooted in pre-defined and 
deterministic standards for transmission and distribution network access. 
The following chapter takes up this discussion, analysing and evaluating the gaps in the current 
transmission access arrangements that affect the optimal development and operation of the 
network. The main findings from this chapter on the needs and requirements of non-
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conventional generation at transmission level will be drawn into this analysis. A framework will 
also be developed to explore the opportunities for developing of new enduring arrangements to 
reflect the need identified in this chapter for a move towards shorter term and increasingly 
market based solutions for transmission access challenges. 
115 
Chapter 3: Network Costs and Benefits 
116 
Chapter 4: Transmission network access arrangements for system with renewables and DG 
CHAPTER 4: Transmission network access 
arrangements for systems with renewable 
and distributed generation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the current transmission access arrangements to determine whether they 
offer a fair and optimal framework for a power system characterised by significant penetration 
of renewable and distributed generation. The critical analysis of the current arrangements 
identifies a number of inefficiencies in the current arrangements that are favouring conventional 
generation at the expense of providing efficient access for wind generation. It also highlights 
some fundamental flaws in the treatment of demand and distributed generation that are 
distorting the market and presenting a barrier to optimal transmission access. The chapter then 
builds upon these outcomes by exploring solutions to the key inefficiencies identified in the 
existing access arrangements and proposing a framework for the development of new enduring 
access arrangements. Three options for new enduring arrangements are proposed and evaluated 
against the proposed framework to determine their suitability. 
Through the reviews and analysis presented in the previous chapters, the scale of the challenge 
in network access has been identified as being most relevant in the transmission networks. With 
high levels of wind generation pending connection in an already congested area of the network 
there is material change facing the transmission network. The impact and implications of 
integration of significant levels of wind generation into the system raise some key challenges; 
firstly, how to make timely connection of renewables on to the network in the short term, and 
secondly, how to address the longer-term issues on the development of enduring arrangements 
to create a cost-reflective environment for new (non-conventional) generating technologies? 
These factors are driving the requirement to act now and ensure that the market and regulatory 
arrangements for network access are fit-for-purpose and not preventing the creation of a level 
playing field for non-conventional generation technologies. This is reflected in the number of 
Industry and Government Groups currently addressing this issue (e.g. Ofgem, 2005a, NGET, 
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2007c) and in a call for a full review of transmission access in the recent Energy White Paper 
(DTI, 2007, Ofgem and DBERR, 2007). 
Although there are a considerable number of issues and developments at the distribution level, 
the penetration of generation into the distribution network (now and that predicted) is not 
sufficient to cause widespread disruption in the network. As such the benefits from improved 
access to distribution have limited material value. Hence, the focus of the remaining chapters of 
this thesis is on questions of transmission access, for both transmission and distribution 
connected generation. Where relevant the issues for distribution network access are briefly 
elaborated on, and Chapter 6 is used to detail further work. 
However, it should be noted that the analysis will include consideration of the current 
transmission arrangements for DG. Although DG may not presently be at levels in the 
distribution network at which it has a material impact, there are certain aspects of the 
transmission access arrangements that must include consideration of DG if they are to be fully 
cost reflective. Of particular importance is the interaction between transmission connected 
generation, DG and demand. At present the transmission access arrangements are not 
synchronised across these network users, and recognition of one requires equal recognition and 
consideration of the others. Furthermore, there are opportunities for generation technologies 
with fuel switching capabilities to have greater involvement in transmission operation and 
development. This is particularly relevant for industrial scale CHP, prevalent in the distribution 
network. Finally, the development of new transmission arrangements must be capable of 
consistency across generation technologies, so that if and when distributed generation does 
arrive the arrangements can accommodate this and make allowance for the differences in 
granularity of inputs (accounting for output by minutes and even seconds may become 
increasingly important for DG), and sheer numbers of units that must be incorporated (this is 
discussed in Chapter 6, with the development of the Virtual Power Plant technical architecture 
for facilitating visibility of DG at transmission level). 
4.2 Evaluation of the current transmission access arrangements 
To measure whether efficient access is being facilitated by the current arrangements depends on 
whether users are being charged according to their use of (and impact on) the system. To 
contribute to the understanding and analysis of this question, Chapter 2 reviewed the current 
arrangements for transmission and distribution network access, laying out the philosophy for 
physical development of the networks and describing the evolution of the current supportive 
regulatory framework. Alongside this, it identified the principle features of a future system with 
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a significant penetration of non-conventional generation and highlighted the gaps and 
challenges in the current framework that may prevent full, fair and cost reflective network 
access in the future system. Chapter 3 then identified the impact (costs and benefits) that 
renewable and distributed generation have on the networks. 
Drawing these two previous chapters together, this section determines whether the current 
framework is suitable for application to the future low-carbon system, in the context of 
maintaining a fair optimal and efficient transmission system based on competitive market 
principles and cost reflectivity. The evaluation identifies the main inefficiencies in the present 
transmission access arrangements that impact cost reflectivity for systems with non-
conventional generation. It begins by briefly highlighting the key characteristics of transmission 
access requirements in systems with transmission connected wind generation and distributed 
generation (derived in Chapter 3). This is followed by a critical analysis of the cuiTent 
arrangements for transmission investment, access and pricing (as set out in Chapter 2) in the 
context of these access-characteristics for non-conventional generation. 
4.2.1 Characteristics of transmission access requirements for wind, DG 
and demand 
To determine the cost reflectivity and efficiency of the present access arrangements on 
renewable and distributed generation it is necessary to highlight the main characteristics and 
requirements of this non conventional generation that differ from those presented by 
conventional generation. These characteristics of transmission access for wind generation and 
DG are extrapolated from the findings in Chapter 3. 
Wind generation operating patterns and timing of network usage 
Wind generation is significantly different to conventional generating technologies for which the 
current arrangements were devised. The current arrangements were developed on the basis that 
generation technology would be operating at maximum output during times of peak system 
operation (i.e. peak demand, which is coincident with peak prices). In the context of 
transmission planning and pricing there is an assumption that all conventional generation 
operates during system peak. Therefore, it has been reasonable to design transmission on the 
basis that during peak demand conditions all generation will require full access to the network. 
Wind, however, is dependent on the weather conditions to generate, and correlation between 
peak demand conditions and output are very weak. Output from wind generation is very 
variable (intermittent), generally inflexible and generators cannot optimise their output 
according to price signals. Output can be predicted to a certain degree, but forecasts for 
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generation become increasingly accurate closer to real time. These differences in operating 
characteristics and time of use of the system have a fundamental impact on the way in which 
wind generation uses the system and drives investment in transmission. At present this is not 
reflected in the commercial and regulatory arrangements that govern transmission investment, 
access and pricing. 
Shared transmission capacity between conventional and wind generation 
When addressing transmission system reinforcement to accommodate the connection of new 
generation, consideration of the cost-benefit implications of connection may justify the 
installation of additional network capacity to allow efficient utilisation of low marginal cost 
generators. Decisions taken to reinforce transmission can be justified if the savings in the 
marginal reduction in generation costs (marginal cost of constraints) are greater than the 
marginal transmission network investment cost. 
Given that it is generally significantly more costly to curtail wind than invest in transmission, in 
areas dominated by wind power, with limited scope to constrain off conventional generation (on 
windy days), the optimal capacity of transmission should be equal to the installed capacity of 
wind power. However, in areas with a mix of conventional and wind generation, transmission 
capacity need not be built to accommodate the simultaneous peak output of all generation. 
Instead an optimal amount of network capacity should be provided and shared between wind 
and conventional generation, with conventional generation being constrained off on windy days 
when wind output dominates capacity. The cost-benefit approach illustrates that economically 
efficient transmission investment is made when the opportunities for sharing of transmission 
between different generating resources are recognised. 
Wind generation also makes less use of this shared capacity than conventional generation; 
therefore wind will also tend to drive less transmission investment. Discrimination between 
generation-types and location to reflect these differences in operation characteristics and output 
is essential if optimal decisions are to be made in transmission investment and if cost-reflective 
pricing regimes are to be devised for accurate reflection of generation costs imposed on the 
system. 
4.2.2 Access requirements for distributed generation and demand 
Integration of DG into transmission access arrangements requires recognition of two key 
factors: 
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i) The impact of diversity in generation and in demand on the net flows at the transmission-
distribution boundary 
ii) The influence of the distribution network on the impact that individual demand and 
generation units make at the transmission distribution boundary 
For the transmission system operator to undertake system balancing tasks and to signal terms of 
usage to drive optimal transmission investment requires quantification of the net flows at the 
transmission-distribution boundary (the GSP). This includes the contribution of both DG and 
demand. To calculate this accurately requires not only the net value of demand requirements 
and generation output but also consideration of the distribution network and its impact on 
energy flows before they reach the GSP. The distribution network links DG, demand and the 
transmission system (via the GSP). This network, through constraints and losses (both active 
and reactive), can significantly modulate the characteristics of distributed resources that are seen 
by the TSO. The distribution network topology changes in real time as the relationship between 
generation output, imports, exports and demand requirements fluctuate and change. As such, 
representation of the network contribution to the impact of individual DG on transmission and 
on net flows at the transmission boundary is fundamental to achieving cost reflective 
transmission arrangements. 
Effectively, if the distinction between transmission and distribution networks is maintained, the 
multiple resources behind a GSP in the distribution network must be presented to the TSO as a 
single resource, similar to any transmission connected generator or large demand customer. The 
characteristics of these distributed resources (demand and generation) should be combined with 
the impact of the network. This creates a single output profile, with a single set of operating 
parameters and cost characteristics that represent the net ability of the entire portfolio. For 
transmission operation and investment purposes it is this aggregated profile that is most relevant 
- rather than the individual activity of hundreds and thousands (and potentially millions) of 
separate units. The following sections assess how well the current arrangements address the 
provision of transmission access that meets these requirements for representation of a net profile 
of a portfolio of resources. Characterisation of DG, demand and the network as a VPP presents 
another challenge that is addressed in the subsequent chapter. 
4.2.3 Recap of the current transmission access arrangements 
A detailed explanation of the current transmission arrangements is provided in Chapter 2. 
However, to aid clarity of the following evaluation, an overview of the current transmission 
access arrangements for transmission and distribution connected generation is made below to 
recap the key areas of the arrangements that will be scrutinised in the following sections. 
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Transmission connected wind 
Currently, all generators wishing to connect to the transmission network must apply for 
Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC) that represents their maximum expected export value onto 
the network. At present, the "invest then connect" philosophy dictates that TEC will not be 
issued until there is sufficient capacity on the network to accommodate the new generator, and 
generators cannot be connected to the system without TEC^'. In return for TEC, generators 
receive a guarantee of firm long term access to the transmission system and compensation (from 
the TSO) if transmission congestion prevents their use of this access right. TEC is used as a 
proxy to indicate user demand for transmission capacity, so is used as justification for network 
expansion where there is not sufficient capacity to accommodate all TEC requirements. 
Charging for use of the transmission system is via the Transmission Network Use of System 
(TNUoS) charge; this is a locational charge, based on the marginal investment costs that 
generators impose on the system. The TNUoS charge uses TEC as a user defined indication of 
capacity requirements for new generators. Allocation of short term costs of access (i.e. 
transmission constraint costs) is executed via the Balancing Service Use of System (BSUoS) 
charge. This is a socialised charge made to all users of the system (generation and demand) on 
the basis of their traded volumes in the wholesale energy market. 
There is currently no user choice in purchasing of access to the transmission system; this is done 
only on the basis of firm long term access. There is no locational pricing of short term access 
that would provide users with the opportunity to purchase access closer to real time. 
Distributed generation 
At present, most generators under lOOMW embedded in the distribution system are exempt 
from TNUoS charges and have no formal interaction with transmission. To operate in the 
market DGs usually contract with an energy supplier for inclusion in their Supplier Volume 
Allocation (SVA). Suppliers with DG in their portfolio treat it as negative demand. They can 
deduct power produced by DG from their total demand requirements in a particular area, and 
thus pay a reduced level of demand TNUoS charges. These "embedded benefits" will usually be 
taken into account when DG are negotiating a contract (or power purchase agreement) with a 
Supplier. For DG that want to export to the transmission network or take part in the various 
transmission related services there are two access products the BEGA and the BELLA that can 
facilitate this interaction. 
This means that new (wind) generation in Scotland cannot be connected until the necessary system reinforcements 
have been made. 
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4.2.4 Evaluation of the current access arrangements for systems with 
wind 
At present, the regulatory arrangements and "invest then connect" philosophy dictates that new 
(wind) generation cannot be connected until the necessary system reinforcements have been 
made. However, the current frameworks for transmission investment, access and pricing have 
been developed for systems with conventional generation. As such they are not optimised to 
reflect the requirements of non-conventional generation as outlined previously and are 
fundamentally incapable of making an accurate assessment of the transmission capacity 
requirements for these technologies. 
In addition there are implications for cost reflectivity of a regime that only facilitates purchase 
of long term firm access. For wind generation where exact access requirements will be 
dependent on variable weather conditions, the lack of a real time market based approach to 
access calls into question the transparency and competitiveness of the current arrangements. 
This section explores these market and regulatory inefficiencies through evaluation of the 
current arrangements, namely TEC and the TNUoS and BSUoS charges. 
Evaluation of the TEC approach for long term investment and pricing 
Although the concept of TEC is attractive in principle, and an appropriate proxy for systems 
consisting of conventional generation, the key problem of the present implementation and 
interpretation of this instrument is its inflexibility and lack of discrimination between generating 
technologies. This results in a lack of consistency with the transmission investment process, and 
transmission network pricing and impacts adversely on the efficiency of generation system 
operation. 
For wind, the TEC associated with an individual generator will not be directly linked with the 
need for transmission capacity on the main interconnected system, particularly in systems which 
feature a diversity of generation technologies, as capacity can be shared. It is clear that different 
(non-conventional) generation technologies may drive different levels of investment in the main 
transmission network. This is primarily due to variation in output over time that is not correlated 
to either demand or generation from other sources. This variation cannot be reflected in the 
value of TEC, which is a static measurement, allocating a fixed volume of capacity throughout 
its duration. 
The process of converting TEC into investment capacity decisions is also not clear. The present 
approach to assessing the need for transmission capacity between large areas does not 
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adequately take into account the effect of diversity in output and corresponding requirement for 
transmission capacity, which is fundamental to achieving efficient development of the network. 
Gross treatment of access requirements (i.e. summing of TEC to determine access requirements) 
fails to recognise the significant diversity in output of generating technologies, and the 
opportunities for wind (and demand) to share transmission capacity with conventional 
generation. 
The absence of a link between TEC for wind/non-conventional generation and the requirement 
for transmission investment means that the concept of TEC, in its present format, cannot 
provide the basis for optimal transmission reinforcement when evaluating the impact and 
requirements of non-conventional generation. Given that the TEC allocated to wind is not 
directly applicable in determining the impact that the user makes on long term marginal 
transmission investment cost, using TEC as the basis for the generation TNUoS charge for 
systems with significant penetration of non-conventional generation is also flawed and will fail 
to achieve cost reflectivity. 
Implications of the inflexibility of TEC, access choice and the need for valuing 
transmission 
Further to the implications of TEC on long term transmission investment and pricing, TEC may 
also impact operational efficiency for generators that purchase a lower amount of TEC than 
their installed capacity. In this instance a generator would be prevented from generating in 
excess of its purchased TEC allocation, irrespective of whether the network is congested or not. 
This is inefficient, as these users are unnecessarily prevented from accessing the transmission 
network (and hence the energy market) when the short term marginal cost of using this 
transmission capacity is minimal (close to zero). 
In addition, limitation of access products to TEC does not provide sufficient choice for 
participants, or the opportunity to balance a long term access position against short term 
availability of transmission capacity. Most new wind generation projects require a guarantee of 
firm access (i.e. TEC) to secure investment backing. However, as there is no alternative to TEC 
and access is a pre-requisite for financial support, long term fixed access is the only option for 
new projects. Development of alternatives to TEC such as products that offer firm access over a 
range of timescales (from intra-day to long term access to transmission) could provide more 
choice to developers and investors, whilst still giving an assurance of access. 
Figure 4-1 provides a simple example to illustrate the inappropriateness of a single inflexible 
TEC product in a system with wind and conventional generation and to highlight the need for 
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valuing transmission through access choice. In this example a conventional generator with 
maximum output of 800MW is connected to the same bus-bar as a wind farm with a peak output 
of 700MW. The transmission line connecting this bus-bar to the rest of the system has been 
optimally sized at lOOOMW (i.e. under a given set of parameters for cost of constraints, and 
investment, this line has been optimally sized to accommodate both generators). This sizing 
implies that it is not optimal to provide transmission capacity to meet simultaneous peak output 
from the generators and that the plant connected at the bus-bar should share transmission 
capacity. 
Conventional 
Generation: 
Max output 
8 0 0 M W 
Wind 
Generation: 
Max output 
700 MW 
Optimal capacity 
1000 MW 
Figure 4-1: Example 2-bus system with conventional & wind generation sharing transmission capacity 
Under the current arrangements, both the conventional generator and the wind farm must apply 
for TEC before they can be connected to the system. Both generators will want to purchase TEC 
to accommodate their peak capacity (a total of 1500MW). However, the optimal capacity for the 
line is lOOOMW and the System Operator will not allocate more TEC than the sum of capacity 
available. To build additional capacity to accommodate maximum TEC for both parties would 
lead to economically inefficient constraint-free transmission. 
The solution is that wind and conventional generation be allowed to share the capacity, but the 
limited TEC product will not allow this. To allow optimal allocation of capacity requires new 
products that facilitate trading of short term access between parties to permit cost effective 
sharing of this optimally constrained capacity. 
For example, the wind generator, with zero marginal cost of operation and a high value of 
Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs), requests 700MW of firm access. The conventional 
generator purchases the remaining 300MW of firm access. Clearly, charges for the use of 
system will be based on these capacities. However, when the conventional generator is 
operating on non-windy days (e.g. where wind power output is less than 200MW), the it can run 
at full capacity of 800MW without the need to purchase any access (assuming that this situation 
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is perfectly predictable). The network will not be congested, so the ex-post access price will be 
zero. On windy days, the output of the conventional generator will be limited by the difference 
between the line capacity (lOOOMW) and the output of the wind farm. Given relatively low load 
factors of wind of around 30%, the conventional generator will be able to achieve a load factor 
of close to 80% of the plant rated at 800MW, while paying TNUoS charges for only 300MW. 
Alternatively, if we assume that the conventional generator holds firm access rights of 800MW 
and the wind generator holds the remaining 200MW, on a windy day, with a potential wind 
power output of 700MW, the conventional generator may sell (via auction or bilaterally) 
500MW of access rights to wind generator. The short term marginal cost of access will be equal 
to the fuel price differential of the cheapest generator that was constrained on (in the importing 
area) and the conventional generator that is constrained off. However, the short term value of 
this access rights may be higher and reach the cost of curtailing wind output (i.e. the marginal 
cost of operation plus the value of ROCs). This example illustrates that the value of firm access 
rights to transmission may be higher for wind than for conventional generation. 
Unequal treatment of demand and generation 
In principle, when the system is dominated by conventional generation, the TEC and TNUoS 
approach creates an optimal network and a cost reflective charge for generation. However, even 
for a conventional system, this approach is not wholly efficient as the method treats generation 
and demand differently. Generation and demand in the same location have equal but opposite 
effects on the system. Yet at present, different methods are used for calculating generation and 
demand requirement for transmission access and contribution to investment costs. There is no 
TEC equivalent for demand, so demand has no opportunity to stipulate how much access they 
require, or any autonomy to release access for generation (through increasing local demand )if 
this becomes economically favourable. 
Regarding TNUoS and pricing of long term access, overall charge is weighted 27/73 on 
generation and demand users with demand responsible for the greater share. To encourage 
demand to take an active role in network investment and operation, cost reflective charging 
should reflect the physical system and allow all users of the system to receive and react to 
appropriate price signals that reflect their impact on the system. This means treating demand 
and generation equally, allowing demand to stipulate access requirements, exposing them to 
cost reflective charges, and allowing full participation in any market based arrangements. 
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Lack of transparency in BSUoS charges 
The BSUoS charge represents the aggregated short term costs of constraints across the system. 
It is socialised amongst all system users (generation and demand) according to their traded 
volumes in the energy markets. This concept of a socialised BSUoS charge is consistent with 
concept of TEC. The TEC approach is based on long term firm access for generation according 
to their stated maximum requirements. If the System Operator cannot provide this access, then 
generation that is not in breach of its TEC is entitled to receive compensation for being 
constrained off the system due to insufficient capacity. 
The non-locational BSUoS charge is necessary to ensure that system users are not compensated 
(or charged) twice for actions taken to resolve short term system constraints. By socialising the 
short term costs of balancing the system all participants bear the costs of constraints equally and 
cost reflectivity is maintained through the long term pricing regime (although whether this is 
cost reflective for non-conventional generation is uncertain, as elaborated above). 
Socialising the BSUoS charge, although necessary to support the current TEC based 
arrangements, means that there is no explicit signal presented to users regarding the short term 
value of transmission in congested areas. Without an efficient indication of the short term value 
of access, system users will not be able to make rational decisions regarding their use of the 
system. Furthermore, justification of reinforcement activities of the System Operator is less 
transparent and inefficient. Without accurate price signals the charging methodologies (BSUoS 
and TNUoS) are just ad-hoc instruments to ensure cost recovery for the System Operators and 
Network Owners, rather than a method to signal future costs of use of the system to users and 
facilitate its efficient development. 
Lack of transparency from long term investment based pricing approach 
Previously, physical system was built on the basis of peak network conditions, with the 
presumption that all generation connecting to the system would be purchasing TEC equivalent 
to the value of their maximum output, and that most generators would want to be generating to 
that maximum at times of peak demand. Under these conditions it is reasonable to use the sum 
of the values of TEC as (part of) a proxy for network capacity required to allow generation to 
meet demand during peak times. There is no need for sharing under these conditions, because at 
peak conditions generators do not want to share, so the network is sized accordingly. Long-run 
investment based pricing is a suitable proxy for the cost of the network as it is driven by these 
peak conditions, that all generators participate in with some regulatory and predictability. 
However, introducing the concept of sharing capacity when it is economic to do so into the 
design and operation of the transmission network is a fundamental change to these 
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presumptions. Sharing of capacity is possible because wind generation does not use the system 
in the same way as conventional generation. Therefore peak output is not (deliberately) 
coincident, and it may not be optimal to size the network to be sufficient to meet coincident 
peak output that occurs on an infrequent basis. The analysis shows that sharing of capacity is a 
more economic solution. However, there will be times when system users want to use more 
capacity than is physically available. In this instance there should be an option for users to 
optimise their access requirements balancing the short term value of transmission against the 
cost of curtailing output. Users need to express choice according to how the capacity should be 
used at times when both parties want to use limited transmission resources. 
The challenge for the current arrangements is how to place a value on access in the short term 
(i.e. when the system is constrained). Long term investment based pricing is not able to capture 
this value, although charging based on the Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) should equal the 
solution under the short run cost (in an ideal system). The TNUoS charge is not sufficiently cost 
reflective or flexible to provide a value for real time usage of the system. To reflect this value 
and provide choice to system users, the Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) of access needs to be 
derived by location across the network. This SRMC should represent the real-time value of 
transmission, i.e. an ex-post assessment of the spot price of transmission on a half hourly basis 
as per the current energy markets, with the additional element that it is also calculated by 
locational (this could be nodal or zonal). Derivation of the SRMC for transmission essentially 
requires consideration of the Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) approach, but maintains the 
separation of energy and access. Further discussion of this sort term valuation of access and 
development of an ex-post market for access is discussed in section 4.4. 
This situation and need for quantification of the short term value of transmission does not arise 
in the current system, because there is little incentive (or option) for conventional system users 
to trade access in the short term. However, when sharing of access is possible it may be an 
appropriate risk management strategy for conventional generators to operate primarily in the 
short term markets (when the system is not congested and therefore access has zero value/is 
zero cost) and hedge their position during peak network times when congestion is more likely. 
By introducing the SRMC aspect this gives users the opportunity to decide how much access 
they require, and for the system operator to charge accordingly. It thereby provides users (all 
users, including demand) with a genuine choice of access products and the opportunity to react 
to real time conditions. 
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4.2.5 Implications of current market and regulatory arrangements for 
wind access 
The current market arrangements separate consideration of energy and access and send no 
locational signals to users of the system on their short term impact on the system. This prohibits 
system users from taking action to optimise their requirement for transmission. In the longer 
term, the current TEC based approach to transmission investment and pricing cannot facilitate 
cost effective and timely integration of substantial amounts of non-conventional generation into 
the UK transmission system. Fundamental revision of the concept of TEC (that could include its 
removal as an option) to reflect the diversity of different generating technologies is essential if 
transmission access and related arrangements for wind are to be cost reflective and transparent. 
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates that the present regulatory and market 
arrangements have two major flaws: 
i) inability to deliver economically efficient transmission solutions in both short and long 
term 
ii) discrimination against non-conventional generation in favour of conventional 
generation 
The present transmission access regime forces all users to acquire long term TEC for all their 
output in order for investors to consider their projects to be financially viable, as there is no 
other choice available. This leads to inefficient investment in transmission capacity as this 
fundamentally undermines the concept of sharing of transmission assets, which is shown to be 
economically optimal. As cost refiective short term value of access is unavailable this regime 
does not provide choice for (new) generators and prevents them from making efficient decisions 
regarding their location and use of the system in the short and long term. This results in 
inefficient operation of the generation system and inefficient investment in transmission. This 
has the ultimate consequence of increasing the cost to the end consumer which demonstrates 
that the present access framework is inherently inefficient when it comes to a system with 
significant penetration of wind energy. 
Furthermore, given that wind generation tends to drive less transmission investment in 
exporting areas, the present TNUoS charging regime overcharges. The TEC concept excludes 
demand and the related charging arrangements charge demand users unequally with regard to 
generation; this is both inefficient and discriminatory. 
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4.2.6 Evaluation of current transmission access arrangements for 
distributed generation and demand 
This section evaluates the impact of the lack of interaction and accountability between DG and 
transmission, and highlights the potential inefficiencies that the current arrangement may 
stimulate, including cross subsidy (between conventional transmission connected generation 
and DG) and perverse incentives to connect to the distribution network. For comparison with 
the analysis on transmission connected generation, the potential impact of application of the 
present charging arrangements (based on TEC) to generation in the distribution network is also 
undertaken. 
It should be noted that the present arrangements, which treat DG as negative demand, also treat 
demand and transmission connected generation differently. Although generation and demand 
have equal and opposite physical impact on the network, the current charging regime does not 
reflect this with regard to transmission connected generation and demand. There are several key 
differences in the treatment of these two users of the system (NGET 2006): 
• Generation charges can be positive or negative, but demand charges are only positive, 
• Demand access charges are based on metered volumes (capacity used), whereas generation 
charges are based on user requests for firm access rights through the TEC, and 
• TNUoS charges are levied 73% on demand and 27% on generation. 
The principal objective of the transmission access and charging arrangements should be to 
expose parties to the cost that they impose in a non-discriminatory manner so that they can then 
make efficient investment decisions. However, with these discrepancies in the treatment of 
system users, it is unclear whether these cost reflective signals are being passed through to DG 
under the current charging arrangements. The current arrangements pose two challenges for DG 
access to transmission: (i) DG is not visible at transmission level, causing inefficiencies in 
transmission investment signals, and (ii) DG is treated differently from transmission connected 
generation, leading to cross subsidy and inefficient allocation of costs between generators 
connected at different levels of the system. Both of these issues are explored in more detail 
below. 
Lack of visibility of DG to the transmission system operator leading to inefficient 
investment decisions 
One of the main challenges to efficient and optimal system development under the current 
charging system is the lack of visibility of DG at transmission level. As demonstrated in chapter 
three, DG has an impact on the transmission system (e.g. through contribution to North-South 
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power flows), however, unless a DG plant operator chooses to take a BEGA or BELLA its 
activity is not visible and it is not accountable to the system operator. As penetration of DG 
increases, flows at the transmission-distribution boundary are changing. Historically, GSPs that 
link transmission and the 132kV distribution networks have imported energy from the 
transmission network onto the passive, uni-directional distribution network. However, the 
increasing penetration of generation into the distribution is seeing some GSPs exporting back on 
to the transmission network at certain times of the day, and applications have been made to the 
system operator for "no-demand" or export only GSPs (NGET, 2005a, Ofgem, 2005a). 
Because most generators in the distribution network do not have the TEC allowance that would 
register their transmission requirements with the system operator they are not visible to the 
system operator. Where the activity of licence exempt generators leads to export onto the 
transmission system (or even alteration of the net flow at the GSP) they are impacting the 
system without being implicated in the charging structure (NGET, 2005a). The lack of a formal 
relationship between most DG units and the transmission system operator means that these 
generators are driving transmission capacity requirements without communicating those 
requirements to the system operator; as a consequence, the system operator is less able to 
translate signals on use of the system into efficient infrastructure investment decisions^®. 
Furthermore, the lack of visibility for DG also renders it unable to integrate into the system and 
contributing to real-time operation through provision of ancillary services. 
Unequal treatment of transmission and distribution connected generation and demand 
Generation units embedded in the distribution network are usually registered with an energy 
supplier and the presence of DG serves to reduce the supplier's net demand position and 
associated TNUoS charges. This arrangement correctly treats DG as negative demand. 
However, because the wider transmission arrangements do not treat demand and transmission 
connected generation equally, the current arrangement also sets up a disparity in treatment 
between transmission-connected generation and DG that has consequences for the cost 
reflectivity of the arrangements. 
Distribution and transmission connected generation is essentially the same. IMW of power 
produced from a transmission connected generator is the same as that from a generator 
embedded in the distribution system. There will be factors such as location in the network and 
the time and pattern of use of the system that affect the ultimate impact of any generator on the 
Note that the impact of DG exporting on to the transmission network and changing net flows at the GSP can decrease 
as well as increase transmission capacity requirements. Up to a point, decreased import will reduce transmission 
connection requirements. Exporting GSPs will not automatically drive additional transmission capacity until it exceeds 
the transmission import capacity. 
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system, but fundamentally generation output is the same. If charges can reflect these differences 
in location and time of use, all types of generation should be subject to the same charging 
methodology to avoid cross subsidy and the creation of perverse incentives for generation to 
connect where it is not optimal to do so. 
For example, under the current arrangements, "embedded benefits" are awarded to DG 
regardless of location. This is based on the principle that DG serves local load, reducing import 
flows and the requirement for transmission capacity. The "embedded benefit" does not 
recognise the fact that DG in the North of the UK will reduce local load, but that this will have 
the net effect of increasing North-South power flows and potentially increasing congestion and 
hence driving the need for transmission investment. Under the current arrangements a generator 
connecting to the transmission network in Scotland must pay TNUoS charges, because there is 
already more generation than demand in the North, so addition of more generation increases 
north-south power flows and the demand for transmission. DG in Scotland has the same effect, 
because it effectively reduces load in the North, however, DG in Scotland will confer embedded 
benefits in reduced demand TNUoS charges. 
Zone^ Tariff (£/kW) 
Charge for 10 
IVIW Gen or 
demand 
(£) 
Charge for 
+5IVIW Gen @ 
Transmission 
(£) 
Charge for 
+5MW Gen @ 
Distribution 
(E)" 
3 
Generation Central London (16) -5.49 -54,900 -27,450 
-
w Demand London (12) 19.78 197,800 
- -98,900 
i 
Generation North Scotland (2) 20.51 205,100 102,550 -
o 
z Demand Northern Scotland (1) 0.40 4,000 - -2,000 
Table 4-1: Demonstration of generation and demand TNUoS charging in the North and South of the GB system, 
and the impact of adding SiVIW of additional generation to transmission and distribution (NGET, 2007a) 
Table 4-1 illustrates this discrepancy using current TNUoS generation and demand tariffs^^. For 
transmission connected generation there is a clear locational signal in the TNUoS charge that 
rewards generation for connecting close to the demand centres in London with a negative charge 
(i.e. generators in the South are paid), whilst generators connecting in Scotland, where there is 
already a surplus of generation, are subject to significantly higher charges. Demand is also 
The GB system is split into 21 zones for consideration of generation charges and into 14 zones for demand. These 
areas broadly overlap, but are not necessarily concurrent. 
The additional "charge" from distributed generation is an embedded benefit claimed by the energy supplier to which 
the generation is registered under. 
The demand TNUoS tariff is split into a demand tariff (charged in £/kW) for half hourly metered loads and based on 
consumption during the TRIAD period, and energy consumption tariff (charged in p/kWh) for non-half hourly metered 
loads and based on daily consumption during peak settlement periods 33-38. For comparative purposes the example in 
the table only uses the demand tariff for half hourly metered loads, the same impact is seen if energy consumption tariff 
is used. 
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charged according to location. Loads in the South are charged more than those in the North, 
although unlike generation, demand charges are never negative (i.e. demand is never paid to use 
electricity). Generation, whether in the transmission or distribution networks, has a broadly 
similar impact on the system that it is connected to. 
However, connection of an additional 5MW of generation to either the transmission or 
distribution networks in the locations used in the example above illustrates a discrepancy in 
their treatment under the current arrangements. Adding an additional 5MW to the transmission 
system in the South results in a £5.49/kW (£27,450 total) payment to the connecting generator; 
adding the same 5MW in the distribution network provides a £19.78/kW benefit (£98,900 in 
total) in reduced demand TNUoS charges. The charges confer nearly four times as much value 
on DG connecting just below transmission. Although the proximity of DG to load could be 
responsible for conferring additional value to this generation, this value will not be consistent 
throughout the distribution network and will be highly dependent on the surrounding network 
conditions, proximity of load, and other generation etc. 
In the North of the GB system the situation is also skewed. 5MW of generation will be charged 
an additional £20.51/kW (£102,550 in total) for connecting at transmission level. The same 
generation connecting to the distribution network will confer a benefit of £0.40/kW (£2,000 
total) to the energy supplier under which it is registered, despite the fact that connecting DG in 
the here will reduce local load, increase power export from the North to the South and increase 
the need for transmission capacity. In this instance, the embedded benefit is conferring nearly 
£20/kW of benefits from connecting to the distribution network, and sending an incorrect signal 
on where to locate resulting in charges that do not reflect the impact of connection on the 
network for DG. 
The cause of this lack of cost reflectivity in charges comes from the fact that generation and 
demand are not treated equally by the current arrangements, so in treating DG as negative 
demand it is treated differently from other generators connected to the transmission system. 
Cost reflectivity is also impacted by the fact that demand charges in areas where demand is 
beneficial do not become negative (as they do in the generation charges). This means that DG 
connecting in areas where demand is beneficial still confers a benefit (of a small reduction in 
TNUoS charges) rather than a punitive charge. 
Table 4-2 illustrates the impact of non-negative tariffs for demand TNUoS charges on the price 
signals sent to DG connecting in a location with an excess of transmission connected 
generation. If the demand tariff cannot be negative, then addition of DG into the system simply 
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reduces the demand charge, in this instance from £4,000 to £3,200. This provides a price signal 
which encourages connection and does not reflect the impact of DG at higher network levels. 
Allowing the demand TNUoS charge to be negative and paying demand in areas where it is 
beneficial means that the additional of DG has the opposite effect. In this instance, adding DG 
(still treating it as negative demand) reduces the net demand value and cuts the TNUoS payment 
proportionately. 
Demand Zone 1 
Northern Scotland 
Tariff 
(£/kW) 
Charge for 
10 MW 
demand 
(£) 
Charge + 
2IVIW Gen @ 
Distribution 
(£) 
Total 
Demand 
TNUoS 
(£) 
Impact of 
DG 
Current Charges (non-negative) 0.40 4,000 - 800 3,200 
Positive: 
Reduction 
in Charge 
Negative charging (illustrative 
charge) -0.40 -4,000 800 -3,200 
Negative: 
Reduction 
of Payment 
Table 4-2: Illustration of the impact of negative and non-negative tariffs for demand TNUoS charges on cost 
reflectivity for connection of DG 
As penetration of DG into the system increases there is a concern that these discrepancies 
caused by unequal treatment of generation and demand will become material resulting in 
transmission connected generation cross subsidising the impact of DG not captured by formal 
transmission arrangements. Furthermore, the lack of adequate locational signals for DG to site 
optimally within the network could lead to sub-optimal and inefficient network development, 
ultimately increasing the cost of power to end-users (Ofgem, 2005a, NGET, 2005a). 
4.2.7 Implications of propagating the TEC-based approach to 
transmission access for distributed generation and demand 
Given the shortcomings of the present arrangements, and the requirements for future 
transmission access arrangements, this section assesses the impact of applying the current TEC 
based investment and access arrangements to all generation embedded in the distribution 
network. It evaluates the potential problems that application of the TEC approach would bring 
to development of efficient investment and access arrangements and assesses the implications 
for development of an enduring cost reflective transmission pricing regime for DG. 
Delivery of net characterisation of generation and demand 
Optimal derivation of DG access requirements should be on the basis of a net consideration of 
all DG in a GSP, including the contribution of demand and considering fluctuations according 
to time of day rather than peak demand conditions. This is to take account of diversity in output 
of different distributed generation technologies and to recognise the equal and opposite impact 
of demand on the net flows at the transmission boundary. TEC in its current format is not 
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suitable for translation to the case of DG as it cannot take account of these subtleties in DG 
operation that are crucial for the recognition and reward of its value to the system, and crucially 
it does not extend to consideration of demand. 
Demand access is calculated on the basis of metered consumption, rather than stated 
requirements (as is the case for transmission connected generation). There is currently no 
compatibility between the calculation and charging for demand and generation access 
requirements. To change this would require creation of a demand Transmission Exit Capacity (a 
stated preference of the maximum required capacity for drawing power from the transmission 
system), or alternatively an equivalent of the ex-post approach for demand could be devised for 
generation. 
A cost reflective solution to this is unlikely to involve TEC in its current form, as this long term 
firm access product has been developed to facilitate calculation of network requirements 
according to the sum of peak generation output only. This is at odds with the optimal and cost 
reflective solution for net DG and demand transmission access arrangements. 
Recognition of diversity and opportunity for sharing of capacity 
Access to transmission for DG using a gross TEC-based approach would see individual 
distributed generators with separate arrangements for transmission access. Based on the current 
arrangements, this would resemble a system where all DG have an individual TEC (or BEGA 
arrangement) for firm transmission access rights. This approach has the potential to grossly 
overestimate the impact of DG at the transmission level and charge without regard to a cost 
reflective and fair solution. 
Under the existing arrangements, providing DG with universal access to transmission, removing 
the embedded benefits reduction and exposing DG to generation (TEC based) charges for use of 
the system would not allow net consideration of the demand/generation balance. This would fail 
to recognise the value that can come from (correctly located) DG serving local loads and would 
simply change, but not resolve, the problems of distorted cost allocation with reference to DG 
driven transmission investment. 
Transmission capacity is driven by net power flows at the transmission/distribution boundary, 
so it is appropriate that the contribution of both generation and demand should be considered. A 
fully cost reflective approach to enabling DG access to transmission should entail net treatment 
of DG within a particular geographic area, including the contribution of demand to recognise 
this diversity and facilitate sharing of transmission capacity between users. 
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Quantifying the impact of DG and demand on transmission 
The generation system is a fundamental part of transmission system management. Increasing 
penetration of DG is changing the use of boundaries between transmission and distribution. The 
impact of this effect on transmission in terms of driving network investment, and allocating 
costs to system users is not clear. But, as numbers of DG connected at the distribution level 
increase further there will be a growing pressure to devolve system control responsibilities, and 
to enable DG to provide an increasing level of system operation services. To facilitate this 
activity requires DG to be visible at the transmission level, to have access to the transmission 
network, and for there to be a clear methodology on how much access DG requires and how this 
should be priced. 
The current TEC methodology requires that generators state their maximum access 
requirements, and pay use-of-system charges according to this requested allocation, hi the 
instance of generation and demand connected at distribution level, not only is their impact at 
transmission level dependent on the output and consumption of the surrounding distribution 
network users, but their individual contribution to the net flow at the transmission distribution 
boundary is dependent on the distribution network topology. All of these factors (generation 
output, demand and network conditions) are subject to continual change, so the complex 
interaction between all three that makes the net flow at the transmission boundary is also 
changing on a second by second basis, as a result of these interactions. As such, for a single 
generator in isolation to be able to state its long term requirements for transmission access in the 
form of a TEC request is an impossible simplification. Not only does the generator not have at 
its disposal the real time information about other generation and demand activity in the locality, 
it also has no information on the topology or real time changes in the distribution network that 
influence its contribution to the GSP boundary flows. 
Indeed, only the Distribution Network Operator is likely to be able to quantify all these impacts, 
allocate a contribution to each generator or load in the network, and create a single profile for 
the TSO. From the perspective of propagating the current TEC-based transmission access 
arrangements to DG and demand, it is clear that this suffers similar shortcomings as for 
application to transmission connected with generation. The lack of a mechanism to facilitate 
sharing of capacity or to appreciate diversity in system users leads to fundamental inefficiencies, 
and the absence of any arrangements for short term access is a key barrier to the development of 
cost reflective charges for non-conventional generation. 
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4.2.8 Conclusions and implications of the evaluation 
The range of gaps and inefficiencies explored in the evaluation make it clear that the present 
transmission arrangements do not create a cost reflective regulatory or market framework for 
systems with non-conventional generation. The TEC-based approach to access is not capable of 
reflecting differences in operating characteristics of generating technologies, or of accounting 
for diversity in output that might allow for sharing of capacity; the two key access requirements 
of non-conventional generation. 
The presence of only long term access options tends to over-value network access in systems 
with non-conventional generation. It doesn't allow transparency of value in the short term, 
which disguises the fact that during most periods of normal operation the network is 
unconstrained and the value of access low (limited to the cost of losses). This absence of a short 
term market for access means that user choice of access products is limited, and mechanisms 
that might facilitate economic sharing of transmission capacity during congested periods are not 
possible. 
The lack of comprehensive transmission arrangements for DG is potentially damaging for cost 
reflectivity and risks cross-subsidy between distributed and transmission connected generation. 
Transmission connected generation and demand customers are not treated equally by the current 
arrangements, and distributed generation is treated as negative demand, thus, there is a disparity 
in the treatment of all parties. Harmonisation of the transmission arrangements between 
distributed and transmission connected generation requires considerable reform of the existing 
arrangements. Moreover, representation of DG and demand at transmission level also presents a 
series of practical challenges on how to characterise and represent an aggregated group of 
resources in a manner which can be interpreted and utilised by the TSO. 
The subsequent section develops a framework for the development of new access arrangements 
that respond to the gaps in the present structure as highlighted above. The following chapter 
(Chapter 5) responds to the final point in the summary which highlights the technical 
complications of aggregation, characterisation and representation of DG and demand at 
transmission level. Chapter 5 also addresses the challenge of developing a technical architecture 
to facilitate transmission access for DG and demand by developing and exploring the concept of 
the Virtual Power Plant. 
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4.3 Framework for universal arrangements for transmission access 
The following section proposes a framework to allow analysis and discussion of the 
development of new enduring regulatory and market arrangements for transmission access with 
universal applicability (i.e. to transmission and distribution connected generation and demand). 
To initiate the process the first section is used to identify a series of high level criteria that 
characterise optimal, efficient and cost reflective transmission access arrangements. These 
criteria are then used as a metric against which proposals for enduring arrangements can be 
tested. 
The subsequent section then generates three options for new transmission arrangements. The 
first represents an incremental improvement on the current arrangements as described and 
evaluated in the previous chapters (i.e. an approach with an absence of locational signals for the 
value of short term transmission access). The second option maintains the lack of any short term 
access arrangements, but includes a step change in investment and access philosophy. The third 
and final option is to create markets for short term access. This represents a fundamental shift in 
philosophy and method with the development of an ex-post market for short term transmission 
access. Each of these options is elaborated further and analysed against the high-level criteria to 
determine their likely contribution to the development of optimal and efficient access 
arrangements. 
4.3.1 Requirements for future transmission arrangements 
Under the current framework, the System Operator must demonstrate the requirement for 
transmission investment in additional capacity for approval by the Regulator. Justification of 
investment should be made using a robust methodology that determines the need for 
reinforcement according to the impact of all users (generation and demand) on the system. The 
following outlines the key requirements for a generic methodology to determine the need for 
transmission investment. 
There are numerous core criteria that should be considered in the development of enduring and 
efficient arrangements for any future transmission arrangements. These are the factors required 
to create efficient cost reflective arrangements that conform to fundamental market principals 
and provide a level playing field for all system users including non-conventional generation and 
demand. The criteria have been developed from the extensive analysis and evaluation carried 
out in the previous chapters, and represent the requirements of a future system which features a 
mix of conventional and non-conventional (renewable and distributed generation). These high-
level criteria which characterise optimal arrangements are: 
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Cost reflectivity to facilitate competition in generation and supply, 
User choice in utilisation of access. 
Reflection of differences in generation characteristics and inclusion of demand, 
Representation of location and time of use, 
Sharing of access between system users. 
Continuity between short and long term value of transmission, and 
Flexibility to deal with uncertainty in future generation development. 
Cost reflectivity to faciiitate competition in generation and supply 
In the context of electrical power systems, cost reflectivity is concerned with sending price 
signals to individual users with respect to the costs they impose on network operation and/or 
development. This will ensure that in the short term, the system is efficiently operated without 
cross-subsidy between users and that, in the long term, it follows the path of least cost 
development (efficient investment). Regarding network operation and expansion, this requires 
some form of coordination between generation and network development as the optimisation of 
the network in isolation from generation would almost certainly not meet the above objective. 
Historically, vertical integration of conventional utilities seemed necessary for a sufficient level 
of coordination to be achieved. In the competitive environment, the necessary coordination of 
investing in generation and network assets is to be achieved through efficient network pricing 
mechanisms. 
User choice in purchase of access 
In future systems, transmission network capacity should be shared amongst various generating 
technologies and hence the network will be occasionally constrained. Users competing for this 
shared capacity will need the opportunity to exercise a choice between exposure to the short 
term cost of access (during the periods of constrained operation) versus purchasing a known-
price firm-access product and paying use of system charges. To allow this choice an ex-post 
short term market for access is required to reveal the value of transmission in real time. Within 
the present charging framework this cannot be achieved as this only considers long term access 
or no access at all. 
Reflection of differences in generation characteristics and Inclusion of demand 
To achieve cost reflectivity and provide choice, commercial and regulatory arrangements must 
be designed to recognise and reflect different generation characteristics between technologies. 
In the past, the generation mix has been dominated by large-scale centralised generation that has 
allowed generalisation and the development of generic arrangements to suit one technology 
type. Future systems are likely to be composed of many different generating technologies, for 
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which generic arrangements are no longer suitable as they fail to recognise the unique 
parameters that dictate the demand for transmission capacity imposed by new generation Failure 
to differentiate between generation technologies is discriminatory against new, non-
conventional generation. 
The recognition and inclusion of demand in any arrangements is also of critical importance. 
Demand has an equal but opposite impact on the system as generation, so the access 
requirements of demand are a potential resource that can be released by effective market 
arrangements. Although, historically, demand has had little engagement with the market and is 
perceived to be relatively inelastic, in future scenarios with significant penetration of wind 
power the differential in cost of access across the system could be significant, and the driver for 
demand to participate may increase. To allow this response and participation it is important that 
new enduring arrangements complete the market and allow demand to make a contribution to 
optimal development and operation of the transmission network. 
Representation of location and time of use 
The impact of generation on the system is also governed by its location on the system and the 
timing of output. For conventional generation this output is generally predictable, and 
coincident with system peak. For intermittent, inflexible technology such as wind, its location 
on the system and its timing of use of the system is less predictable. To capture the real impact 
of wind on the system requires a framework able to distinguish location and time of use of the 
system throughout the day, and design network investment and related charging structures 
accordingly. 
Sharing of access between system users 
If consideration of location and time of use of the system is made for all generation (and 
demand), then account can be taken for the same transmission resource being used by different 
generators at different times. Economically optimal access arrangements will evaluate the cost 
of constraints against the cost of building new transmission to meet the peak capacity 
requirements of all users in a constrained area. Where constraint costs are low, and in locations 
with diversity of generation technologies and demand, the resulting diversity in output will 
permit economic sharing of capacity, which should be reflected in any new transmission 
arrangements. 
Continuity between short term and long term costs 
The short term value of transmission access capacity is derived from the costs of balancing 
system constraints caused by insufficient transmission capacity to allow the fulfilment of energy 
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contracts between generation and demand in different locations across the system. Long term 
value of transmission is driven by the requirement for network reinforcement and the need for 
additional investment in capacity to counteraction network constraints. The long and short term 
value of transmission is linked such that consistently high value of transmission in the short 
term should translate to activity in the long term to invest and build additional capacity. 
Conversely, construction of transmission infrastructure as part of a long term investment 
strategy should also impact the short term value of transmission, for example, investment in 
network reinforcement in a heavily congested area should lower the short term value of 
transmission by reducing constraints. 
Because there is continuity between long and short term value of transmission, revealing the 
short term value of transmission is a key aspect of providing additional evidence on the need for 
transmission investment, and indicating the cost effectiveness of sharing transmission between 
system users. Additionally, consider the short term value of transmission for intermittent and 
highly variable generation. Short term access is highly relevant to these system users as their 
usage of capacity and impact on the system is difficult to quantify accurately away from real 
time. Take the example of wind generation which can only accurately forecast its output (and 
transmission access requirements) very close to real time (i.e. intra-day, less than 4 hours ahead 
of real-time). A long term access product is relatively meaningless in terms of signalling the 
actual capacity requirements of these technologies. 
Flexibility to deal with uncertainty in future generation development 
There is currently 16GW of onshore and 8GW of offshore wind with outstanding applications 
for connection to the GB transmission system. The exact materiality of all these applications is 
unknown; experience would suggest that only a proportion of the applications for connection 
will resuh in connection of new generation (because of for example, rejection of planning 
permission or loss of investment backing). The exact amount of new generating capacity that 
will make it on to the GB system in the short term is uncertain, and as the planned connections 
exceed all previous historical developments, there is little experience to draw on to determine a 
likely outcome. In addition to this new generation uncertainty, there is a similar level of 
uncertainty on the side of retirement and decommissioning of existing plant. Together, these 
two factors place several GW of uncertainty on development of the future system over the 
coming few years. 
Any new arrangements developed for the evolving system will have to take into account not 
only the different generating characteristics of new technologies, and the locational and 
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temporal aspects of generation - but also the fact that the exact nature of the generation mix 
(and demand landscape) is subject to some considerable uncertainty. For the development of 
enduring transmission arrangements it is therefore desirable that they are sufficiently flexible to 
allow any future uncertainty to be factored into the approach without compromising cost 
reflectivity. 
4.4 Comparative framework for assessment of future transmission 
access arrangements 
Three broad options for development of transmission access arrangements for system with 
significant penetration of DG and renewables were introduced in the previous section and are 
illustrated in Figure 4-2^\ 
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Figure 4-2: Options for future transmission access arrangements 
Each option represents a different philosophy and method for allocation of access, and they 
have been devised to facilitate discussion of the relative merits of a pricing policy based on 
short term ex-post market derived values, versus a long term investment based approach, 
grounded in a prediction based planning approach to network operation and development. The 
characteristics of each option are laid out below, followed by an analysis with reference to the 
high level criteria and discussion of the implications of implementation. 
Although it may be possible to derive different variations and combinations of the options analysed, these are not 
elaborated further given the objective and scope of this thesis. 
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Invest then connect: Incremental change to status quo access arrangements 
This option ("invest then connect" philosophy, predict costs) is grounded in the present 
arrangements, predicting all future market developments and investment requirements through 
forecasting and system modelling. The impact of users on the system is modelled using 
deterministic, stochastic and/or heuristic rules, and system users give a limited indication of the 
impact they have on the system (through TEC). This philosophy is suited to an "invest then 
connect" method and is broadly in line with the current GB arrangements. Where it differs from 
the present arrangements is through an improved planning process which quantifies the different 
impact of individual users with a greater level of accuracy. 
Connect and Manage: New cost discovery method for status quo access arrangements 
Although the focus on long term investment based charging for access remains, this option 
("connect and manage" philosophy, observe costs) has moved to the "connect and manage" 
approach to system reinforcement. All generation is connected to the system and given 100% 
firm access to accommodate all output. The System Operator observes system constraint costs 
and volumes caused by users activity on the system, and acts on trends in costs to stimulate long 
term investment where high constraint costs signal that it would be economically optimal. There 
is increased transparency in the derivation of the short term value of transmission and the need 
for long term investment, but constraint costs are socialised and system users are not exposed to 
the full costs of their actions. 
Market based: Fundamental reform of access to introduce short term value of access 
This option (market based philosophy, ex-post spot pricing) is a departure from the current 
approach, and a development of the competitive market based approach to access. The final 
option involves determination of short term prices for access to transmission via an ex-post 
competitive market for access. Under this philosophy the value of access is determined by the 
market and system users; both generators and demand can make appropriate choices when 
valuing transmission in the short and long term and can balance their position accordingly. 
These market derived prices also provide evidence of need for additional capacity if network 
reinforcement is required. 
To explore the possibilities for development of appropriate transmission arrangements for future 
sustainable energy systems, these three approaches to transmission access are compared against 
the requirements for new arrangements laid out in the previous section. 
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4.4.1 Invest then connect 
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The "invest then connect" philosopiiy is broadly in line 
with the current GB arrangements. Under this approach, all 
future market developments and investment requirements 
are predicted through forecasting users' need for 
transmission over the long term (ideally covering the life 
span of the transmission assets) including the user's 
commitment to connect through purchase of TEC. Under 
this option the status quo approach is marginally improved 
through a development of the planning process which 
quantifies the different impact of individual users on the 
demand for transmission capacity with a greater level of 
accuracy ,35 
However, there is uncertainty over how much TEC individual system users should purchase 
(specifically non-conventional generators with an output profile and use of the system that does 
not correlate to peak network conditions). This is a particular problem in areas with a mix of 
conventional and non-conventional generation such as wind, where the opportunity for sharing 
of transmission is at its greatest. Practically, development of the "invest then connect" approach 
to reflect this would require a more transparent process to be established between the amount of 
TEC issued and the actual transmission capacity required to support it. This relationship is not 
clear at present, particularly when considering non-conventional generation. 
Where economically optimal, sharing of transmission capacity is desirable, but as discussed in 
Chapter 4 the fixed TEC product is incapable of delivering this outcome. The restrictive nature 
of TEC means that differences in location and time of use of the system for different system 
users cannot be taken into account with any accuracy. In addition, limitation of access products 
to only TEC does not provide sufficient choice for participants. Most new generation projects 
require a guarantee of firm access to secure investment backing. As there is no alternative to 
TEC, and access is a pre-requisite for financial support, all new schemes must purchase a long 
term access product, regardless of its appropriateness for their needs. Development of 
alternatives to TEC such as products offering firm access over a range of timescales (from intra-
day to long term access to transmission) could offer more choice to developers and investors, 
whilst still providing an assurance of access. This could be delivered through the "invest then 
connect" approach. 
For further elaboration of the planning process and format of the current standards for design of transmission 
networks see Chapter 2. 
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4.4.2 Connect and manage and observe system costs 
The philosophy of observing network constraint costs and 
volumes is linked to the "connect and manage" method of 
system operation and investment. This method allows 
connection of all new entrants to the system prior to 
reinforcement. Investment in new transmission is then 
made by observation of actual trends in system constraint 
costs and volumes, and construction of new infrastructure 
is then undertaken with an understanding of where 
observed constraint costs indicate that it is (economically) 
optimal to do so. This approach implicitly allows the 
sharing of capacity between generation technologies with a 
diverse use of the system, and provides a more transparent 
view of the criteria for system expansion and 
reinforcement. 
In the "connect and manage" system constraint costs caused by users' activity on the system 
will be monitored and observed, and the system operator will act on trends in costs to stimulate 
long term investment where it is economically optimal. Under this approach there is increased 
transparency in the derivation of the short term value of transmission and the need for long term 
investment, but constraint costs are socialised and system users are not exposed to the full costs 
of their actions. There is an increased transparency of the process in determining the need for 
additional capacity, however there is the danger that under this approach, without timely 
investment in reinforcement, constraint costs could escalate and remain high for unacceptably 
long periods. 
Under this regime, TNUoS charges and system security standards could be updated to reflect 
the new "connect and manage" approach and to recognise the influx of non-conventional 
generation. TEC is no longer required as all generation is given full access at all times. 
Participants would be charged according to their actual use of the system, i.e proportionally to 
the capacity their connection drives. Transmission investment proposals are still made by 
National Grid and approved via the Regulator; however, this activity is now justified via the 
observed constrained costs in the system, rather than on forecasts of future network conditions. 
Under this method, the System Operator has an appreciation of the short and long term value of 
transmission in different locations across the network that can assist in development of an 
optimal investment strategy. However, the pricing signals provided to users of the system will 
be similar to the present arrangements; locational TNUoS signals will indicate the long term 
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costs of using the system (albeit with a new cost reflective methodology), and short term 
BSUoS charges socialised across system users. 
In the process of developing enduring market based transmission access arrangements, the 
"connect and manage" option can possibly serve as an interim solution but further work is 
required to examine such proposition quantitatively. 
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4.4.3 Competitive l\^arket Philosophy: Ex-post spot pricing 
The alternative to the above market proxy solutions is to 
pass transmission investment decisions over to competitive 
markets and use cost reflective locational access price 
signals to indicate to users their impact on the system and 
guide optimal development of the network. According to 
this philosophy, capacity investment, expansion and access 
is all coordinated by the establishment of an ex-post short 
term market for access that is driven entirely through 
efficient short term market signals, e.g. Locational 
Marginal Pricing (LMP)^®. As highlighted previously, 
under BETTA there is a separation of energy from access, 
such that energy can be bought and sold anywhere in the 
network without consideration for locational constraints. 
To maintain this separation of energy and access requires 
the establishment of a spot market for access. The development of a separate market maintains 
the overarching structure of BETTA and does not disrupt the energy markets, but it removes the 
requirement for prediction or observation of the need for transmission investment and access 
putting users of the network in the centre of the investment decision making process. 
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Deriving the short run marginal cost of transmission access 
As discussed earlier, the key requirement for achieving efficient investment in a system with 
significant penetration of wind power is an understanding of not only the cost but also the value 
of transmission in both the short and long term. To achieve this requires the creation of an ex-
post (overrun) short term market for access. From this ex-post spot-price for access, the market 
participants (including the system operator) can derive appropriate hedging products (for 
example, trading or auctions of access rights over various time horizons that allow them to 
The LMP model is implemented, among a number of jurisdictions, in the Nord Pool (www.nordpool.com) which 
calculates zonal prices and in the largest Electricity Pool in the world, Pennsylvania, Jersey and Maryland (PJM), where 
ex-post LMPs for more than 50,000 busbars are calculated every 5 min fvww.pim.comV 
" This discussion of the SRMC is based only around the impact of constraint costs. It excludes consideration of losses. 
Consideration of the impact of losses is an area for further work. 
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balance their position ahead of real time (as is the case in the wholesale electricity market)^^. 
Given that the change in access arrangements is driven by the need to integrate wind power cost 
effectively, and bearing in mind the variability of wind power over short term time horizons, it 
is essential that trading includes half hourly resolution (as seen in the wholesale electricity 
market)^^. Moreover, it is essential that system users always have the option to overrun and pay 
the ex-post short term access price that reflects the marginal costs of resolving the constraint 
caused by the overrun. This ex-post (overrun) price is the key for establishing the value of any 
ex-ante hedging contract and ultimately the value of existing and future transmission 
investment'^". 
To generate a market for access requires derivation of a spot price for access, i.e. pricing based 
on the short run marginal costs (SRMC) of transmission. These prices are implicit within the 
LMP calculation which determines the cost of energy including the locational element. To 
derive the short run costs of access separate from the energy costs requires the decomposition of 
this LMP calculation into its component parts whereby: 
SRMC transmission = LMP - Reference Energy Price'*' 
The derivation of a short term marginal cost for access from the LMP price illustrates that, in 
principle, it should be possible to mimic LMP locational price signals in the British model, 
whilst maintaining the separation of energy and access. 
Development of alternative access products and hedging short term risk 
Identification of the short term value of access should highlight that under non-peak network 
conditions additional transmission access can be facilitated at very low (close to zero) marginal 
cost. During congested periods, the SRMC of transmission will reflect the value of the network. 
Network users exposed to SRMC will be able to balance their exposure between the short term 
and longer term through consideration of hedging facilities, contract trading and actions of 
access and investment. Where constraint costs are consistently high, and the SRMC of 
^ It is Important to note that establishment of an effective ex-post short term access market is the key factor in achieving 
efficient and optimal enduring arrangements; trading of access (or auctions) and development of long term hedging 
products is of secondary importance as none of this is possible without the derivation of a spot price. 
Attempting to draw parallels between the transmission accesses arrangements for gas and electricity may not be 
appropriate. Trading arrangements limited to months or weeks ahead, as seen in the gas arrangements, are not 
appropriate in an electricity system with a significant penetration of wind power (characterised by unpredictable short 
term variability in output). 
In an over-invested transmission network, the network will be unconstrained for a significant proportion of time and 
hence the short term value of access may be very low. Where constraints are prolonged and corresponding costs are 
consistently high, with the short term marginal costs of transmission being greater than the marginal cost of 
transmission reinforcement, this should signal the requirement for long-term investment in new capacity. 
This decomposition of the LMP can be derived from SCHWEPPE, F., CARAMINIS, M., TABORS, R. & BONN, R. 
(1988) Spot Pricing of Electricity, Massachusetts, USA, Kulwer Academic Publishers. This approach to derivation of the 
SRMC of transmission access was also taken in ILEX (2002) Transmission Access: Defining Alternative Models, Ilex 
Energy. 
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transmission is greater than the marginal cost of transmission reinforcement this should signal 
the requirement for long term investment in new capacity. In the context of developing a spot 
market for access, it may also be desirable to consider the principles behind the LMP approach. 
Under the LMP market model (which combines energy and access), positions are hedged using 
the point-to-point Financial Transmission Right (FTR). The FTR is a purely financial 
instrument that pays a rent to the FTR owner that is equal to the nodal price differential 
multiplied by the amount of capacity bought over the course of the contract (which can be any 
duration from hours to years). 
In the access-only market described here there are parallels between the physical access rights 
afforded through TEC products and the FTR instrument. To mirror the FTR approach, the TEC 
market product must be adapted to facilitate its purchase (trading) over a range of timescales. In 
the case of wind, short term intra-day hedging products derived from TEC will be required to 
manage risk close to real time. Hedging products for wind outside of a few hours ahead of real 
time are relatively useless as the accuracy of forecasts for output reduces significantly rendering 
any medium to long term hedge inefficient and sub-optimal. This suggests that the wholesale 
electricity and access markets should operate with the same resolution. 
Further analysis is required to explore the financial and physical approaches to hedging access 
positions in the competitive market, and to understand how TEC (as a physical transmission 
right) can be adapted to the competitive market for access. Creation of markets for access also 
raises questions of property rights for access that arise from physical transmission rights, held 
by incumbent generators with existing TEC. 
Implications of market based access arrangements for demand 
Currently, demand and generation are treated differently by TNUoS. There is no TEC 
equivalent (i.e. Transmission Exit Capacity) for demand, so whilst generators pay transmission 
charges on the basis of their TEC allowance (i.e. their maximum stated access requirements), 
demand is charged for access on the basis of its use of the system during the Triad (system 
peak). The total revenue generated through the TNUoS charge is recovered in skewed 
proportions, with 27% of the total TNUoS revenue coming from generators and 73% from 
demand. The BSUoS charge is shared equally amongst all system users, proportional to 
volumes each user has traded on the electricity markets. Under these arrangements, demand has 
little presence or influence on transmission system development. Demand is fixed by system 
arrangements as inflexible and unresponsive, as it has little or no opportunity to respond to price 
signals or the short term value of transmission. 
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In exporting areas that are subject to transmission constraints and where the value of 
transmission is high, the value of energy from zero marginal cost generation (i.e. wind) will 
drop to low values that could be materially different from other locations in the system (EAEA, 
2007)'^^. Generators in these areas may need to pay a high price for transmission access to export 
energy. Conversely, demand within an exporting area should receive payment for accessing the 
network, as their use of the system reduces transmission constraints. Increasing demand in such 
areas can release transmission capacity, which will have value to generators in the same location 
wishing to export more. In instances of high price transmission constraints (and low price 
energy in constrained exporting areas) it would be beneficial for the system if flexible loads 
could respond to these signals and increase demand during these times. 
With fully locational price signals and a difference in energy price (and the value of 
transmission) between constrained areas that is potentially material, demand should be able to 
respond to these prices in both the long and short term. In the short term, demand response and 
load shifting could take advantage of price signals and relieve local constraints. Whilst in the 
longer-term, opportunities for fuel switching could be material. For example, using electricity 
for space heating; if the price drops low enough electricity could displace gas which would have 
been otherwise burned, for example in industrial processes or for space heating. Furthermore, if 
economically optimal, this demand side fuel switching could also displace the need for 
transmission investment. 
The current market carries the demand side as a silent participant. The transmission 
arrangements for investment, access and pricing are designed to make decisions on network 
expansion based on the assumption that demand is in the majority inflexible and inelastic. 
Arrangements have been developed that prevent demand side participation even when prices 
could potentially be influential enough to stimulate both short and long term demand response. 
The demand side has the potential to compete for the provision of transmission solutions and 
access, but this can only be achieved through full inclusion of demand within transmission 
arrangements. This should expose demand to these price signals to provide a basic platform and 
stimulus for demand participation. The case for including (or excluding) the demand side still 
needs to be presented and further analysis is required to determine the materiality of demand 
side participation of this nature. 
Under the two methods based on market proxy arrangements for transmission access ("invest 
then connect" and "connect and manage") there is little impact on the potential for demand side 
Recent projections undertaken by EA Energy Analyses on 50% wind penetration in the Danish system have 
highlighted this feature that on windy days the price of wind power will drop to zero or near zero. 
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participation in response to transmission constraints and increased value of transmission. Under 
these two methods it is possible the maintain the current treatment of demand, whereby it is not 
exposed to locational price signals on the value of transmission and so not incentivised to react 
by load shifting or fuel switching. Moving on from the two market proxy arrangements, a spot 
market for access would necessitate a re-evaluation of the manner in which demand gains access 
to transmission and the method by which it is charged for its impact on the system. The 
locational BSUoS approach that is the result of a spot market for access necessitates the equal 
treatment of demand and generation. This recognises that demand and generation have equal but 
opposite impacts on the requirement for access, and should be charged accordingly. Under the 
market for access method, demand would also have to participate in the market to the same 
level as generation, i.e. participation in the spot-market and purchasing of hedging products to 
mitigate risk of exposure to volatile short term prices. 
This approach would expose demand to locational signals on the value of access, and may 
facilitate the long and short term demand participation activity as outlined previously. It is the 
only option that facilitates exposure of all system users to costs which are reflective of their 
impact on the system and allows evaluation of the potential actions of ail users to find the 
optimal solution for system development. 
4.5 Summary of options for future transmission arrangements 
Table 4-3 below compares the market approach with the "invest and connect" and "connect and 
manage" approaches through assessment of each against the requirements for achieving 
efficient system operation and investment. The table lists each of the options against the 
requirements for optimal system development as identified in section 4.3.1. 
The overarching metric against which these arrangements are measured is the contribution they 
make towards cost reflectivity and accurate representation of the impact of individual users on 
the system. The table exposes that full cost reflectivity is only achieved through the market for 
access approach. The "invest then connect" approach which maintains TEC as a means for 
allocating capacity is not capable of generating cost reflective charges in systems with 
significant penetration of non-conventional generation. Whilst the "connect and manage" 
approach does allow National Grid and the regulator to observe the real costs of the system and 
make appropriate investment decisions, these costs are not systematically passed on to users. 
National Grid determines how the system will respond to these costs and makes investment 
decisions accordingly, using the observed trends in constraint costs and volumes to justify 
network expansion to the Regulator. The allocation of costs in this instance requires further 
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analysis to understand how revenue flows of all parties will be affected and whether this can be 
justif ied against savings in energy costs. 
Philosophy & 
Method 
Requirement 
Predict costs Observe costs Competitive market 
Invest then connect Connect and manage Ex-post market for 
access 
Cost 
reflectivity 
Not cost reflective, 
absence of link 
between TEC and 
TNUoS charge 
Proxy for long term cost 
reflectivity from 
observed constraint 
costs. No signal for 
short term costs 
Cost reflective, 
provided efficient (ex-
post) SRMC for access 
can be established 
Access choice Only long term access Not applicable 
Full choice between no 
access (i.e. ex-post real 
time pricing) and long 
term firm access 
Reflection of 
differences in 
generation 
characteristics 
and inclusion 
of demand 
Limited ability of TEC to 
discriminate between 
generation technologies 
reduces opportunity to 
reflect differences 
accurately. 
Arrangements favour 
conventional generation 
and exclude demand 
Identification (through 
observation) and 
incorporation of specific 
technology 
characteristics into 
arrangements is 
required, but still does 
not allow full inclusion 
of demand 
Different generation 
characteristics and 
demand implicitly 
included in market 
approach (provided 
appropriate market 
products are devised to 
support activity) 
Representation 
of location and 
time of use 
(TOU) 
No silort term market, 
TEC inherently unable 
to establish link 
between TOU and 
impact on investment. 
Too inflexible. Long 
term locatlonal signals 
from TNUoS charges 
TSO observes impact 
of short term locational 
and temporal variations 
in use, but this is not 
signalled to users. Long 
term locational signals 
from TNUoS charges 
Location specific SRMC 
of transmission 
published half hourly, 
equivalent to locational 
BSUoS charge. 
Allow sharing 
of capacity 
No sharing of capacity 
possible 
The managed approach 
facilitates sharing of 
capacity 
Sharing of capacity 
implicitly included in 
market approach 
Continuity 
between long 
and short term 
value of 
transmission 
No direct/transparent 
link between long and 
short term value, both 
are based on TSO 
prediction of user 
requirement 
Increased transparency 
on link between long 
and short term value as 
TSO and regulator 
observe short term 
costs 
Correct market design 
should allow continuity 
between long and short 
term value 
Able to deal 
with 
uncertainty in 
generation 
development 
No, inflexible approach 
makes it difficult to 
respond to unpredicted 
changes in generation 
development 
Yes, to an extent. 
Connect and manage 
allows some 
responsiveness. But 
some market proxy 
arrangements are still 
inflexible to change 
Yes, dealing with 
uncertainty in 
generation 
development is implicit 
in a market approach 
Table 4-3: Summary table of future options for developing transmission investment, access and pricing 
arrangements against Identified requirements for optimal system development. 
The TEC based approach does not offer sufficient choice in access (generators without long 
term access cannot generate), hence it does not allow sharing of capacity and cannot 
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differentiate between generation types and maintains the current situation of excluding demand 
from having an active role in the transmission investment and access framework. 
The opportunity for sharing of transmission between different generating technologies and 
demand is also necessary for the optimal development of transmission access requirements. 
Under the "invest then connect" approach, sharing of capacity is not possible. TEC prevents 
cost effective development of transmission, leading to over- or under- development of the 
network because it is too inflexible to guide transmission investment on the basis of diverse 
requirements for access, balanced against constraint costs and the marginal cost of investment in 
new capacity. The "connect and manage" method allows 100% access to all system users at any 
time; this inherently facilitates sharing of capacity, although demand is not necessarily included 
in these arrangements. Under this approach, where extreme constraint costs are experienced, 
this should be observed by National Grid and used as evidence for reinforcement of the network 
to alleviate the constraint. The market for access also operates the same implicit approach to 
sharing of transmission, although under this method demand is also fully included in the market, 
treated in the same way as generation and enabled to respond to the changing value of 
transmission access. 
Achieving continuity between the long and short term value of transmission is a balancing act to 
optimise long and short term costs. High value of transmission in the short term, in constrained 
areas, should indicate the need for transmission investment and reinforcement. Demonstration 
of the link between the long and short term value of transmission is required to justify action on 
building capacity, particularly when transmission is treated as a monopoly function. The "invest 
then connect" approach is based on the philosophy of predicting future network development 
and user impact on the network. The case for investment is then made as a derivation of these 
forecasts (subject to uncertainty of future outcomes and the assumptions made in their 
development). A stronger case for the justification of investment is made by the alternative 
approaches that might still use an element of the forecasting technique, but also base 
infrastructure investment on observed constraint costs ("connect and manage") and on market 
derived spot prices for transmission access (market for access). 
This leads into the final requirement for optimal future transmission arrangements, which is the 
ability to deal with uncertainty in future generation development. As highlighted previously, the 
"invest then connect" method predicts a future scenario for generation development (and 
demand, generation retirement etc.) and bases all arrangements around this forecast. The 
alternative options are both grounded in responding to the real time requirements of the system. 
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SO both are better placed to become enduring arrangements, able to incorporate uncertainty in 
system developments without the loss of cost-reflectivity. 
4.6 Conclusions on options for new enduring access arrangements 
This framework for enduring transmission access arrangements supports the case that the 
present regulatory arrangements for transmission investment, access and pricing do not produce 
a supportive environment which reflects the fundamental economics of systems with wind and 
conventional generation; under the framework this thesis sets out the high level requirements for 
enduring transmission access arrangements and develops a method and philosophy for enduring 
transmission access that would deliver efficient transmission infrastructure investment for a 
sustainable system. 
This framework uses a number of core criteria that should be considered in the development of 
enduring transmission arrangements: (i) cost reflectivity, (ii) availability of choice in access 
arrangements, (iii) reflection of differences in generation characteristics, (iv) representation of 
location and time of use, (v) sharing of access between generation technologies, (vi) continuity 
between short and long term value of transmission and (vii) flexibility to deal with increased 
uncertainty in future generation development. These are the factors required to create effective 
and efficient arrangements that conform to the fundamental economics of a system with a high 
penetration of wind generation and provide a level playing field for all system users including 
demand. These criteria were used to demonstrate the key advantages of a market-based 
approach to access using ex-post, short-run transmission access pricing. The strengths of this 
market approach are identified through comparison against the present "invest and connect" 
approach and the proposed "connect and manage" philosophy. 
The analysis strongly emphasises that the key requirement for achieving efficient investment in 
a system with significant penetration of wind power is an understanding of not only the cost but 
also the value of transmission in both the short and long term. To achieve this requires the 
creation of an ex-post (overrun) short term market for access. From this ex-post spot-price for 
access, the market participants (including the system operator) can derive appropriate hedging 
products e.g. trading / auctions of access rights over various time horizons that allow them to 
balance their position ahead of real time (as is the case in the wholesale electricity market)''^ 
Given that the change in access arrangements is driven by the need to integrate wind power cost 
effectively, and having in mind the variability of wind power over short term time horizons, it is 
It is important to note that establishment of an effective ex-post short term access market is the key factor in achieving 
efficient and optimal enduring arrangements; trading of access (or auctions) and development of long term hedging 
products is of secondary importance as none of this is possible without the derivation of a spot price. 
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essential that trading includes half hourly resolution (as seen in the wholesale electricity 
market). Furthermore, it is essential that system users always have the option to overrun and pay 
the ex-post short term access price that reflects the marginal costs of resolving the constraint 
caused by the overrun. This ex-post (overrun) price is the key for establishing the value of any 
ex-ante hedging contract and ultimately the value of existing and future transmission 
investment'*''. 
In systems with significant penetration of wind energy, the value of access for generation in 
highly export-constrained areas (e.g. Scotland) will increase. Under a location specific approach 
for pricing short term access, this will lead to a reduction in energy prices in these areas, 
particularly during periods of significant wind generation output, i.e. on windy days. This effect 
is already being predicted in Denmark if penetrations of wind generation continue to increase 
(EAEA, 2007). There is the potential for prices to drop to the extent that previously latent 
demand response may be activated, increasing demand for the cheap electricity and possibly 
displacing gas which would have been otherwise burned (e.g. in industrial processes or for 
space heating). In the longer term, if economically optimal, this demand side fuel switching 
could also displace the need for transmission investment''^ 
In summary, in order to solve the long term transmission investment problem and to facilitate 
cost effective integration of wind energy in the UK, there is a need for a radical shift in the 
approach to transmission access pricing from long tenn investment based network pricing to ex-
post short term network access pricing; part of the radical change should also include the 
incorporation of demand in access arrangements''^. 
^ In an over-invested transmission networl(, the network will be unconstrained for a significant proportion of time and 
hence the short term value of access may be very low. Where constraints are prolonged and corresponding costs are 
consistently high, with the short term marginal costs of transmission being greater than the marginal cost of 
transmission reinforcement, this should signal the requirement for long-term investment In new capacity. 
" In Denmark for example, there are significant initiatives (e.g. EcoGrid) to increase demand side participation to 
manage cross-border transmission access and instead of exporting wind energy on windy days to Norway at zero 
marginal price, to use this electricity to displace usage of gas, see www.enerQinet.dk and the EocGrid project microsite: 
www.ecoqrid.dk. 
This analysis also raises important questions on the roles played by various owners and operators on the system. 
Although out of the scope of the present discussion, further work could include consideration of the roles of the system 
operator versus transmission owners, and explore the role of the independent system operator (ISO), and whether the 
connection between TO and SO is a valuable one still relevant in the developing marketplace. 
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CHAPTER 5: Technical architecture to facilitate 
transmission access for DG and demand 
5.1 Introduction 
The arrangements described in the previous chapter accommodate the transmission access 
requirements of DG and demand by allowing representation of the characteristic requirements 
of these system users (sharing of capacity, recognition of diversity, equal treatment of demand 
and generation etc). However, the application of this new framework to DG and demand for 
exposure to transmission arrangements brings a logistical challenge with the issue of managing 
the involvement of thousands (potentially millions) of small network users. There is also the 
practical challenge of how to characterise and utilise these distributed resources that are 
autonomous users of the network, but have an impact at transmission level that must be 
represented as part of a net calculation of generation, demand and network conditions. The 
practical concerns can be distinguished under the following headings; aggregation, 
characterisation and functionality, and representation. 
i) Aggregation: Most DG and demand units are too small to be considered as 
significant or useful at transmission level. As individuals they have little physical 
impact of note, so utilisation of their services is not practical or helpful. To gain 
presence and recognition at transmission level, users connected to the distribution 
network must be aggregated into portfolios that have a combined output and impact 
of more significant magnitude. 
ii) Characterisation and functionality: Determining the individual and collective 
impact of DG and demand on the transmission network requires new approaches in 
characterisation. Designation of the impact of an individual unit on the net flows at 
the GSP varies with time, and with the changing parameters of other generators, 
demand and the network. Portrayal of a portfolio of resources in terms that will be 
useful to the TSO is the first task, followed by decomposition of the aggregated 
profile into composite parts to indicate to the participants their role and 
responsibility and charge (or reward) accordingly. 
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iii) Representation: There are hundreds of thousands, and potentially millions of users 
in the distribution network who could be exposed in some way to the transmission 
access arrangements described and allowed to participate in activities at 
transmission level. Realistically, if the level of transmission access is devolved right 
down to the low voltage level of the distribution network, there will be physically 
too many participants and interactions for the TSO to form individual contracts and 
interactions with each and everyone (notwithstanding the initial problem that as 
individuals, units in the distribution network hold very little interest or impact for 
the TSO). To allow the TSO to take advantage of these resources requires a third 
party agent/aggregator role to characterise and quantify the output of a group of 
resources. 
One proposal to address these practical issues is the development of Virtual Power Plant (VPP) 
structures which would allow the aggregation of a large number of distributed resources into a 
single profile which resembled the output and characteristics of a transmission connected 
generator. The following section explores the VPP options for aggregation, characterisation and 
representation of these resources. By analysing the development of the VPP concept the chapter 
explores how transmission access can be realised for DG, both to offer system services, and 
accurately calculate the impact of DG on the higher level networks. The VPP aggregation 
concept also raises opportunities for portfolio control to allow controlled and optimal 
interfacing of distributed resources with the energy and ancillary services markets. The 
characterisation explores the development of integration achieved through inclusion of demand 
and application of advanced ICT. 
5.2 The Virtual Power Plant 
The potential use of the VPP concept has been recognised in a number of recent publications 
and explored in several ongoing research projects'*^. Early identification of the concept of virtual 
collections of distributed resources can be found in (Awerbuch and Preston, 1997). This 
contribution describes the advance of distributed generation coupled with changes in the 
commercial and regulatory structure of liberalising electricity industries have created 
opportunities for devolution of transmission access to lower levels of the network. In 1997 
(Awerbuch et al., 1997) proposed that these factors would result in the emergence of numerous, 
smaller and leaner organisations able to take advantage of the benefits of distributed energy 
resources managed in a VPP-like configuration. 
" E.g. Two European Commission funded research and demonstration projects; Flexible Electricity Networks to 
Integrate the eXpected energy evolution (FENIX), www.fenix-proiect.orq , and distributed intelligence in CRitical 
Infrastructures for Sustainable Power (CRISP), www.ecn.nl/crisp. 
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Since then, significant developments in information and communication technologies have led 
to new forms of DG control and electricity market interfaces (Gregerson and Mariyappan, 
2001), Sophisticated ICT architectures have been proposed to cope with the increasing 
complexity of interaction required to facilitate decentralised system management and VPP 
activity (Bitsch and Knox, 2002, CRISP, 2006), and there is now scope within existing 
technologies and regulatory frameworks for DG to participate in transmission balancing through 
offering scheduled ancillaiy services (Ilex and UMIST, 2004, Akhmatov and Knudsen, 2007, 
Lopes et al., 2007). Although at present only a very small number of DG is able to offer these 
services in the UK (Ilex, 2005), many of the necessary regulatory regimes are in place to allow 
aggregated groups of smaller generators and demand to participate in offering transmission level 
ancillary services (NGET, 2006). 
The VPP can facilitate the devolution of the system management necessary for systems with a 
large number of DG and controllable loads (Dielmann and van der Velden, 2003). Further 
research has demonstrated the potential application of VPP for managing the schedule of 
different types of energy generation and demand (electricity and heat) (Shultz et al., 2005) and 
for distribution network management as reported in (Caldon et al., 2004). A number of vendors 
has also developed energy management software focusing on the generation scheduling based 
on the concept of VPP (Encorp, 2002, SaarEnergie, 2004, AREVA, 2006). On the commercial 
front, VPP has been used in Belgium and The Netherlands as a vehicle to make physical and 
financial call options with a pre-defined strike price (Willems, 2004) and in Germany and the 
UK to offer system balancing and ancillary services from aggregated groups of distributed 
generation and demand units (Platts, 2004, Platts, 2005, DTI, 2006d). 
In this thesis, the functionality of the VPP as an aggregator of distributed energy resources and a 
facilitator of transmission access is explored and developed in more detail. Beyond network 
access, the VPP concept can also allow DG and demand to access to the energy and ancillary 
services markets. In this way the VPP configuration of DG and demand can contribute to the 
full integration of distributed energy resources in system operation and management. Further 
elaboration of the benefits of integration of DG and demand into system operation and 
management in this way is out of the scope of the thesis. However, some aspects of this 
additional function of the VPP will be touched on in the following sections which provide an 
insight into the benefits of aggregation of DG, and elaborate on the technical and commercial 
functionality that the VPP configuration and characterisation can provide. 
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5.3 Characterising the 
As illustrated in Figure 5-1, the Virtual Power Plant (VPP) is comparable to transmission 
connected generating plant. Transmission connected plant has a profile of characteristics such 
as, schedule of generation, generation limits, operating cost characteristics. Using this profile 
individual plant can interact directly with other market participants and the system operator to 
offer services and make contracts. Via direct communication with the transmission system 
operator or through market-based transactions, a transmission connected generating unit can 
contribute to system management and can be made accountable for use of the system with 
exposure to relevant charges. Generation output and other associated services can be sold 
through interaction in the wholesale market or direct contact with energy suppliers and other 
parties. 
Actua l ne twork con f i gu ra t i on T ransm iss i on Sys tem Operator Perspect ive 
400 kV 
400 kV 
32kV 
Figure 5-1: Characterisation of distributed generation (G) and demand (L) at various voltage levels in the 
Distribution Network as a Virtual Power Plant 
hidividual energy resources (generation and demand) connected in the distribution network do 
not have sufficient capacity, flexibility or controllability to make these system management and 
market based activities cost effective or technically feasible. However, with the creation of a 
Virtual Power Plant from a group of DG and controllable loads, these issues can be 
counteracted. As illustrated in the figure, from the network configuration perspective, a section 
of distribution network can be composed of many diverse generation units and loads; however, 
at the transmission-distribution boundary (the 400kV-132kV transformer in the figure) there 
will be a single set of PQ characteristics (i.e. generation capability characteristics; active and 
reactive power production capability) that represents the capabilities of the entire section of 
" The characterisation and elaboration of the VPP concept is based on worl< undertaken by the author as part of the 
FENIX project fwww.fenix-Droiect.orQ) of which she is a part. This work has also been published: PUDJIANTO, D,, 
RAMSAY, C. & STRBAC, G. (2007) Virtual power plant and system integration of distributed energy resources. 
Renewable Power Generation, lET, 1, 10-16. 
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distribution networlt below. From the TSO perspective, illustrated on the right hand side of the 
figure, the VPP is a formal aggregation of these generators and loads (and network 
characteristics), which defines and presents the single set of PQ characteristics to the TSO, in 
the same way as a single, large transmission connected generator would provide its generation 
capabilities. 
Given this, a Virtual Power Plant is a flexible representation of a portfolio of smaller generators 
and demand. A VPP not only aggregates the capacity of many diverse units, it also creates a 
single operating profile from a composite of the parameters characterising each contributor to 
the portfolio. It can also incorporates a spatial (i.e. network) constraint into its description of the 
capabilities of the portfolio, as well as describing the aggregate cost characteristics of the 
resources. The VPP is characterised by a set of parameters usually associated with a traditional 
transmission connected generator, such as scheduled output, ramp rates, voltage regulation 
capability and reserve. Furthermore, as the VPP also incorporates controllable demands, 
parameters such as demand price elasticity and load recovery patterns are also used for 
characterisation of VPP. Table 5-1 outlines some examples of generator and controllable load 
parameters that can be aggregated and used to characterise the VPP. 
Generator parameters Controllable load parameters 
Schedule or profile of generation 
Generation limits 
Minimum stable generation output 
Firm capacity and maximum capacity 
Stand-by capacity 
Active and reactive power loading 
capability 
Ramp rate 
Frequency response characteristic 
Voltage regulating capability 
Fault levels 
Fault ride through characteristics 
Fuel characteristics 
Efficiency 
Operating cost characteristics 
Schedule or profile of load 
Elasticity of load to energy prices 
Minimum and maximum load that can be 
rescheduled 
Load recovery pattern 
Table 5-1 Examples of generation and controllable load parameters for aggregation to characterise a Virtual 
Power Plant 
Given that a VPP is composed of multiple generation and demand units of various technologies 
with various operating patterns and availability, the characteristics of the VPP may vary 
significantly in time. Furthermore, as the units that belong to a VPP will be connected to various 
points in the distribution network, the network characteristics (network topology, impedances, 
losses and constraints) will also impact the overall characterisation of the VPP. 
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The VPP is essentially a facilitator of access for the units in the portfolio to a wide range of 
markets. The VPP can be used to facilitate generator trading in the wholesale energy markets 
(e.g. forward markets and the Power Exchange) and can provide services to support 
transmission system management (for example, various types of reserve, frequency and voltage 
regulation). In the development of the VPP concept, these activities of market participation and 
system management and support are described respectively as "commercial" and "technical" 
activities, which derive two roles of Commercial VPP (CVPP) and Technical (TVPP)''®. 
5.3.1 Commercial VPP activity 
CVPP overview and characteristics 
The commercial VPP is a representation of a portfolio of distributed energy resources that can 
be used to participate in energy markets in the same manner as transmission connected 
generating plant. Being part of a CVPP allows DG and demand to access the benefits of 
aggregation with other units. Aggregation of several distributed generators and loads can 
smooth the peaks and troughs in output caused by intermittency or variability in generation; for 
example, through matching the output of several uncorrelated (or negatively correlated) 
generators (Ilex, 2001) or taking advantage of diversity in wind resources across different 
locations (Holttinen, 2004, Milborrow, 2003, Dale et al., 2004). Aggregation of output in this 
way reduces the risk of imbalance and penalties incurred through falling long or short on a 
predicted output (Lampaditou and Leach, 2004) and can create a more flexible and reliable 
output that can gain additional revenue through offering ancillary services back to the grid 
(Marnay et al., 2000). When matched with demand, aggregated generation can provide a better 
match to variable demand loads (Born, 2001, Sinden, 2005), and controllable demand could also 
be used to balance a portfolio of resources participating in the wholesale energy markets and 
assist in provision of ancillary services to the system operator (DGCG, 2005, Ramsay and 
Leach, 2005, Ilic et al., 2007). 
For DG in the portfolio (particularly intermittent or variable generation), this approach reduces 
imbalance risk associated with lone operation in the market and provides the benefits of 
diversity of resource and increased capacity achieved through aggregation. DG can experience 
economies of scale in market participation and benefit from intelligence on market participation 
to maximise revenue opportunities. 
" These should not be confused with the "financial" and "physical" VPP reported in WILLEMS, B. (2004) Physical and 
Financial Virtual Power Plants. Leuven, Belgium, Catholic University of Leuven, which refer to physical and financial call 
options with a pre-defined strike price. 
160 
Chapter 5: Technical architecture to facilitate transmission access for DG and demand 
DG & DEMAND INPUTS 
• Operating parameters 
• Marginal costs 
• Metering data 
• Load forecasting data 
OTHER INPUTS 
• Market intelligence e.g. 
price forecasts 
• Locational data/network 
modelling 
CVPP 
CVPP 
CVPP 
> Aggregates capacity from 
DER units 
> Optimises revenue from 
contracting DG and 
demand portfolio output 
and offering services 
OUTPUT 
• FX & forward 
contracts 
• DG and demand 
schedules, 
parameters and 
costs for TVPP 
Figure 5-2; Inputs to- and output from CVPP activity 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the required inputs to create a CVPP and the outputs of the aggregated 
portfolio. Each unit that is included in the CVPP portfolio submits information on its operating 
parameters, marginal cost characteristics. These inputs are aggregated to create the single VPP 
profile representing the combined capacity of every unit in the portfolio. With the addition of 
market intelligence, the CVPP aggregating agent will optimise the revenue potential of the 
portfolio making contracts in the Power Exchange (PX) and forward markets, and submitting 
information on the DG and demand schedules and operating costs to local system operators. 
The CVPP portfolio composition and agent 
In systems allowing unrestricted access to the energy markets (i.e. any system constraints 
caused by contracts in the market, or other locational issues are not accounted for at the time of 
contract creation, as is the case in the current UK market), the CVPP portfolio can include 
resources from any geographic location in the system. However, in markets where energy 
resource location is critical (such as in an LMP market, or in the proposed new framework for 
transmission access, with short term pricing of access by location) the CVPP portfolio will be 
restricted to include only resources from the same locality (i.e. the distribution network area or 
transmission network node). In these instances, a third party aggregator agent can still represent 
distributed generation and demand units from various locations, but aggregation of resources 
must occur in discrete portfolios characterised by geographic location. 
In theory, the CVPP can be composed of any number of units and individual participants are 
free to choose an aggregation agent to represent them to the system (i.e. to the transmission 
network, wholesale and balancing markets etc.). This commercial VPP aggregation function can 
be undertaken by a number of market actors including incumbent Energy Suppliers, third party 
independents or new market entrants. 
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5.3.2 Technical VPP activity 
TVPP overview and characteristics 
The Technical VPP provides visibility of energy resources connected to the distribution network 
to the TSO, allowing DG and demand to contribute to transmission system management 
activities 50 
The TVPP aggregates and models the PQ (generation) and cost characteristics of a system 
containing DG, controllable loads and networks within a single electric-geographical (grid) 
area, essentially a description of sub-system operation and operating costs. A hierarchy of VPP 
aggregation may be created to characterise systematically the operation of distributed units at 
low, medium and high voltage regions of a local network. Essentially, the TVPP generates 
LMPs for individual users of the distribution network, and aggregates these price and operating 
characteristics into a collective profile. The aggregated profile increases in numbers of 
participants as the VPP aggregation hierarchy incorporates the higher levels of the network. 
This culminates in a single profile at the distribution-transmission network interface 
representing the entire local network. 
DER INPUTS 
(provided via CVPP) 
• Operating schedule 
• Bids & Offers / marginal 
cost to adjust position 
• Operating parameters 
OTHER INPUTS 
• Real-time local network 
status 
• Loading conditions 
• Network constraints 
TVPP 
' Uses individual DER 
inputs to manage local 
network 
• Aggregates portfolio of 
DER inputs to 
characterise network at 
transmission boundary 
OUTPUT 
Characterisation of 
aggregated DER/ 
network capabilities 
in terms of generator 
operating parameters 
(see Table 5-1). 
Figure 5-3: Inputs to-and outputs from TVPP activity 
Figure 5-3 summarises the required inputs and outputs that characterise TVPP activity; 
information on generation and demand in the local network is passed through by the various 
CVPPs operating agents that represent units in the area. In the local distribution network, DG 
and demand operating positions, parameters and the bids-and-offers collected from the CVPP 
agent can be used to improve visibility of both generation and demand to the DSO. It can also 
be used to assist with real-time or close to real-time network management for the TSO and to 
Aspects of the TVPP can also facilitate use of generation and flexible demand capacity in the distribution networks 
should active network management be desirable. But this is not an aggregation function; this just uses the information 
gathered for the TVPP profile to control individual units in relevant locations for distribution system management 
purposes. 
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provide scheduled ancillary services. To facilitate DG and demand access at the transmission 
level, the DNO aggregates the operating positions, parameters and cost data from every unit in 
the network, together with detailed network information (topology, constraint information etc). 
It then calculates the contribution of each participant in the local system to the flow at the GSP 
and forms the TVPP profile. The TVPP is characterised at its point of connection to the 
transmission system, using the same parameters as transmission connected plant (e.g. as 
outlined in Table 5-1). This TVPP grid aggregation profile and marginal cost calculation 
(reflecting the capabilities of the entire local network) can be evaluated by the TSO along with 
other bids and offers from transmission connected plants, in order to provide real time system 
balancing. 
Example of TVPP activity 
TVPP aggregation algorithms to describe and characterise the PQ characteristics of sections of 
distribution network have been developed in (Pudjianto et al., 2007). Although the author was 
not directly involved in the development of the TVPP model outlined below, presentation of the 
results from this work is given here to demonstrate the concept and outputs of the TVPP, and to 
illustrate how this characterisation can interface with the existing UK market frameworks. 
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Figure 5-4: UK Generic EHV voltage model (DG&SEE, 2007) mapping to a single VPP PQ characterisation 
The example is based on the UK Generic Distribution Network Model, developed by the 
CDG&SEE and is shown in the Figure 5-4 below. The topology and network characteristics of 
the selected model have a resemblance to rural network characteristics in the UK. The model 
consists of one 132/33 kV substation, 33 kV feeders, a number of 33/11 kV substations and 
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some loads connected at 33 kV and 11 kV. For this example, the 132 kV node is assumed to be 
a point of connection between transmission and distribution systems. Total load in the network 
was set to 12.4 MW and 2.5 MVAr. This represents an off peak load condition. Data for this 
model can be obtained from (DG&SEE, 2007). 
A number of DG were added into the model and placed into various locations in the network, as 
shown in the figure. The range of MW (active power) and MVAr (reactive power) output from 
the aggregated DG assuming they are connected at one busbar is between 19.75(min) and 
40.25(max) MW and between -22.78 and 22.78 MVAr respectively. The DG are scheduled to 
produce 30.5 MW output for this snap-shot condition. Thus, since output of DG is higher than 
the load, it is scheduled that this will export power to the grid. A constraint was introduced in 
one part of the system that would restrict the export from the area on the right hand part of the 
tie line to 10 MW (illustrated in the figure with a dashed line). 
Creating the TVPP equivalent of the system shown in Figure 5-4 is a challenging task. The 
approach used in (Pudjianto et al., 2007) was an optimal power flow (OPF) algorithm. The OPF 
can be used to find out the maximum capability of injecting or absorbing active and reactive 
power at the point of connection between transmission and distribution without violating 
operation constraints of the generators, loads and the network. At the same time, OPF can also 
be used to ascertain the changes in generation cost due to the requirement to increase or 
decrease generation output from TSO and/or DNO. 
(Active) power output (MW) 
Figure 5-5: PQ characteristic of the TVPP 
The PQ characteristics of the TVPP obtained from an OPF are shown in Figure 5-5. The figure 
illustrates the reactive power capability against increasing (active) power outputs from the VPP. 
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The characteristics are similar to the conventional generator PQ characteristics. In addition to 
the PQ characteristics, the OPF can also be used to find the characteristics of aggregate 
generation costs of the TVPP. This information can be presented in different ways depending on 
the type of electricity market. Under the spot market approach (as in the UK), bids and offers 
are needed from the TVPP for participation in the balancing mechanism. In this example, bids 
(the amount the TVPP will pay to decrease output) and offers (the amount the TVPP should get 
paid to increase output) for the TVPP were determined using the OPF. The results are 
illustrated in Figure 5-6. 
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Figure 5-6: Bid-offer ladder from the TVPP 
Increment 
This is the same as a bid-offer ladder that would be submitted by transmission connected 
generation to the TSO, providing cost data on the charge (or payment) per MW of deviation 
from the initial dispatch that is required. In this example the bids and offers submitted by the 
TVPP are based on the marginal cost of generation, in reality the costs submitted may deviate 
from the marginal costs (e.g. as a result of market power, to take advantage of a strategic 
position in the network). If the TSO does not require changes in the final position of the TVPP 
and the scheduled output (initial dispatch) is met, the TVPP will not get paid or pay. However, 
if the TVPP is asked to decrease or increase generation for system balancing, this will incur 
some payment or charges to the network operation according to the submitted bid offer ladder' '. 
The TVPP agent 
To provide a comprehensive TVPP profile, and to provide data to the TSO on net flows at the 
GSP, requires local network knowledge and network control capabilities; naturally, the DNO 
will be best placed to carry this role. However, with its monopoly position, and considering the 
What has been demonstrated in this example (and in more detail in the referenced paper) is a preliminary finding of 
the work to characterise the TVPP. Other characteristics such as ramp rate, frequency response, fault level and 
dynamic characteristics of TVPP also need to be determined. 
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implications of the DNO operating in the transmission based markets on behalf of DG and 
demand in the TVPP portfolio, careful consideration is required to assess the implications for 
competitiveness, and the opportunities for the DNO to exert undue market power or tilt the 
arrangements in favour of particular system users. Further research into the contractual and 
regulatory implications of this arrangement will certainly be required. 
In addition, with this TVPP data gathering capability, the DNO role could also evolve to include 
active management of the distribution network (i.e. not aggregating the data into a TVPP, but 
simply using the costs and output information for system users to control the distribution 
network in real time), analogous to a transmission system operator. 
5.3.3 Interaction between CVPP and TVPP 
O 
c 
o 
3 
.Q 
% 
b 
"O (1) 
c 
w 
c 
o 
u 
ENERGY MARKETS 
GENERATION DISTRIBUTION WHOLESALE 
MARKETS 
Supplier 
CVPP 
Demand 
Supplier 
CVPP 
Demand 
Supplier 
CVPP 
Demand 
od < 
< O lU 
K O O 
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
TRANSMISSION 
s HI h-H U 
« ^ 
>- D; CO < 
z S TSO 
g o 
w z 
<2 o 
s z 
w < 
2 -J < < 
Q; m 
t-
Individual operating parameters, contracts, or FPN/Bids & Offers 
^ Aggregated operating parameters, contracts, or FPN/Bids & Offers 
Figure 5-7: Commercial and Technical VPP activity In energy market and system management context 
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The interaction between the CVPP and TVPP is illustrated in Figure 5-7. The figure shows the 
respective roles of the Commercial and Technical VPPs and their interaction with each other 
and the wider system. The CVPP is operational in the energy markets, and responsible for 
passing information on distributed generation and demand through to the TVPP. The TVPP is 
engaged in system management, and facilitates management of local network constraints as well 
as aggregating generation and demand with local network parameters for presentation at 
transmission level. 
In the instance of an unconstrained distribution network (shown on the top row of the figure), 
the energy supplier optimises the position of its CVPP portfolio in the wholesale markets as 
usual. In addition the supplier can also optimise the position of its CVPP portfolio in the 
balancing market. Although it should be noted that to offer location specific transmission 
network balancing the CVPP must be separated into smaller portfolios representing Grid Supply 
Points on the transmission network. The TSO then evaluates the CVPP offering along with bids 
and offers from transmission connected generation. 
If the distribution network is subject to constraints (or requires active management) this is not 
possible, instead the CVPP optimises the position of its portfolio with reference only to the 
wholesale markets (see the bottom rows of the figure). It then passes the generation and demand 
output schedules and operating parameters on to the TVPP. This can then be used to offer 
transmission balancing services which the transmission system operator can evaluate along with 
bids and offers from transmission connected generation. 
From the transmission system management perspective, the interaction between transmission 
and distribution (on the right hand side of the figure) will be infiuenced by the level of control 
and active management in the distribution network. In a scenario of passive distribution network 
management of a strong network with ample headroom for generation and demand fluctuations, 
the contribution that DG and demand can make at transmission level (to system management) 
could be material. However, in the instance whereby the distribution network is actively 
managed to utilise all latent network capacity (and distribution network operation is at the 
margins of the capabilities of the network), the availability of VPP services at higher voltage 
levels will diminish. An actively managed distribution network will demand flexibility and 
participation from demand and generation connected in the lower voltage networks, with the 
knock on effect that there will be less capacity available for use at transmission level. The TVPP 
profile will report the characteristics and parameters of the network below the transmission 
boundary and make the transmission access requirements visible, but the resources in the VPP 
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portfolio will have little flexibility to change this profile in response to transmission demand for 
services. 
5.4 Representation and the role of the agent 
For DG to be represented at transmission level under the net model proposed in Chapter 4, a 
mechanism for aggregation and calculation of net position is required (i.e. the VPP). This 
characterisation and aggregation function should be controlled by a single agent to overcome 
the logistical problem presented by the TSO attempting to coordinate contracts between 
hundreds of thousand if distribution network users. The most obvious candidates for such a role 
within the current system would be the incumbent Energy Suppliers or DNOs^^. 
Although many Distributed Generators are registered under an Energy Supplier (usually via a 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for sale of their output) and this existing arrangement could 
be a useful platform for the purchasing of appropriate transmission access rights, there are 
difficulties with this approach posed by the competitive nature of the supply business. 
Distributed generators are free to choose which Supplier they will register under, and can 
(subject to the contractual arrangements of the PPA) change Supplier if they wish. Transmission 
access for DG is best allocated on the basis of a net position for all DG (and demand) in a 
specific geographic area to account for diversity in the output of a group. An Energy Supplier is 
unlikely to be able to capture the full benefits of diversity as many Suppliers may be 
representing DG in a single distribution network area. In addition, if a Supplier determines the 
net position of a group of DG within a particular GSP this is calculated on the basis of the net 
access requirements of the group; mobility of DG to other suppliers will affect this net position. 
As the allocation of access is based on a net position, it is complex to confer individual rights to 
generators. So, for generators transferring to another Supplier, there will be significant issues 
around ownership of transmission access rights and transferral of those rights. 
Under the Supplier agent model it is likely that this can only operate if all DG are given an 
individual access allowance (similar to an individual TEC - the gross model approach). This 
would negate any benefits of diversity, and forego the opportunity to include demand in the 
calculation of access requirements. 
There is also the role opportunity for a third party consolidator to take on this role; a good example of this would be 
the (only) existing UK Consolidator Smartest Energy Cwww.smartestenerQv.comV The opportunities for third part 
consolidators and similar are explored in the paper; RAMSAY, C. & LEACH, M. (2005) Can Virtual Utilities Revive the 
Consolidation Market? BIEE Academic Conference: European Energy - Synergies and Conflicts St. Johns College, 
Oxford University, British Institute of Energy Economics. 
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The DNO agent model overcomes these problems and facilitates the generation/demand net 
approach. Each DNO is responsible for calculation of the net position of all generation and 
demand in their jurisdiction, allowing maximisation of the benefits of diversity. Generators will 
interact directly with the DNO, who will make arrangements with the TSO on their behalf. 
Generators are free to change Supplier, but access arrangements for transmission will remain 
fixed with the DNO, and based on the location of DG in the network and its patterns of output 
in relation to other generators and demand. 
Importantly, the DNO is also the only agent that is capable of providing detailed information on 
the actual state of the physical flows at the transmission distribution boundary. The distribution 
network sits between DG and the TSO, network constraints and losses at this level will 
significantly modulate the characteristics of DG as seen by the TSO. Distribution network 
topology changes in real time, such that the DNO is the only party with sufficiently detailed 
network knowledge capable of determining how individual DG (and demand) activity will 
contribute to the net flows at the transmission-distribution boundary. 
Furthermore, in the future, distribution networks may be actively managed, and DG could be 
used to contribute to transmission system management. In this situation, the evaluation of 
feasible flows across the distribution-transmission requires detailed knowledge about the real 
time topology and availability of distribution networks. Again, the DNO is the only agent with 
detailed information suitable for elucidating actual net transmission capacity requirements at the 
transmission-distribution boundary. 
5.5 Conclusions on developing transmission network access for DG 
Under the Business as Usual future, large-scale penetration of DG and transmission connected 
renewables will displace a significant amount of the energy produced by conventional plant. 
However, as this new generation and the demand side are not provided with cost reflective 
access they cannot integrate into system operation, so conventional generation continues to be 
necessary for provision of system support services (e.g. load following, frequency and voltage 
regulation, reserves) and is required to maintain security and integrity of the system. This 
implies that a high penetration of non-conventional generation is unduly limited in the capacity 
of conventional plant it can displace. Given that DG is connected to the distribution networks, 
maintaining the traditional passive operation of these networks and the philosophy of control 
provided through conventional generation will necessitate increase in capacities of both 
transmission and distribution networks. By not integrating these new technologies, the existing 
framework is failing to recognise and reward the value that RE, DG and demand can offer and 
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favours conventional generation; a situation which will lead to inefficient operation and sub-
optimal system development. 
Alternatively, by developing access arrangements that result in the full integration of DG and 
demand side into network operation and development as proposed in the "Integrated Future", 
transmission connected renewables, DG and demand side will take the responsibility for 
delivery of system support services, alongside the remaining conventional generation. In this 
case the new generation will be able to displace not only energy produced by incumbent 
conventional generators but also their controllability, reducing the capacity of central generation 
as in shown in the figure. To achieve this, the operating practice of distribution networks will 
need to change from passive to active. This will necessitate a shift from the traditional control 
philosophy to a new control paradigm of coordinated centralised and distributed control. This 
future requires significant Information and Communication Technology (ICT) capabilities to 
facilitate interaction between thousands (potentially millions) of DG units and demand 
participants (as well as transmission connected generation) and the system operators, as well as 
new decision support tools to interpret and act upon the new information presented by 
integrated DG. This will bring an increase in complexity of system operation; however, with the 
correct development and innovation this new paradigm of shared centralised and distributed 
control should facilitate the development of more reliable, cost effective and sustainable 
systems that achieve maximum utilisation of all the resources connected within them. 
This transition towards full integration of distributed generation and demand could be achieved 
through the commercial and technical VPP activities. In future, system management will rely on 
support from a significantly larger pool of resources across wider network areas. As the 
transition towards greater integration of DG and demand is made, appropriate commercial and 
regulatory frameworks such as those presented in Chapter 4 will need to be developed to ensure 
that the transmission access arrangements allow a full representation of distributed energy 
resources at transmission level as well as participation in both market and system operation. 
Development of information, communication and control infrastructure to support this 
development will be a major challenge for realising this future. However, this necessary 
increase in complexity to deal with large numbers of small scale distributed resources will also 
facilitate realisation of the true value of distributed energy resources in the system. It will 
improve access to energy and system management markets for DG and demand, optimising the 
utilisation of system capacity and the efficiency of operation. 
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CHAPTER 6: Discussion, conclusions and further work 
6.1 Discussion 
6.1.1 Summary of findings 
In the introduction to this thesis the core role of the network in the modem power system was 
described; namely to securely and efficiently transport power from generators to demand 
customers. The introduction highlighted that the existence of a network facilitates competition 
in generation and supply by allowing customers to access the cheapest generation resources 
regardless of their location in the system. It emphasised that the concept of fair and cost 
reflective network access is fundamental to the development of efficient markets that create an 
environment in which all system users follow the same rules and are given an equal ability to 
compete. Achieving this optimal, cost reflective outcome that maintains and develops a 
competitive market in network access for a future low-carbon power system has been at the 
centre of this research. 
The work identified the main features of network access and the regulatory structures that 
support it, and explored the impact and value of the new renewable and distributed generation 
that is entering the system and highlighted the latent potential of the demand side. Using this 
review of the old and new systems a critical analysis of the interaction between the physical 
system and the evolution of regulation was undertaken. The analysis observed the present 
arrangements in the context of the future system and used this to identify gaps in the market and 
regulatory framework that failed to represent the physical manifestation and fundamental 
economics of the new system. Finally, in response to the gaps identified in the current 
arrangement, a new framework for the creation of enduring access arrangements suitable for the 
future low-carbon power system was discussed and developed, and a technical architecture for 
the integration of DG and demand was explored. 
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6.1.2 Changing roles in transmission networl< access 
Challenging the appropriateness of the current GBSQSS 
Markets and regulatory frameworks are developed to achieve optimal allocation of resources in 
particular systems; they are tailored to meet the needs of the incumbent technologies and 
operating philosophies. As the profile of technologies changes for example with the penetration 
of renewable and distributed generation, accordingly market and regulatory arrangements may 
also need to change to reflect the changing characteristics of the system. The current system has 
been developed in the context of large-scale transmission connected generation. The standards 
that guide the design and development of the system, the GBSQSS, are a proxy to deliver 
optimal development of this system. 
However, with the penetration of non-conventional generation technologies and a changing 
physical system, there is the growing concern that this proxy is no longer suitable for the system 
that we have (or are moving towards). Recognition of the issue of spatial and temporal 
differences in renewable and distributed generation versus conventional generation is the key to 
developing an optimal system that rewards generators appropriately, sends the correct signals 
regarding location and timing of output, and does not discriminate against any participant. For 
example, the role of reliability in network standards is likely to change. Previously a driving 
factor in network design, new generators entering the system are less able to make a 
contribution towards system reliability, to the extent that they will drive very little in terms of 
capacity requirements to ensure that their output can secure peak load. Instead the relevance of 
economic efficiency may come to the fore, with additional network capacity being required 
simply to allow demand to access low marginal cost power in locations remote from demand. 
Another key difference is in the drivers behind network design. Currently, the system is driven 
by peak network conditions and the presumption that all generators will be using the system at 
peak output during peak demand periods. This means that the network is designed to support 
simultaneous peak outputs from generation, and generators are charged accordingly. One of the 
key differences in conventional and non-conventional generation is that this approach no longer 
holds for systems with a high penetration of renewable and distributed generation. These 
technologies have lower load factors and different operating characteristics driven by factors 
other than load following such as the weather and heat demand. Their requirements for network 
capacity are such that when there is sufficient diversity in generation it is economically efficient 
to share network capacity between users. It is no longer efficient to size the network for 
simultaneous peak output because the probability of this occurring is usually too low to justify 
the investment expense. This element of sharing also drives a move towards the requirement for 
a valuation of short term access and choice in purchasing access over a variety of time frames. If 
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access is to be shared, then there will be occasional points of congestion when the access 
provided is insufficient. Short term access prices are required such that system users can 
optimise their positions under these circumstances. 
Given this importance of spatial and temporal issues, and the difference between conventional 
and non-conventional generation in this respect, it is apparent that the new system will have 
different requirements. The optimal balances between investment in capacity and management 
of operational costs will change and this needs to be reflected in new GBSQSS - or some other 
proxy. Standards are the starting point between the TSO and system users on how the network 
should develop, and as such any new standards should not ignore (or oversimplify) what users 
want. In a competitive market environment user choice is the key; if the current standards are to 
remain they must reflect this and evolve to represent the increasing number of options in system 
development and operation. 
Maintaining the separation of energy and access 
The current market arrangements under BETTA maintain a separation of energy and access, so 
that energy is sold in the wholesale markets without including the value of short term network 
access in the wholesale price. In the current system, a homogenous group of generation units 
uses the system in a similar and predictable fashion, constraint costs are low and the impact of 
location on the value of power is minimal. So this approach of separating energy and access has 
not been damaging; the future system could change this. 
New, renewable generation is entering the system in potentially very large amounts and because 
of the availability of the wind resource this new generation must be sited in an area of the 
network that is already experiencing congestion, and it will exacerbate the already apparent 
north-south flow of power. It is likely that the value of access in these already constrained areas 
could change quite significantly (with time of use of the system and weather conditions) and 
that this could massively impact the value of energy from particular locations. Failure to reflect 
these differences in value that change with both location and time, and to pass the costs on to 
the users of the system that impose them, could result in a non-competitive environment of sub-
optimal development and considerable cross-subsidy between users. It also prevents certain 
system users (primarily demand) from receiving cost reflective price signals that could stimulate 
efficient responses in terms of system operation and promoting optimal long term development 
in non-network solutions (i.e. demand response could mitigate network reinforcement). 
For the current conventional system, energy and access are entirely separate and dealt with 
under different philosophies. Electricity is sold on the basis of short run marginal cost derived in 
the power exchange (with subsequent forward and bilateral contracts being derived from this 
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short-run price). Transmission access is valued on the basis of long term investment costs 
derived from a philosophy essentially rooted in a central planning approach; there is no 
indication of the short term value of access. This approach tends to overvalue access for (low 
load factor) non-conventional generation through only allowing purchase of full, fixed, long 
term products. Moreover, it also undervalues access in the short term in areas where constraints 
have become a material problem and where demand response and user choice for short term 
transmission access requirement should be made transparent to allow optimal resolution of the 
constraint. 
Short term versus long term charging for network access 
In future systems, transmission network capacity should be shared amongst various generating 
technologies and hence the network will be occasionally constrained. Users competing for this 
shared capacity will need the opportunity to exercise a choice between exposure to the short 
term cost of access (during the periods of constrained operation) versus purchasing a known-
price firm-access product (that supports network reinforcement at marginal investment costs) 
and paying use of system charges. To allow this choice an ex-post short term market for access 
is required to reveal the value of transmission in real time. Within the present charging 
framework this cannot be achieved as this only considers long term transmission network access 
(or no access at all). 
It is important to emphasise that this lack of any short term valuation of access is inherently 
linked with the way the transmission network is priced, namely long term investment based 
pricing. This approach intends to charge users based on the long term investment cost they 
impose on the network and prevents the application of the principle of sharing of transmission 
capacity which results in inefficiencies. This approach is also not in line with the pricing of 
wholesale electricity, which is based on ex-post short term generation costs. The current market 
arrangements separate consideration of energy and access and send no locational signals to 
users of the system on their short term impact on the system. 
As a cost reflective short term value of access is unavailable, the present approach does not 
provide access choice to existing and new generators and prevents them from making efficient 
decisions regarding their use of the system in the short and long term. This results in inefficient 
operation of the generation system and inefficient future investment in transmission. 
In summary, the current TEC based approach to transmission investment and pricing, which 
focuses on charging for long term access rights, cannot facilitate cost effective (and timely) 
integration of substantial amounts of non-conventional generation into the UK transmission 
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system. Fundamental revision of the current TEC based arrangements to reflect the diversity of 
different generating technologies and to incorporate the short term valuation of transmission is 
essential if access arrangements for systems with significant contribution from wind energy are 
to be cost reflective and transparent. 
This thesis outlines a number of core criteria that should be considered in the development of 
enduring transmission arrangements: (i) cost reflectivity, (ii) availability of choice in access 
arrangements, (iii) reflection of differences in generation characteristics, (iv) representation of 
location and time of use, (v) sharing of access between generation technologies, (vi) continuity 
between short and long tenn value of transmission and (vii) flexibility to deal with increased 
uncertainty in future generation development. 
These are the factors required to create effective and efficient arrangements that conform to the 
fundamental economics of a system with a high penetration of wind generation and provide a 
level playing field for all system users including demand. Through the analysis in Chapter 5 it is 
clear that the only access solution capable of delivering all these aspects essential to enduring 
transmission access arrangements is the development of a market for short term access based on 
ex-post pricing of access overrun. 
It should be noted that the solutions proposed to the transmission access questions are, however, 
nothing new in terms of market development and experience. All these ideas for short term 
access and increasing the market approach to access are within the present understanding and 
literature on this subject and implemented with growing success in markets across the world. 
The proposed framework is a step change from the present orthodoxy in the UK, and its 
adoption would represent a fundamental shift in the incremental evolution approach to 
regulation that has been adopted to date. The arrangements for transmission network access 
need radical change to allow the optimal and efficient representation of low-carbon generation 
technologies - but this radical change is achievable using the solutions already at work in other 
markets. 
6.1.3 Changing roles in distribution networi< access 
Developing network access arrangements for generation 
The primary feature of the current network access arrangements for the distribution is that they 
have been developed to serve the requirements of demand alone. Because of the historical lack 
of generation connection in the distribution network and the passive unidirectional operation 
philosophy, the driving factor in development and design of the networks has been in securing 
demand and ensuring quality of supply to demand customers. 
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The first and most relevant challenge to distribution access arrangements therefore is the need to 
augment the emphasis of the current arrangements to include consideration of the requirements 
of demand in network operation and development. Without this consideration, as the penetration 
of generation grows in the network the current standards will be increasingly ill-equipped to 
direct the development of an optimal and cost effective network. 
As an example, the ER P2/6 does not address the security of power transfers originating from 
generation. Because of the historical demand-only focus, currently DNOs are not required to 
provide a particular level of security to generator customers. Although the adaptation of the 
P2/6 methodology to include the contribution of generation in securing demand was a 
significant step forward in recognising the contribution of DG to network conditions, this still 
maintains the demand focus, and makes no mention of the security requirements of DG. 
Although not a material problem in the current system, offshore wind generation highlights a 
potential problem with this approach. 
A number of the new offshore projects will be coming onshore with a point of connection in the 
distribution network rather than directly to the onshore transmission network. This means that 
distribution networks may be required to transfer energy between transmission operators. In 
such circumstances, the applicability of the offshore Security and Quality of Supply Standard 
could be undermined in the absence of requirements to securely transport the power flows from 
such generation across distribution networks. As the current arrangements may not provide 
sufficient certainty for the developments in offshore wind, it will be important to understand 
these requirements and to quantify the appropriate levels of network security to transport the 
output from generators. A possible development path would be to review the existing industry 
codes, practices and governance procedures followed by development of an SQSS for onshore 
distribution networks and a corresponding industry code. 
DUoS for generation 
A further example of this omission of generation from the distribution access arrangements is 
seen in the Distribution Use of System (DUoS) charging methodology. Although consultations 
have been underway for some years to amend the charging methodologies to reflect the impact 
and contribution of generation, the majority of methodologies in use are still based on the 
historical demand led approach. The impact of generation on distribution networks (in terms of 
costs and benefits) is site specific: it may vary in time, it will depend on the availability of the 
primary sources (important for some forms of renewable generation), as well as on size and 
operational regime of the plant, proximity of the load and layout and electrical characteristics of 
the local network. It is not, therefore, surprising that the relatively simplistic DRM tariff 
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structure, with network charges being averaged across customer groups and various parts of the 
network, cannot reflect the cost impact of distributed generation on distribution network. 
It should be noted that DRM tariffs also have no real ability to capture the impact of multi-
directional flows (caused by the presence of distributed generation) and cannot deal with the 
temporal and spatial variations of cost streams. One solution, already being discussed as part of 
the ongoing review of distribution network pricing, could be to move distribution access 
charging towards the transmission approach. Under this methodology, long term investment 
based pricing could incorporate and reflect the cost and impact of generation as well as demand 
on a locational (and time of use) basis. 
Integrating DG and recognising its value 
DG has an impact on the distribution across many areas. As described in section 1.3 (Figure 
1-1), in a system with DG, to create access arrangements with a cost reflective regime requires 
recognition of this and realisation of the value and impact of generation according to its location 
in the network (and use of the network). These points of value for DG include: 
• Provision of security of supply for demand: DG can provide a source of security of supply 
for loads in addition to the existing network. As is now reflected in the ER P2/6 standard, 
generation can be used to secure supply, providing an alternative non-network solution to a 
network problem. However, the majority of CI/CML come from faults in the 1 IkV network, 
so to be of assistance in securing load generation must be in place below the fault. This 
means that the majority of assistance from DG must be coming from those connected at low 
voltage - which is complex considering that these generators are smaller and less capable of 
delivering output with a confirmed level of certainty. 
• Reduction of import requirements: Local generation connected at distribution levels, 
particularly at the lower voltage levels and close to demand will have the effect of reducing 
flows from transmission to distribution because demand is met locally. This means that the 
HV distribution network and transmission carry less load, and in some instances this can 
have the effect of releasing capacity and deferring investment whilst allowing load growth in 
the lower voltage networks. Variable generators like PV and wind make no contribution to 
this effect, but technologies such as CHP, ^CHP and biomass plant can potentially make 
some contribution. 
• Reduction of Losses: DG that is correctly placed (very near loads) and that has output 
correlated with peak loading of the network can make a significant contribution to the 
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reduction of losses in both rural and urban areas. However, this effect will be dependent on 
penetration density of the technology. Once the density exceeds a certain level in some areas, 
the positive impact on losses can be reversed. Because of its strong correlation with domestic 
energy demands (and peak demand conditions), jiCHP has considerable potential for 
contributing in reduction of distribution network losses. 
However, the present framework doesn't incentivise DNOs to use DG in this way. DNO 
revenue recovery is on Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) rather than Operating Expenditure 
(OPEX) which DNOs are incentivised to reduce, A network solution to a network problem such 
as rectifying voltage rise or mitigating faults results in an addition to the asset base. Utilisation 
of DG or active management techniques to solve or mitigate the same problem does not result in 
capital expenditure, but falls under the OPEX remit. These issues and incentives for integration 
of DG are currently under review in the ongoing Distribution Price Review. 
In addition, the commercial frameworks are not in place to reward DG for these contributions to 
the network. However, the actual value of some of these services is currently very low. In the 
example of losses, although DNOs are incentivised to reduce losses, this is not an issue that has 
historically been a high priority for network operators (or something that has made a significant 
difference to their revenues). The same is true of activities such as contribution to security for 
demand and reduction in network capacity requirements. The distribution network is relatively 
strong (because of a history of passive operation that has ensured that the network is sufficiently 
strong to withstand a large amount of operational variation) so that value of these services is 
correspondingly low. 
A final consideration on the use of DG to provide network services is on the implication of 
using intermittent/variable generators to provide system support and solutions to network 
problems for DNOs. This is a fundamentally different approach from the current method of 
providing system services which relies on network solutions (i.e. installing more network 
capacity, switchgear etc.) to reduce faults, ensure adequate security for demand etc. Using DG, 
some of which are inherently stochastic in nature or have limited availability, will change the 
level of certainty with which services can be delivered. Although this can be accounted for to 
some extent (the ER P 2/6 calculations on the contribution that generation can make to system 
security do account for availability and unreliability) the risk level of using DG is materially 
different to the network alternative. 
By using DG for solving network problems DNOs will have to evaluate the risk and cost of 
non-delivery of service. This is not only a shift in the way that DNOs currently evaluate 
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solutions to network problems, but also creates potential incompatibility with the Quality of 
Supply incentive approach to regulation of the DNOs. The current approach to incentivising 
quality of service is about rewarding reductions in customer interruptions; using generators to 
secure demand may increase faults or will at least change the risk profile (and consideration of 
risk) associated with the likelihood of faults (and customer interruption). So in terms of 
balancing the costs of using DG versus network solutions this will also have to include a 
calculation of risk of non-delivery of services and the cost implications that this has for the 
quality of service/supply indicators. 
6.1.4 The growing role of the demand side in network access 
This research has identified changing drivers for demand side response and participation that 
would improve the competitiveness and cost reflectivity of the current arrangements. The key 
issue with the current arrangements is the lack of recognition that, at a physical system level, the 
impact of demand and generation on the network is equal and opposite; IMW of demand 
injected into the network is the same as IMW of demand curtailed (as long as there is no 
recovery of load during a subsequent period). The current transmission arrangements treat 
demand and generation differently, which introduces cross subsidy between parties, and curtails 
demand from taking an active role in the network (this is on the presumption that demand is 
inelastic). However, the changes that have been outlined in this thesis have demonstrated that 
the material difference between the current and future generation mix will stimulate different 
requirements in network access that could open up new areas of participation and more extreme 
price differentials that may stimulate demand to participate. But, this can only happen if demand 
and generation are treated equally and demand is exposed to its full impact on the network. 
New wind generation is being sited by location of the wind resource rather than by location of 
demand. The transmission system will need to accommodate this new generation and manage 
the constraints it causes optimally. One of the alternative market arrangements proposed in this 
promotes the development of a market for short term access to send locational price signals to 
users of the network on the true costs of access. Under this approach, energy prices could be 
dramatically influenced by the cost of access in certain locations at certain times of the day. The 
wholesale price for purchase of wind generation in Scotland (i.e. near generation) on windy 
days could drop very low under this regime, giving demand the clear signal that increasing load 
during this time could be beneficial to the network. Although there are some non-market based 
ramifications and likely concerns around a solution that promotes the increase of demand as a 
solution to integrating more wind generation, these are certainly options that deserve more 
consideration and evaluation. Recent studies in Denmark have explored the impact of 50% 
penetration of wind in the country, and have highlighted the issue of very low prices for wind 
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on windy days, coupled with the opportunities for demand response to take advantage of this -
potentially providing a new market for wind during peak periods that would give consumers a 
cheap source of energy, but would also provide a market for excess wind (EAEA, 2007). In 
Denmark where CHP is a significant source of heat and power, this option of engaging the 
demand side opens the opportunity for fuel switching. Instead of burning gas in CHP units to 
provide heat and power, excess wind is used on windy days to provide both, displacing the gas 
requirement. 
A more long term question is the issue of integration of demand and providing this network user 
with the same access rights and ability to offer services as generation. Although not explicitly 
explored, the solutions proposed for transmission access arrangements are broadly applicable to 
fair treatment of both generation at distribution level and demand. Although in both instances 
further discussion to overcome various practical integration challenges is needed, as explored in 
the work on the VPP in Chapter 5. 
6.2 Conclusions and recommendations 
6.2.1 Response to research questions 
The aim of the thesis was to uncover pathways for the evolution of the existing market and 
regulatory frameworks for network access to support the future low-carbon power system 
through maintaining a competitive environment and ensuring all generation and demand is 
provided with equal opportunity to participate and realise the full value of their contribution. 
From this aim a series of four research questions was identified to scope the research objectives 
and build a structure for the thesis. These initial research questions and the key conclusions on 
each are elaborated below, and following this are the overarching conclusions and 
recommendations from the thesis. 
RQ1. What are the main challenges facing development of the market and 
regulatory arrangements governing network access for the future low-
carbon power system? 
The key challenge in the market and regulatory arrangements for transmission access will be in 
their suitable development to respond to the changing generation mix and location. As 
penetration of renewable and distributed generation increases (and the role for demand 
participation emerges) the generation mix will increasingly be driven by different characteristics 
than those reflected in the current planning standards. Further challenge is derived from the fact 
that the majority of new transmission connected renewable generation requesting access must be 
located in Scotland, where there is already transmission congestion. Understanding how much 
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transmission capacity these new users require and how they will use the network is the key to 
ensuring timely connection of these low-carbon energy resources. 
In distribution, the challenge rests on the need to incorporate generation into the operation and 
investment philosophy of the network which currently centres only on meeting the requirements 
of demand. However, because the network is sufficiently strong to absorb the impact of 
increasing penetration of distributed generation, the access challenge in the distribution network 
is not a material issue in the short to medium term timeframe addressed in this thesis. 
RQ2. What is the impact (costs and benefits) of non-conventional generation on 
the transmission and distribution networks? 
At transmission level, the different impact of non-conventional generation such as wind is 
derived from the different operating characteristics and time of use of the network as compared 
to conventional generation. Intermittent and variable generation that is not load-following will 
tend to drive less capacity. Furthermore, diversity in generation technologies (conventional and 
non-conventional) will allow transmission capacity to be shared. In the short term, new 
renewable and distributed generation will contribute both positively and negatively to 
transmission constraints and power flows depending on location and time of use of the network. 
For the distribution network with its focus on the satisfaction of demand customers, the impact 
of generation is felt in areas that have the potential to impact quality and security of supply for 
customers. DG can have both positive (reduction of losses) and negative (increase in fault levels 
and voltage rise effects) impacts in the short term. In the long term DG can drive the need for 
additional capacity, but if located and operated optimally can also contribute to a reduction in 
the need for network reinforcement (through contribution to network security and reduction of 
power flows at higher voltage levels etc.). 
RQ3. Are the current network access arrangements still cost reflective when 
applied to systems with significant penetration of non-conventional 
generation? 
At transmission level the current access arrangements are not cost reflective when applied to 
non-conventional generation because they fail to recognise the impacts outlined previously. 
They do not recognise differences in generation technologies that drive different impact on the 
network according to location and time of use of the system; nor do they properly recognise 
distributed generation. Furthermore, they treat demand and generation un-equally. There is no 
calculation of the short run value of network access, which limits user choice. Although a 
suitable proxy for the current conventional system, the future system with a significant 
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penetration of renewable and distributed generation technologies is materially different. As 
such, the future system has different requirements from the network in terms of short term use 
and long term capacity needs. 
RQ4, What should the be the main features of enduring arrangements in access 
for future low-carbon power systems, and how should the technical 
architecture of the system support this framework? 
The analysis undertaken indicates that the main feature of a new transmission access regime to 
support the future low-carbon power system should be the calculation of the short run value of 
access. This would open up the possibility for sharing of access between users and would 
provide all users with the information they need to make optimal decisions on their use of the 
network over a range of timeframes, particularly important for non-conventional generation 
which is variable in nature and not load-following. 
A technical architecture to support this system (with reference to transmission access for 
distributed generation and demand) was discussed in the form of the VPP. There are no clear 
conclusions on how this architecture will progress, but it is clear that there are outstanding 
challenges still to be met in this area, such as development of ICT frameworks to support the 
coordination of thousands (even millions) of individual units in the distribution networks and to 
advance decision support methods to allow interpretation of signals from these units for System 
Operators to utilise. 
6.2.2 Final conclusions and recommendations 
Overall, three broad conclusions can be drawn from this work; each conclusion is stated and 
discussed in brief below. Following this is a critique of the research approach adopted and of the 
research aims, objectives and scope including detail on suggestions for further work in the area. 
Cl.The relevance of the network access question develops as the network 
becomes stressed; network access has limited value in a strong system with 
few constraints. 
The value of access and need for action on network access arrangements is inherently linked 
to the status of the network and the available headroom in the system. The access question 
is becoming a material concern in the transmission system because of the additional 
generation requesting connection in an already congested region. If the network access 
arrangements are fully cost reflective then the costs passed on to generation and demand in 
these congested areas should reflect the additional stress (or timely assistance) they offer to 
the network. Under stressed network conditions these charges could make a material impact 
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on the final price of energy. At this point it becomes relevant and useful for full attention to 
be paid to the access requirements and individual impact of all system users. 
Five years ago, in the distribution network, the main emphasis of regulatory review and 
development was on the challenge posed by generation entering the distribution networks 
and managing the 11 kV network issues. Removal of barriers to DG was a key focus and 
successive reforms succeeded in systematically removing some of the most restrictive 
issues. However, the revolution in decentralisation of power generation has yet to 
materialise, as identified in the recent Energy White Paper consultation paper for DG, 
capital cost remains the primary barrier for DG entry to the system. Although there should 
be opportunities for DG to add value to its proposition through recognition of the positive 
impact it can bring to the network (or the mitigating impact on costs that can be achieved 
through active management), the distribution system is not currently stressed. These 
positive impacts that reduce losses and mitigate capacity reinforcements are small credits 
against a large cost (and against the relatively cheap alternative of network reinforcement). 
Until the penetration of DG begins to challenge the integrity of the distribution network and 
the system begins to value short term access as stresses need to be resolved in real time, 
there is little value in the positive benefit that DG (or other enabling technologies) can bring 
to the distribution network. 
C2.Transmission network access regulation must move beyond incremental 
change and adaptation. A step-change in the regulatory and market 
arrangements for transmission access is required to keep pace with the 
physical changes in the power system. 
This research and analysis has raised an important question on whether an approach which 
promotes only incremental changes developing the market and regulatory frameworks for 
network access keep pace with physical changes underway in the system. The physical 
power system has evolved quickly over last five years - particularly in terms of what is 
material and relevant in the generation sector. The recent development in access (the 2007 
Energy Wliite Paper Review and its precursors) has reflected the change in emphasis, 
namely the diminishing immediate relevance of distribution access concerns in favour of 
resolving transmission access questions that will help to get new renewable generation 
capacity (that is already waiting) online now. Although the reflection of these changes in 
regulatory reform is apparent, this analysis has highlighted an underlying concern that 
physical system is progressing beyond the rate of evolution in regulation. The implications 
of this are that with only incremental changes in access there is the growing danger that 
regulatory and market reform is not keeping pace with the physical changes. This will 
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ultimately be reflected in a lack of cost reflectivity and a non-competitive environment for 
all users. 
The transmission network is built on the basis of deterministic standards, optimised to serve 
a system that will soon not exist. Standards can be adapted and improved to reflect these 
changes in the system, but they are part of a philosophy grounded in long term planning and 
charging that is fundamentally unsuitable for use in the new system. The analysis in this 
thesis suggests that in the case of transmission access, a more radical change is required 
beyond incremental improvement in the status quo. The gaps are so significant in terms of 
the growing importance of short term access to allow sharing of capacity and cost effective 
investment, that this thesis argues a radical rethink of the current transmission access 
arrangements (and philosophy) is required. A fundamentally different approach is needed, 
one which is grounded in the short term valuation of network access. This is a development 
that is wholly compatible with the overall policy remit to develop increasingly market based 
approaches to the operation and development of the sector with the aim of delivering a 
better deal for customers. 
C3. Delivery of an optimal network to support a low-carbon power system can be 
facilitated by a competitive market approach to network access. 
The competitive market approach can deliver optimal networks that recognise the 
contribution and impact of non-conventional (low-carbon) generation, but this approach 
needs to fully embrace the principles of market operation if all the requirements and 
characteristics of the future sustainable power system are to be incorporated into fair and 
optimal network access arrangements. 
The key aspects for recognition are that all users should be given equal access to the 
network and charged proportionally to their use of the network resource. This means equal 
treatment and recognition of all generation technologies and also equal treatment of demand 
and generation. Supplemental to this is the recognition of location on the network and on 
the time and pattern of use of the network resources. This is required to ensure that the 
differences in impact between technologies and across geographic locations are taken into 
account, and is of particular relevance for non-conventional generation that is not 
characterised by traditional patterns of output or use of the network. Finally, user choice in 
access should be facilitated. Implicit in all traditional commodity market operations is the 
notion of consumer choice in purchasing that derives from price information; short term 
spot prices dictate the value of a commodity. Using the short term market approach, 
participants can then choose to make a purchase in real time, or to hedge their positions and 
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purchase ahead of time in forward markets or through bilateral contracts. Network access 
requires this same level of transparency for user choice. Calculation of short term value of 
access and derivation of long term value is fundamental. It allows users to make an optimal 
response in determining their network requirements and guides optimal network operation 
and investment for long term development. 
6.3 Critique of the thesis and proposals for further work 
Network access issues in the UK are an ongoing challenge which is experiencing an increasing 
profile with the announcement of a major review of transmission network access in the 2007 
Energy White Paper (DTI, 2007 pg. 164). The research and analysis presented here frames the 
major issues surrounding the access debate in both distribution and transmission. Furthermore, 
the change in emphasis of the thesis to focus on the transmission network has strengthened this 
link with the current issues and ensured that the research aims and objectives remain valid and 
relevant. However, inevitably there are some limitations to the approach that was taken to 
explore these issues. These are presented in the following section along with a description of 
additional work to explore or alleviate these limitations. To conclude this chapter there is a final 
section on suggestions for further work to augment and take forward some of the main findings 
from the thesis. 
6.3.1 Limitations of the approach 
Whole system analysis limited to electricity 
The whole system analysis adopted as the overarching approach for the research was limited in 
its scope to include only consideration of the power system. It does not extend beyond 
consideration of electricity networks to consider interactions with the gas networks and other 
energy services/energy storage options such as heat. Clearly the electricity, gas and energy 
storage concepts are all inextricably linked, as has been touched upon in Chapter 4; 
opportunities for fuel switching could arise if electricity prices drop dramatically in highly 
constrained network areas. These complex interactions have not, however, been thoroughly 
explored in this work. 
This is particularly relevant in the context of distributed generation. The thesis examined only 
distributed electricity and did not explore the potential for a wider consideration of distributed 
energy. The implications of decentralisation of generation were largely bypassed because of the 
restrictive nature of the timescale chosen for this work, limiting the research brief to the short 
and medium term and exploration of the immediate issues for network access. However, there is 
potential for further exploration of the network access implications of various decentralised 
1 8 5 
Chapter 6: Discussion & Conclusions 
energy scenarios. As developed in (Greenpeace, 2005), there are some considerable efficiency 
gains to be sought from a decentralised future that combines and optimises heat and power 
provision to localised regions/small towns. Exploring these options for decentralised energy 
networks and their interaction with the transmission network could have significant implications 
for access requirements at higher voltage levels. 
None of this was explored in the thesis because of the restrictions in the time-horizon of the 
research. Further exploration of network access issues that incorporate all energy networks, 
could raise some interesting and relevant questions that would complement the work already 
carried out. 
Additional work in this area could include; 
• Extension of the whole system analysis to incorporate an "energy system" approach, 
including reference to gas, heat, and electricity networks. Network access requirements 
could incorporate consideration of efficiency gains through local heat networks and the 
evaluation of potential for fuel switching or storage in this context (i.e. using electricity to 
generate heat, for heating/cooling purposes). 
• Exploration of network access issues under alternative future scenarios for decentralised 
energy networks, e.g. a CHP dominated future, and extend to include theoretical concepts 
such as the "Energy Hubs " approach (Favre-Perrod et al, 2005, Geidl et al, 2007). 
• Although there are some localised examples of the integrated (gas-electricity-heat) energy 
system working in practice (HoL, 2005), there has yet to he a comprehensive assessment of 
the benefits of the local CHP based approach for the UK network operation and 
development. 
Whole system analysis grounded in network access 
The whole system approach was grounded in the analysis of network access, to the exclusion of 
considering the generation sector beyond the impact of non-conventional generation on the 
network. As such, the scope of the work didn't extend to include analysis of the impact of non-
conventional generation on the incumbent generation sector. For example exploration of how 
much conventional generation might be displaced (or retired) by the influx of new technologies 
was not discussed, nor was the role of generation in provision of ancillary services to assist in 
management and balancing of the system or the impact of introducing intermittent or variable 
generation sources in terms of causing imbalance in the system. All this work was out of the 
scope of the thesis; however, the approach taken misses the opportunity to draw further links in 
terms of network impact from the changing generation mix and the role of generation in 
offering ancillary services and providing system reliability. 
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Some of these issues are touched upon in Chapter 5, with the development of the Virtual Power 
Plant concept. The VPP provides the technical architecture for the full integration of distributed 
generation and demand into transmission (and distribution) system operation. By providing 
transmission network access for resources in the distribution network the VPP also makes these 
resources visible to the TSO and potentially available for use in offering ancillary services. 
However, the majority of the research considers only the high level drivers for short and long 
term network access requirements. 
Additional work could include: 
• Development of the scope to consider the implications of the full integration of renewable 
and distributed generation and demand on network access issues. 
• Further exploration and development of the VPP concept, e.g. requirements and design of 
the VPP portfolio of resources. Explore, what kind of controllability and services should 
VPP offer? What problems can be resolved by DER/VPP? How can DER portfolios be 
characterised as VPPs with respect to dynamic and steady state characteristics given the 
stochastic nature of DG output? What new Distribution Management System / Energy 
Management System applications are required to make use of VPP based services? 
• Development of a commercial and regulatory framework for the integration of ancillary 
service provision from non-conventional generation, or VPP portfolios. 
Development and impact of alternative scenarios for sustainable energy futures 
The thesis has not developed or explored scenarios for alternative sustainable power futures. 
The work was grounded in the short to medium term, and the scenario for future development of 
the network based only on the current visible trends in renewable and distributed generation. 
Although this was a necessary boundary to set a feasible scope for the thesis, it does mean that 
certain scenarios that could potentially have a significant impact on the proposed access 
arrangements have not been discussed. 
For example, the scenario chosen excluded consideration of new nuclear build in the medium 
term future. Nuclear could be a low carbon option for the sustainable system, and one that 
would have significant implications for the transmission access questions raised in this analysis. 
Not only would the nuclear option change the scale of these discussions (current reactor designs 
can be as large as 1.6GW), but depending on their location could potentially alter some of the 
fundamental characteristics seen in the present transmission network. The recent Energy White 
Paper explored the possibilities of connecting new nuclear capacity in the south, far nearer the 
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demand centre of the system. This could change the north-south transmission power flow, and 
would clearly have implications for access arrangements throughout the system. 
Alternative scenarios based on greater decentralisation of generation were also excluded. For 
example, scenarios in line with the proposal from the London Mayor to install 3GW of 
generation in the greater London area (PBPower, 2006, MoL, 2005), these decentralisation 
initiatives would site generation on the doorstep of the demand centres in the GB system. The 
outcomes and implications of a decentralised future located close to demand centres obviously 
focus attention on the distribution network access questions and again will challenge some of 
the assumptions and frameworks developed in this thesis. 
• Additional work could include exploration and development of new feasible scenarios based 
on larger and smaller scale low-carbon futures, and could highlight new questions for the 
access debate under these conditions. 
The low carbon agenda 
Rather than an explicit exploration (or promotion) of a low carbon agenda, the focus of the 
research was on finding the most economically efficient solution to network access problems 
and resolution of network access issues to create a level playing field for all network users 
within the confines of the competitive market environment. These issues are not incompatible, 
but the former requires further analysis and exploration for its inclusion in the access debate. 
The work presented here proposes a transmission access regime that will charge users of the 
network according to the costs that they impose. This has the implication that these price signals 
should encourage generation and demand to make optimal short and long term decisions on 
where to locate themselves on the network and when to access the network. However, the 
majority of large-scale renewable technologies are limited by the availability of primary energy 
resources as to where they can be sited. Wind resources in the UK are amongst the best in 
Europe, but they are positioned in the North of the land mass and beyond (on the Scottish 
Islands), a long way from the demand centres in the South-East. The proposed network access 
arrangements wouldn't necessarily discourage this development, but would price the network 
access required by renewables in Scotland according to the costs they impose on the network. 
The issue that this raises for the pricing of network access is encouraging the system to value 
the additional benefits that come from connection of renewable and low-carbon generation. The 
network is in place to ensure efficient and reliable transport of electricity from generator to 
consumer and to facilitate the competitive market allowing consumers to access cheaper 
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generation resources. For renewable generation in the North, the network also facilitates the 
connection of customers to remote low-carbon energy resources. 
Direct promotion of low-carbon generation technologies was not an explicit aim of this 
research. Indeed, the aim of the work was to create a level playing field to allow equal 
consideration of all technology options. The market approach challenges the notion that all 
renewable or low carbon generation is "good" by virtue of simply having a reduced emission 
profile. Any new generation technology connecting to the network can increase pressure in an 
already congested system. For example, in the case of DG in Scotland which reduces local 
demand. The market based approach to network pricing, which reflects the impact of users on 
the network, will charge wind generation and DG connecting in Scotland relatively more than 
generation connecting elsewhere. However, this is simply reflecting the current priorities of 
network operation and development. 
Markets can deliver a low-carbon power sector - but market design must reflect these priorities 
and commoditise externalities that can contribute to the alternative optimisation of the network 
that incorporates the low carbon agenda. Indeed, this is a key output from the recent Stern 
Review of Climate Change that called for urgent action on the continued development of carbon 
markets if the environmental impact of CO2 emitting activities was to be taken seriously. 
Further explicit consideration of the carbon properties of generation technologies in this market 
framework would require additional research to explore the monetisation of current non-price 
goods (such as carbon). This is a non-trivial exercise, but would allow equal consideration of 
the value of low/no carbon generation alongside the other traditional factors considered in the 
optimisation of network access. 
• Additional work in this area could include exploration of the impact of valuation of carbon 
on the long term development of the networks. 
6.3.2 Suggestions for development of key findings 
Building on the findings of the thesis, and notwithstanding the limitations of the approach 
explored in the previous section, there are also a number of avenues for further research that 
could continue to develop the themes of network access in a future sustainable power system. 
Three areas that would merit further work and discussion are outlined briefly below: 
Quantitative studies to support proposed transmission access arrangements 
The final chapters of this thesis proposed a new framework for enduring transmission access 
arrangements to support a system with high penetration of renewable and distributed generation. 
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The analysis included a qualitative evaluation of three options for development of access 
arrangements against a set of criteria/high level principles for optimality. To build on this initial 
qualitative assessment and advance the argument for or against any of these options the next 
stage in the analysis should be to undertake quantitative modelling of the findings on the GB 
system model and explore the sensitivities of any outcomes against key drivers. 
Further work and quantitative studies to support the new framework for enduring access 
arrangements could include: 
• Sensitivity studies on the constraint costs of adding wind in Scotland without reinforcement 
• Analysis of revenue streams and potential for market power etc. under alternative options 
for connection of new wind generation in Scotland and treatment of access (i. e. invest then 
connect, connect and manage and short term market for access). 
• Evaluation of the potential for demand side involvement in constrained networks to utilise 
low marginal cost (intermittent and renewable) generation at times of peak output (high 
constraint costs, and low value to traditional demand centres). Identification ofpotential for 
local demand increases (and or fuel switching) in response to very low prices. 
Exploration of infrastructure investment options 
The work carried out to date has not explored the various options for undertaking network 
investment, nor has it attempted to discuss the merits or otherwise of an (economically) 
optimally constrained network. Full realisation of the competitive market approach to network 
operation and development would indicate the approach of merchant transmission investment, 
however there are concerns that this approach is not sufficient to ensure that optimal network 
access is provided. The alternative is the current approach of the regulated monopoly requiring 
approval of all investment plans through the regulator. 
The quote from (Helm, 2003) below illustrates some of the challenges open for debate in the 
long term network access field: 
" [networks] are the motorways to the market, and over provision is greatly 
preferable to under provision. The optimal level of interconnection will not be 
developed by private vertically integrated oligopolists and their design and 
development have system-wide characteristics. An element of planning and a 
(heavy) dose of regulation is essential. It was a lucky coincidence that the market 
approach of the 1980s and 1990s was applied in the context of mature and well-
invested electricity and gas networks. The assets could be sweated without 
worrying too much about the cost of capital or supply security. That luxury is no 
longer available, and hence the regulatory priority, and the appropriate 
instruments, need to shift towards investment " (Helm, 2003 pg. 422-423) 
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There is a discussion to be developed on whether, as Helm speculates, over provision of 
networks is preferable for the good of the whole system, or if merchant transmission investment 
can in fact deliver optimal development and long term stability (Hogan, 1999). Or, indeed, 
whether merchant transmission investment can be effective against a backdrop of regulated 
monopoly network owner operators and semi-unbundled utilities (e.g. Brennan, 2006, Lyon, 
2007). The current UK climate in which private investment drives most new infrastructure 
projects also colours the possibilities for future approaches to network investment. Projects with 
long term pay-back and multiple beneficiaries are not typically funded under the private 
investment model. 
Further work in this area should scope the main issues in transmission investment relevant to 
the UK, this could include: 
• Exploration of the theoretical issues associated with approaches to transmission 
investment, access and pricing, including: separation of energy from access, merchant 
versus monopoly investment, financial versus physical transmission rights and evergreen 
property rights for transmission access. 
• Review of the experiences of merchant transmission investment from markets elsewhere in 
the world. 
Enduring arrangements for distribution network access 
In-depth development and analysis of future access arrangements for the distribution network 
was not a part of this research because it was out of the scope of the study. However, several 
areas of interest for further exploration were highlighted in the initial exploration of the 
distribution network access issues. In the short term there may be some merit in exploring the 
implications of recent changes to the distribution access arrangements that have come about 
through the revision of the Engineering Recommendation P 2/6, the distribution network 
security standard. P 2/6 makes allowance for the contribution that DG can make to securing 
load in the distribution network. As yet there have been no commercial arrangements to reward 
DG for this contribution, and the standard remains focused on security of supply for demand 
this raises several areas for further investigation, outlined in brief here: 
• Analysis of DG provision of non-network services in the context of risk of non-delivery of 
service against impact on quality of supply indicators (CIs and CMLs). 
• Developing the business case and commercial arrangements for DG and demand side 
contribution to distribution network operation and security. 
• Exploring the implications of generation driven security standards in the distribution 
network as well as demand driven. This is particularly pertinent with reference to the 
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offshore transmission network bring power from offshore wind units into the onshore 
network at the distribution level. At transmission level generators are compensated if they 
cannot access the network, at distribution level there has been no provision made for 
generation. 
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